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Family Secrets and Relational Privacy:
Protecting Not-So-Personal, Sensitive
Information from Public Disclosure
J. LYN ENTRIKIN*
This Article seeks to map contemporary relational privacy issues in the context of the evolving “right of privacy”
in the United States. Generally, the Article explains why the
so-called “personal” right of informational privacy, whatever its legal foundations, cannot be realistically confined to
an individual right given the dramatic scientific and technological developments in the twenty-first century. In particular, the Article proposes that both state and federal law must
grapple with the inherently relational nature of privacy interests with respect to DNA profiles, which inherently implicate the privacy interests of one’s biological relatives,
whether known or unknown.
Part I summarizes the historical development of the right
of privacy in the United States, as well as its relational aspects that predate recognition of the “personal” right of privacy. Part II explores the early recognition of the relational
aspects of tortious invasion of privacy. Part III addresses the
nature and scope of “personal privacy” interests expressly
recognized in federal statutes regulating freedom of information and privacy with respect to public records. Part IV
explains the constitutional foundations of the American right
of privacy, including the conceptual relationship between
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informational privacy and autonomous decision-making privacy. Part V discusses relational privacy interests in the context of DNA databanks, whether used for criminal investigations or genealogical research. The Article concludes by
conceptualizing the ever-expanding American right of privacy to encompass at least close family members whose privacy may be implicated when sensitive information about a
relative is at risk of public disclosure without family members’ knowledge or consent.

A rapidly developing technology is furnishing ever
more effective means of invading privacy, and the situation has been viewed with increasing alarm.1
[T]he most beautiful quality of law is that it is never
finished.2
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................784
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Harry D. Krause, The Right to Privacy in Germany – Pointers for American
Legislation?, 1965 DUKE L.J. 481, 481; see, e.g., David H. Kaye, The Genealogy
Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of “Familial Searching”, 50 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 109, 163 (2013) (conceding that “a database of expanded profiles of convicted offenders used for full-match and near-miss [criminal investigation] trawls
will cause anguish to family members when it links close relatives to crimes, and
if and when it exposes genetic relationships (or their absence) . . . kept as family
secrets”); Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases,
109 MICH. L. REV. 291, 315–16 (2010) (discussing sensitive issues of family privacy surrounding the use of DNA databases for criminal investigations); see also
Monica Rodriguez, You Discovered Your Genetic History. Is it Worth the Privacy
Risk?, FORTUNE (Sept. 10, 2018, 4:51 PM), https://fortune.com/2018/09/10/genetic-history-test-privacy-risk/.
2
Leon Green, Basic Concepts: Persons, Property, Relations, 24 A.B.A. J.
65, 69 (1938) [hereinafter Green, Basic Concepts].
1
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INTRODUCTION
Members of a traditional family share a unique configuration of
sub-cellular biological material known as deoxyribonucleic acid—
more commonly known as DNA—that provides modern technology
a window into the most personal of family relationships and secrets.3
For decades, law enforcement organizations have developed and
maintained DNA databanks using samples taken from crime scenes,
convicted felons, and even arrestees.4 More recently, commercial
genealogy companies have heavily promoted the voluntary collection of saliva samples to locate close and distant relatives with statistically similar DNA profiles through a process called DNA
matching.5 Law enforcement investigations have recently solved a
See Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Fact Sheet, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES.
INST., https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DeoxyribonucleicAcid-Fact-Sheet (last updated Nov. 13, 2019).
4
“The advent of DNA technology is one of the most significant scientific
advancements of our era. The full potential for use of genetic markers in medicine
and science is still being explored, but the utility of DNA identification in the
criminal justice system is already undisputed.” Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 436,
442, 461 (2013) (5-4 decision) (holding that routinely taking DNA cheek swabs
from felony arrestees at booking and uploading results to state law enforcement
DNA databases to assist in investigating cold cases do not qualify as an unreasonable search for Fourth Amendment purposes because “the Court must give great
weight both to the significant government interest at stake in the identification of
arrestees and to the unmatched potential of DNA identification to serve that interest.”).
DNA was first used for law enforcement purposes in 1986 to prosecute a
criminal case in England. Id. at 442 (citing JOHN M. BUTLER, FUNDAMENTALS OF
FORENSIC DNA TYPING 5 (2009)). In 2008, a routine DNA swab taken from a
young man during a driving incident identified the driver as a close match with a
DNA sample collected at the 1983 crime scene of a rape and murder. James
Sturcke, Man Jailed for Life over 1983 Murder of Colette Aram, GUARDIAN (Jan.
25, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jan/25/paul-hutchinson-jailedcolette-aram. The arrest led investigators to identify the young man’s father as the
perpetrator of the crime twenty-five years earlier. Id. The murderer pleaded guilty
in 2009 but died in prison eight months later from a self-inflicted drug overdose.
Colette Aram Murderer Paul Hutchinson Died from Overdose, BBC NEWS (Oct.
25, 2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-nottinghamshire-15452142.
5
See, e.g., How It Works: It’s Just Saliva. No Blood. No Needles., 23ANDME,
https://www.23andme.com/howitworks/?vip=true (last visited March 10, 2020);
see also Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 877 (2015)
[hereinafter Ram, DNA by the Entirety] (“DNA’s shared nature complicates the
3
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number of “cold cases” using this type of “familial searching” in
genealogy databases to locate relatives with shared DNA profiles6
and by contacting those individuals to ask whether they have any
relatives who might match the DNA collected from crime scenes.7
usual individualistic rules that have characterized the law governing DNA.”); Natalie Ram, The U.S. May Soon Have a De Facto National DNA Database, SLATE
(Mar. 19, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/03/national-dnadatabase-law-enforcement-genetic-genealogy.html [hereinafter Ram, U.S. DNA
Database] (“Since April 2018, law enforcement investigations stemming from
DNA searches in consumer genetics databases have led to nearly three dozen arrests. In every case, those ultimately arrested . . . were identified through partial
matches between crime scene DNA samples and the genetic profiles of oftendistant relatives shared on consumer [genealogy] platforms . . . .”).
6
Familial Searching: What Is Familial Searching?, NAT’L INST. JUST.,
https://projects.nfstc.org/fse/13/13-0.html (last visited March 13, 2020).
Familial searching is a process by which a DNA profile of interest in a criminal case is searched against the database. If there
are no direct matches, it is then searched again in an attempt to
find DNA profiles that are similar to the profile of interest and
could belong to a close relative of the person who left the DNA
at the crime scene. There are two parts to the process. First, the
software ranks candidate offender relatives in order of likelihood that they are closely related to the person who left the
DNA. There will always be an appreciable number of candidates on this list. Next, all of the offender candidates’ samples
are subjected to additional DNA typing, using existing Y-chromosome testing. This testing can strongly establish the existence of a close familial relationship (typically father-son or
brother-brother) between the person who left the evidence and
the offender in the database.
Id.
7
E.g., Hayley Compton & Caroline Lowbridge, How Familial DNA
Trapped a Murderer for the First Time, BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-nottinghamshire-45561514 (describing
an early use of “familial DNA searching” to locate close relatives of a rapist and
murderer in England and reporting that the technique was first used in 2002 by a
team led by Frances Bates to solve a manslaughter case); Camila Domonoske,
Suspect in Decade-Old Serial Rapes Arrested, with Help of Genealogy Database,
NPR (Aug. 23, 2018, 11:54 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/23/641208167/
suspect-in-decade-old-serial-rapes-arrested-with-help-of-to-genealogy-database
(explaining how law enforcement solved the cold case of the “Ramsey Street Rapist” in Fayetteville, North Carolina); Laurel Wamsley, In Hunt for Golden State
Killer, Investigators Uploaded His DNA to Genealogy Site, NPR (Apr. 27, 2018,
7:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/27/606624218/in-
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What legal rights, if any, does a person have after voluntarily
contributing DNA to a commercial or noncommercial database?
Can the contributor prevent law enforcement from using DNA collected after an arrest if the arrestee is later exonerated?8 Does a
hunt-for-golden-state-killer-investigators-uploaded-his-dna-to-genealogy-site
(describing how investigators identified the “Golden State Killer” in California
using familial DNA searching on GEDmatch, a website inviting voluntary contributions of DNA samples). The Terms of Service and Privacy Policy for GEDmatch, now owned and operated by Verogen, Inc., display the following statement:
While the results presented on this Site are intended solely
for genealogical research, we are unable to guarantee that users
will not find other uses, including both current and new genealogical and non-genealogical uses. For example, some of these
possible uses of Raw Data, personal information, and/or Genealogy Data by any registered user of GEDmatch include but are
not limited to . . . [f]amilial searching by third parties such as
law enforcement agencies to identify the perpetrator of a crime,
or to identify remains.
You understand that future genealogical and non-genealogical uses may be developed, including uses that GEDmatch cannot predict or foresee. If you find any of these current or future
uses unacceptable, do not provide Raw Data to GEDmatch, and
remove any of your Raw Data already provided to this Site.
GEDmatch.com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH,
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last updated Dec. 9, 2019) (emphasis
added). Verogen, Inc. acquired the GEDmatch website on December 9, 2019. See
Press Release, Verogen, Inc., Gedmatch Partners with Genomics Firm (Dec. 9,
2019), https://verogen.com/gedmatch-partners-with-genomics-firm/; see also
Nila Bala, We’re Entering a New Phase in Law Enforcement’s Use of Consumer
Genetic Data, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/12/gedmatch-verogen-genetic-genealogy-law-enforcement.html
(“With no legal regulations providing clarity on how and when genetic genealogy
should be used to fight crime, we have left private entities in charge of the decision-making. And with Verogen taking over GEDmatch, we have new reasons to
be concerned.”); Jennifer Lynch, Genetic Genealogy Company GEDmatch Acquired by Company with Ties to FBI & Law Enforcement—Why You Should Be
Worried, EFF (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/12/geneticgenealogy-company-gedmatch-acquired-company-ties-fbi-law-enforcementwhy.
8
Cf. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 18–19
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is one thing to disclose the identities of targets who were
eventually convicted in public proceedings; but the privacy calculus becomes increasingly more significant if disclosure extends to those who were acquitted, or
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contributor, for example, have any legal right to prevent the use of
that information by law enforcement officials for genetic genealogy
testing to identify close or distant relatives who may be suspected of
perpetrating crimes?9 What about insurance companies, which
might be interested in accessing commercial DNA databases to
identify genetic markers that represent a heightened inherited risk
for certain diseases, such as breast cancer and alcohol or drug addiction?10
This Article seeks to map these issues in the context of the “right
of privacy” as it has developed in the United States. In particular, I
propose that to address the privacy issues surrounding the use of
DNA, the law should recognize the inherently relational nature of
privacy interests with respect to DNA profiles.11 More generally, the
Article explains why the so-called “personal” right of informational
privacy, whatever its legal foundations, cannot be realistically confined to the individual any longer. In fact, a handful of cases decided
over the last two decades reflect a growing judicial awareness that
privacy rights cannot be so narrowly cabined, especially given the
dramatic scientific and technological developments in the twentyfirst century’s global community.
Part I of this Article summarizes the historical development of
the right of privacy in the United States, as well as its relational aspects that predate recognition of the “personal” right of privacy beginning in the early twentieth century. Part II explores the early
recognition of the relational aspects of tortious invasion of privacy
to those whose activities were never the focus of public attention, such as uncharged investigative subjects, witnesses, or bystanders.”).
9
See Domonoske, supra note 7 (referring to “genetic genealogy testing” as
the process of “look[ing] for partial matches in DNA [that has] been uploaded to
public genealogy sites by people looking to find relatives”); Rodriguez, supra
note 1 (reporting on the results of one person’s efforts to track down her
estranged father using genealogy databases).
10
See Michelle Andrews, Genetic Tests Can Hurt Your Chances of Getting
Some Types of Insurance, NPR (Aug. 7, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/08/07/636026264/genetic-testscan-hurt-your-chances-of-getting-some-types-of-insurance; Fergus Walsh, DNA
Test Reveals 80 Markers for Inherited Cancer Risk, BBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2013),
https://www.bbc.com/news/health-21945812.
11
See Ram, DNA by the Entirety, supra note 5, at 898–906 (explaining scientific reasons why DNA is “immutably and involuntarily” shared among biological relatives).
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as the cause of action developed beginning in the early years of the
twentieth century. Part III addresses the nature and scope of “personal privacy” interests expressly recognized in federal freedom of
information and privacy statutes. Part IV explains the constitutional
foundations of the American right of privacy, including the loose
(and somewhat overlapping) relationship between the two primary
aspects of privacy interests: informational privacy and decisional
privacy. Part IV also evaluates and critiques recent cases in the
Ninth Circuit holding that relatives have a privacy right, grounded
in substantive due process, to limit dissemination of sensitive information that relates to the death of a loved one.12 Part V discusses
relational privacy interests in the context of DNA databanks,
whether used for criminal investigations or genealogical research.
The Article concludes by summarizing the ever-expanding view of
the American right of privacy to encompass at least close family
members whose privacy may be implicated when sensitive information about a relative is at risk of public disclosure or dissemination without knowledge or consent of family members.13
12

E.g., Marsh v. Cty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1157–60 (9th Cir. 2012)
(holding that while surviving mother had a substantive due process right to relational privacy supporting her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against county prosecutor
for disclosing to the press an autopsy photo of her deceased toddler son, qualified
immunity vindicated defendants because the constitutional right was not clearly
established at the time of disclosure).
13
While some nations have expressly defined “sensitive information” in privacy statutes or regulations, U.S. law does not provide a general definition for that
term. See, e.g., Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) pt II div 1 s 6 (Austl.) (defining “sensitive
information” broadly to include genetic and biometric information); Data Protection Act 2018, c. 12, § 3 (Eng.) (defining terms consistent with the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation); cf. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c F.31 (Can.) (defining “personal information”); Council Regulation 2016/679, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter GDPR] (discussing “personal data”).
United States military law relating to government contracts narrowly defines
“sensitive information” to mean “confidential commercial, financial, or proprietary information, technical data, or other privileged information.”
10 U.S.C. § 129d(b)(2) (2018); see also 10 U.S.C. § 2367(g) (defining “sensitive
information”); 38 U.S.C. § 5727(19) (2018) (defining “sensitive personal
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AMERICAN RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND RELATED “QUASIPROPERTY” INTERESTS
With few exceptions, civil liability for invasion of privacy in the
United States has traditionally focused on the interests of the individual.14 In 1890, Samuel Warren and future Supreme Court justice
Louis Brandeis urged courts to openly recognize an individual’s
“right to be let alone”15 in what would become one of the most
I.

information” for purposes of veterans’ benefits); cf. Perkey v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 721 P.2d 50, 61 (Cal. 1986) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (describing “personal
and sensitive” information).
Individuals are constantly faced with requests for personal and
sensitive information from a wide variety of government agencies and private organizations. In many cases, this information
is essential to the provision of needed services . . . . The collection and storage of fragmentary bits of information and their use
for narrowly specified purposes do not necessarily pose a serious threat to individual privacy, provided there are adequate
safeguards against misuse and unwarranted disclosure.
Id.
The federal Freedom of Information Act does not define “sensitive information” but does define “record” to mean “any item, collection, or grouping of
information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but
not limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal
or employment history and that contains his name, or the identifying number,
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger
or voice print or a photograph . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (2018) (emphasis
added).
14
See, e.g., James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information
Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003) (“[I]nformation privacy legislation in the
United States has placed heavy reliance on individuals policing their own data
records and protecting their own information from unintended use.”); Neil M.
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 127 (2007) (“American privacy law has centered
around the individual’s inviolate personality . . . .”); cf. Tiffany R. Jones & Larry
Peterman, Whither the Family and Family Privacy?, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 193,
201 (1999) (making the case that “recent thinking, especially as it is reflected in
court decisions, diminishes [the historical focus of American thought on] family
distinction and privacy, preferring instead individualized conceptions of privacy”).
15
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 197 (1890) (considering whether existing law afforded “a principle
which can properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it
does, what the nature and extent of such protection is”) (emphasis added).
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influential American law review articles of all time.16 They inventoried early cases that tentatively marked the boundaries of a personal right to control dissemination of private information and images.17
Beginning soon after the turn of the twentieth century, states one
by one started recognizing a private tort action to vindicate intentional invasions of personal privacy.18 Some states enacted statutes.19 Most addressed the issue by judicial declaration.20 The personal right of privacy began as a matter of state law and developed

16
See, e.g., SAMANTHA BARBAS, NEWSWORTHY: THE SUPREME COURT
BATTLE OVER PRIVACY AND PRESS FREEDOM 64 (2017) (referring to the Warren
and Brandeis article as a “legal landmark”); Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of
the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 1, 3 (1979) (crediting Warren and
Brandeis with having invented “a categorical description of the right to privacy”).
17
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 207–11.
18
See Kyle Sammin, Honor and Dignity: The Common Law of Privacy,
North and South, 1890-1967, 23 J. S. LEGAL HIST. 93, 97–107 (2015).
19
See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (Consol. 1909) (originally enacted 1903).
20
See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 91–92 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931);
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 68 (Ga. 1905); Kunz v. Allen,
172 P. 532, 532–33 (Kan. 1918). Professor Thomas Cooley has been credited with
coining the term “the right to be let alone.” E.g., Glancy, supra note 16, at 3 n.13;
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 195 n.4. However, Cooley used the term in
a very different sense analogous to individual liberty. Among several classifications of rights, he referred to the right of “personal immunity” as “the right to be
let alone.” THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE
WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (Callaghan & Co. 1879).
That right, he explained, was a corollary of one’s duty to refrain from injuring (or
attempting to injure) anyone else. Id.; cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2599–602 (2015) (grounding same-sex couples’ fundamental constitutional right
to marry in part on the “individual autonomy” protection of the Due Process
Clause, while explaining that “decisions concerning marriage are among the most
intimate that an individual can make” and referring to the constitutional right “to
enjoy intimate association,” to family relationships and autonomy as “a central
part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause,” and to “the right of samesex couples to marry [as] part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment”) (citations omitted); ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST
WE HIDE? 9–11 (2011) (arguing that a nation that prizes personal liberty must
impose mandatory privacy protections, whether or not the general citizenry desires them).
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incrementally in jumps and starts.21 And the nature and scope of privacy rights varied substantially from one state to the next, although
invasion of privacy has always been categorized as an intentional
tort.22 By 1957, one jurist described the still-developing right of privacy as “a haystack in a hurricane,”23 calling to mind the familiar
English idiom “tempest in a teapot.”24
A.
Disposition of Human Remains
With respect to privacy issues surrounding the death of a loved
one, courts in the nineteenth-century United States began acknowledging the special interests and emotional vulnerability of a decedent’s next of kin.25 This trend reflected a significant departure from

One author writing in the early 1930s declined to speculate “what the scope
of the right to privacy should be, or to discuss the various necessary limitations
involved in the recognition of a right of such a vague nature as freedom from the
publication of one’s features, doings or personal history.” S. G. P., Torts: The
Right to Privacy and the Pursuit of Happiness, 20 CALIF. L. REV. 100, 100 (1931).
“The right even in the jurisdictions where it has been recognized is a nebulous
one[,] and there has been but a slight development of the law concerning it.” Id.
22
See, e.g., Marich v. MGM/UA Telecomms., Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 60, 63
(Ct. App. 2003) (“The elements of both the statutory invasion of privacy and common law invasion of privacy include intentional conduct.”).
23
Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956).
The court observed that the still-young right of privacy already had a broad and
multi-faceted reach, having “read of the right of privacy, of invasion of property
rights, of breach of contract, of equitable servitude, of unfair competition; and
. . . even suggestions of unjust enrichment.” Id. at 485; see id. at 485 n.7 (referencing various examples); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (acknowledging that the Court’s “‘right of privacy’ cases . . . defy[] categorical description”).
24
See The Scotch Poets, Hogg and Campbell—Hynde and Theodric, 17
BLACKWOOD’S EDINBURGH MAG. 109, 112 (1825) (critiquing a Campbell poem
describing “strife in the elements” by describing the passage as “[a] tempest in a
teapot!”).
25
See, e.g., Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, 285 (1868). Responding to a
claim for wrongfully disinterring the corpse of plaintiff’s decedent and reburying
it in a “charity lot,” the Massachusetts court stated that “the natural injury to the
feelings of the plaintiff may be taken into consideration . . . . We know of no rule
of law which requires the mental suffering of the plaintiff, or the misconduct of
the defendant, to be disregarded.” Id.; see also Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point
Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227 (1872).
21
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tradition. English common law had recognized no property interest
on behalf of surviving family members in a human corpse, reasoning
that the disposition of human remains was primarily an ecclesiastical matter.26 English criminal law provided the exclusive remedy for

That there is no right or property in a dead body, using the word
in its ordinary sense, may well be admitted. Yet the burial of the
dead is a subject which interests the feelings of mankind to a
much greater degree than many matters of actual property.
There is a duty imposed by the universal feelings of mankind to
be discharged by some one towards the dead; a duty, and we
may also say a right, to protect from violation; and a duty on the
part of others to abstain from violation; it may therefore be considered as a sort of quasi property, and it would be discreditable
to any system of law not to provide a remedy in such a case.
Pierce, 10 R.I. at 237–38.
26
See Pierce, 10 R.I. at 237 n.1; Meagher, 99 Mass. at 284 (holding that an
heir has no property interest in his ancestors’ bodies or ashes); Larson v. Chase,
50 N.W. 238, 239 (Minn. 1891) (“The doctrine that a corpse is not property seems
to have had its origin in the dictum of Lord Coke, . . . where, in asserting the authority of the church, he says: ‘It is to be observed that in every sepulchre that
hath a monument two things are to be considered, viz., the monument, and the
sepulture or burial of the dead. The burial of the cadaver that is caro data vermibus
[flesh given to worms] is nullius in bonis, and belongs to ecclesiastical cognizance; but as to the monument action is given, as hath been said, at the common
law, for the defacing thereof.’”); see also Erin Colleran, My Body, His Property?:
Prescribing a Framework to Determine Ownership Interests in Directly Donated
Human Organs, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1203, 1205–07 (2007); J. F. H., Note, The Nature of Rights in a Dead Body, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 404, 404 (1926) (stating that
there were no property rights in a corpse at common law); Francis L. Wellman,
Note, Law of Burial. – Quasi Property in Corpse. – Right to Dispose of Remains
Before Burial, and After Burial, 14 AM. L. REV. 57, 59 (1880) (“By the common
law though the heir has a property [interest] in the monuments and escutcheons
of his ancestors, yet he has none in their bodies or ashes; nor can he bring any
civil action against such as indecently, at least, if not impiously, violate and disturb their remains when dead and buried.”). But cf. Snyder v. Snyder, 60 How. Pr.
368, 369–70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880) (“It is asserted in many cases, following the
Roman law, that the exclusive right of burial and the right to select the place of
burial rests, in the absence of any testamentary direction on the part of the deceased, in the next of kin.”).
The primary reason for the English courts’ refusal to recognize a property
right in a human corpse was that the duty to ensure a dignified disposition of the
body fell on the church; burials were considered matters of ecclesiastical cognizance. See R. S. Guernsey, The Ownership of Corpse Before Burial, 10 CENT. L.J.
303, 303–04 (1880).
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the removal of human remains from a burial site.27 And early common law courts in both England and America, skeptical of the potential for fraudulent claims, were not inclined to award recovery for
mental anguish alone.28
In early America, however, equity jurisprudence found ways to
remedy the emotional distress of surviving family members by acknowledging a property right of sorts to control the manner of disposition of a human corpse.29 It was not uncommon in early America
for creditors to seize a corpse as security against the unpaid debts of
the decedent; and body-snatchers, motivated by greed, sometimes
stole human corpses and held them for ransom.30 Perhaps for those
reasons, equity courts began to consider a decedent’s corpse as an
asset of the estate—a quasi-property interest within the jurisdiction
of equity.31 These early judicial remedies were all the more
27

See Pierce, 10 R.I. at 237 n.1 (citing relevant cases).
See infra note 32 and accompanying text; see also Culpepper v. Pearl St.
Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 883 (Colo. 1994) (“[T]here is no property right in a
dead body . . . .”).
29
See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 63 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th
ed. 1984) (expressing skepticism regarding the “property” right as “something
evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and . . . in reality the personal feelings
of the survivors are being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a
lawyer”); e.g., Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422, 423 (1881) (“Neither the husband
nor the next of kin have, strictly speaking, any right of property in a dead body;
but controversies between them as to the place of its burial are in this country,
where there are no ecclesiastical courts, within the jurisdiction of a court of equity.”).
30
CHRISTINE QUIGLEY, THE CORPSE: A HISTORY 277–79 (2005); see Wellman, supra note 26, at 59 (describing ancient laws of Egypt and parts of Europe
treating a human corpse as legal security for debts and referring to Massachusetts
and Rhode Island statutes forbidding the practice).
31
Joseph R. Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights, 33
YALE L.J. 115, 115–16 (1923) (acknowledging a general rule that “the test of equity jurisdiction” is “the existence of a property right needing protection,” but
critiquing the premise that an equity court has “no jurisdiction to protect personal
rights where no property rights are involved”). Some courts have recognized that
the constructive “property right” with respect to human remains was merely a
legal fiction to redress surviving family members’ emotional distress, for which
they had no remedy under common law. See, e.g., Colavito v. New York Organ
Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 224 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying New York law).
The courts that have declined to treat this sort of claim as asserting a valid property right have explained that it should have
28
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remarkable for the time. A remedy for emotional harm alone, especially in the absence of physical injury, was highly unusual in the
nineteenth century.32
In the mid-nineteenth century, most courts granted the primary
right to determine how and where to bury human remains to the

been brought as a claim for emotional distress—which indeed
is the gravamen of the injury bereaved families seek to redress
in such circumstances . . . . But because the mishandling of a
corpse is presumed to be emotionally distressing even though
there is no physical impact on the plaintiff, courts have created
the legal fiction of the “quasi-property right” . . . to permit recovery in such cases.
Id.
32

See, e.g., Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law
of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936) (noting that English and American
common law “has been reluctant to recognize the interest in one’s peace of mind
as deserving of general and independent legal protection, even as against intentional invasions”). Magruder traced this principle back to English common law.
Id. at 1033 (“Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to
redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone.”) (quoting Lynch
v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577, 598 (1861)). His premise, novel for its time, was that
United States courts had recognized a tort action claiming damages for emotional
distress independent of any other tort claim, as long as the “mental distress [was]
of an aggravated sort, resulting from an outrageous aggression by the defendant
upon the plaintiff’s peace of mind.” Id. at 1064; see also William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 874–
75 (1939).
The American Law Institute later recognized the tort of emotional distress,
but not until 1948. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. Supp. 1948);
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (outlining the
elements of “Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 45–47
(AM. LAW INST. 2012) (defining “emotional harm” to mean “impairment or injury
to a person’s emotional tranquility”). The independent tort action to remedy emotional distress, like the claim for invasion of privacy, arose from academic scholarship rather than the courts. See John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law:
Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 797 (2007). Kircher
acknowledged that long before the tort of outrage was recognized in the United
States, courts granted remedies for “mental distress associated with intentional
mistreatment of dead bodies or burial rights.” Id. at 796 (referencing Gostkowski
v. Roman Catholic Church of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus & Mary, 186 N.E. 798,
800 (N.Y. 1933)).

2020]

FAMILY SECRETS AND RELATIONAL PRIVACY

795

decedent’s surviving spouse.33 The decedent’s close family members could seek equitable remedies against private parties for interfering with a gravesite or grave goods—often known in early America as “grave-robbing” or “body-snatching.”34 By the end of the
33

See, e.g., Durell v. Hayward, 75 Mass. 248, 249 (1857) (rejecting a claim
by the mother of a female decedent against decedent’s widower for removing a
gravestone erected by the mother and replacing it with one selected by widower).
The indisputable and paramount right, as well as duty, of a husband, to dispose of the body of his deceased wife by a decent
sepulture in a suitable place, carries with it the right of placing
over the spot of burial a proper monument or memorial in accordance with the well known and long established usage of the
community.
Id.; see also Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422, 424 (1881) (holding that surviving
widower had implied right to remove decedent’s remains from original place of
burial in proximity to her siblings and move it to a suitable burial plot of his own
choosing); Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 235 (1872)
(recognizing widow’s right to remove decedent’s body from original burial place
over objection of decedent’s only child); Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S. 471, 473
(App. Div. 1896) (recognizing, as a matter of first impression, a widow’s tort
claim against the defendant for unlawfully conducting an unauthorized autopsy
over her objection after husband died in tragic accident).
By the common law, and stricti juris, the proposition [that no
property right exists in a dead body] may be maintainable. A
long line of judicial decisions appear to have established a general doctrine to that effect; but courts of equity have frequently
interfered to protect the remains of the dead, and courts of law
have also afforded remedies . . . wherever any element of trespass to property, real or personal, was associated with the molestation of the remains of the dead. In more recent times the
obdurate common-law rule has been very much relaxed, and
changed conditions of society, and the necessity for enforcing
that protection which is due to the dead, have induced courts to
re-examine the grounds upon which the common-law rule reposed, and have led to modifications of its stringency. The old
cases in England were decided when matters of burial, and the
care of the dead, were within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, and they are no longer absolutely controlling.
Id.
34
For example, during the nineteenth century, medical schools often secured
cadavers for purposes of teaching anatomy by disinterring recently buried corpses,
which led to a public outcry. MICHAEL SAPPOL, A TRAFFIC OF DEAD BODIES:
ANATOMY AND EMBODIED SOCIAL IDENTITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
3–5
(2002);
Grave
Robbing,
OHIO
HIST.
CENT.,
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nineteenth century, some state courts recognized comparable common law rights for the violation of which surviving close relatives
could claim money damages.35
Tort remedies for interfering with the survivors’ rights to dispose of a dead body survive today in many jurisdictions.36 The Restatement (Second) of Torts expressly recognized a cause of action

https://ohiohistorycentral.org/w/Grave-robbing (last visited Feb. 15, 2020); see
also Foley, 37 N.Y.S. at 472 (noting that in 1854, New York enacted a statute
expressly barring a hospital, over objection of “relatives or friends of the deceased,” from dissecting the corpse of a patient who had died in the hospital, or
delivering a corpse to someone else for that purpose).
To deter the practice of grave-robbing, enterprising inventors patented devices such as the “coffin torpedo.” See, e.g., Coffin-Torpedo, U.S. Patent No.
208,627 (filed June 29, 1878) (issued Oct. 8, 1878). The invention’s purpose was
as follows:
to provide a means which shall successfully prevent the unauthorized resurrection of dead bodies; and with this end in view
[the] invention consists of a peculiarly-constructed torpedo,
adapted to be readily secured to the coffin and the body of the
contained corpse in such manner that any attempt to remove the
body after burial will cause the discharge of the cartridge contained in the torpedo and injury or death of the desecrator of the
grave.
Id.
35
See, e.g., Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 240 (Minn. 1891) (“[I]t would be
a reproach to the law if a plaintiff’s right to recover for mental anguish resulting
from the mutilation or other disturbance of the remains of his dead should be made
to depend upon whether in committing the act the defendant also committed a
technical trespass upon plaintiff’s premises, while everybody’s common sense
would tell him that the real and substantial wrong was not the trespass on the land,
but the indignity to the dead.”).
36
E.g., Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373, 375 (N.M. 1989) (quoting
Infield v. Cope, 270 P.2d 716, 719 (N.M. 1954)) (noting that while “no special
rule provides relatives a right of privacy in the body of a deceased person[,] . . . New Mexico has granted relatives of a decedent a [limited] cause of
action for mistreatment of a corpse . . . derived from the common law notion of ‘a
quasi-property right in a dead body vesting in the nearest relatives of the deceased
and arising out of their duty to bury their dead’”); Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d
188, 189 (Fla. 1950) (holding that impact rule did not bar mother’s claim against
undertaker for tortious interference with her child’s body without her consent;
acknowledging that “tortious interference with rights involving dead human bodies” naturally results in “mental anguish to the surviving relatives[,]” which “is
frequently the only injurious consequence to follow from it.”).
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for tortious interference with a dead body.37 The superseding Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm, finalized
in 2012, continues to recognize the claim, but now treats it as a subcategory of tortious infliction of emotional distress.38

37

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)
(“One who intentionally, recklessly or negligently removes, withholds, mutilates
or operates upon the body of a dead person or prevents its proper interment or
cremation is subject to liability to a member of the family of the deceased who is
entitled to the disposition of the body.”). In limiting the claim to the family member “who is entitled to the disposition of the body,” id. § 868 cmt. a, the Restatement recognizes a family member’s tort action for intentional, reckless, or negligent interference with the decedent’s body, which some courts have characterized
as a “quasi-property” right. E.g., Cochran v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 59
N.E.3d 234, 243 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (“This cause of action has its roots in the
early recognition of a quasi-property right in a decedent’s body by his next of
kin.”), aff’d, 93 N.E.3d 493 (Ill. 2017). The Restatement further acknowledges
the questionable nature of the property classification, observing that “the technical
right has served as a mere peg upon which to hang damages for the mental distress
inflicted upon the survivor; and in reality the cause of action has been exclusively
one for the [survivor’s] mental distress.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 868 cmt. a.
38
The Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes that the claim is essentially
one for negligent, reckless, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 cmt. b,
Reporter’s Note cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (addressing liability for negligent
conduct directly inflicting emotional harm on another). The Reporter’s Note explains that the rule in subsection (b) originated in cases dealing with negligent
mishandling of corpses and negligent transmission of information about death or
terminal illness, and the rule has since been expanded in many states to include
“other activities or undertakings.” Id. (citing Kaufman v. W. Union Tel. Co., 224
F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955) as “what appears to be the last of the negligent telegraphtransmission cases”); see also Jackson v. McKay-Davis Funeral Home, Inc., 830
F. Supp. 2d 635, 653, 655 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (denying summary judgment to defendant funeral home on claim by decedent’s widow and daughter for negligent
handling of human remains and negligent infliction of emotional distress, noting
that “the negligent handling [of human remains] cases have developed in tandem
with the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress”); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 2012)
(addressing liability for outrageous intentional or reckless conduct causing severe
emotional distress).
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B.

Names and Reputations of Decedents and Surviving
Relatives
In the late nineteenth century, at about the same time Warren and
Brandeis published their groundbreaking law review article, surviving family members began seeking equitable remedies for conduct
they perceived as sullying the names and reputations of their deceased relatives and, by implication, their own.39
Among the earliest cases was Schuyler v. Curtis,40 decided by
the New York Court of Appeals in 1895. The plaintiff, a nephew of
the female decedent who had died fourteen years earlier, sought to
enjoin the defendants’ plans to erect a statue honoring his deceased
aunt without the consent of the “immediate members of the [decedent’s] family.”41 The plan was to display the statue at the Chicago
World’s Fair in the same room as a statue depicting Susan B. Anthony, an early ardent feminist.42 The nephew asserted various concerns about the plans, including a complaint that the circulars promoting the statue had inaccurately credited the decedent for certain
philanthropic actions during her lifetime.43 He also alleged that these
were activities for which the decedent would not have wanted publicity, and that she would have rejected any apparent affiliation with
Susan B. Anthony.44 But the plaintiff’s primary rationale for litigating the issue was “to establish a principle[] that the right of privacy
should be respected.”45
The court rejected the nephew’s claim.46 It reasoned that any
right of privacy on the part of the decedent had died with her, and
the surviving family members had no claim against the promoters
39

For a concise summary of early state cases addressing the right of privacy,
see Sammin, supra note 18, at 97–107.
40
42 N.E. 22, 22 (N.Y. 1895).
41
Id. at 24.
42
Id. at 23; see, e.g., Barbara Babcock, Women’s Rights, Public Defense, and
the Chicago World’s Fair, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 481, 482, 486–87 (2012) (describing Susan B. Anthony’s role in the fair’s promotion of women’s suffrage and
recognition of women’s contributions to the labor force).
43
Schuyler, 42 N.E. at 24.
44
Id. at 24–25. The court was unpersuaded that the planned display would
suggest that the decedent had in any way sympathized with Ms. Anthony’s advocacy of the nascent “wom[e]n’s rights movement.” Id. at 27.
45
Id. at 25.
46
Id. at 26.
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for failing to secure the family’s consent to erect the statue depicting
the decedent.47
47

The court explained its reasoning for rejecting the claim, which asserted
what would later become known in academic circles as a relational right of privacy:
Whatever the rights of a relative may be, they are not, in such
case as this, rights which once belonged to the deceased,
and which a relative can enforce in her behalf and in a mere
representative capacity; as, for instance, an executor or administrator, in regard to the assets of a deceased. It is not a question
of what right of privacy Mrs. Schuyler had in her lifetime. The
plaintiff does not represent that right. Whatever right of privacy
Mrs. Schuyler had died with her. Death deprives us all of rights,
in the legal sense of that term; and, when Mrs. Schuyler died,
her own individual right of privacy, whatever it may have been,
expired at the same time. The right which survived (however
extensive or limited) was a right pertaining to the living only. It
is the right of privacy of the living which it is sought to enforce
here. That right may in some cases be itself violated by improperly interfering with the character or memory of a deceased relative, but it is the right of the living, and not that of the dead,
which is recognized . . . . We hold that in this class of cases
there must, in addition, be some reasonable and plausible
ground for the existence of [the survivors’] mental distress and
injury. It must not be the creation of mere caprice nor of pure
fancy, nor the result of a supersensitive and morbid mental organization, dwelling with undue emphasis upon the exclusive
and sacred character of this right of privacy . . . . The fact that
Mrs. Schuyler is dead alters the case, and the plaintiff and other
relatives must show some right of their own violated . . . .
Id. at 25–26 (emphasis added).
The court’s reasoning has been followed by other courts in analogous cases
decided throughout the twentieth century and beyond. See, e.g., Young v. That
Was the Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337, 1341 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (“[T]he right
of privacy is personal and can only be asserted by the individual whose privacy
has been invaded. It dies with him and cannot be claimed by his estate. Neither
can it be asserted by the anguished or outraged relatives and friends of the subject
individual, who may have been disturbed by the disclosure or exploitation.”),
aff’d, 423 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1970); Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W.
285, 287 (Mich. 1899) (rejecting claim that defendants used decedent’s photograph to market cigars without consent; holding that “a court of equity has no
power to restrain a libelous publication”); see also Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 423 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Ark. 2012) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977)) (rejecting a mother’s
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In 1940, the New York Court of Appeals revisited the issue.48
The court dismissed a claim by a widow and her children, who alleged that a newspaper article had erroneously described their decedent as a confessed murderer and identified the plaintiffs as his survivors.49 The court held that “a libel or slander upon the memory of
a deceased person which makes no direct reflection upon his relatives gives them no cause of action for defamation.”50
In 1952, the California Supreme Court addressed an invasion of
privacy claim against local law enforcement officials after the plaintiffs’ son was acquitted for the misdemeanor offense of unlawful
assembly.51 The parents claimed that the prosecution’s publicity had
negatively affected the father’s practice as an attorney and CPA.52
The court refused to recognize the parents’ claim that their privacy
had been violated as an incident of the prosecutor’s allegedly wrongful prosecution of their son.53 For the same reason, in 1959, a federal
district court in Illinois held that a decedent’s son had no claim for

claim on behalf of her deceased daughter for invasion of privacy, referencing Restatement (Second) of Torts in part for proposition that “[i]n the absence of statute,
the action for the invasion of privacy cannot be maintained after the death of the
individual whose privacy is invaded”).
48
Rose v. Daily Mirror, 31 N.E.2d 182 (N.Y. 1940).
49
Id. at 182–83.
50
Id. at 182.
51
Coverstone v. Davies, 239 P.2d 876, 881 (Cal. 1952). The court was unable
to identify any cases allowing a plaintiff to recover “where defendant’s alleged
wrongful act was directed toward a third person, and only as an incident to that
act was it claimed that plaintiff’s privacy had been invaded.” Id.
52
Id. at 880.
53
The court reasoned that recognizing such a privacy claim would open the
floodgates to litigation by involuntary public figures:
Neither reason nor authority indicates that there should be an
extension of liability to cover such a situation. Such a rule
would open the courts to persons whose only relation to the asserted wrong is that they are related to the victim of the wrongdoer and were therefore brought unwillingly into the limelight.
Every defamation, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution would then be an actionable invasion of the privacy of the
relatives of the victim.
Id. at 881 (emphasis added).
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libel of his own name on the basis of defendant’s alleged libel of the
plaintiff’s deceased father.54
Similarly, modern courts have generally rejected “relational”
claims by relatives for defaming the names or reputations of their
decedents.55 In some cases, courts rely on state survival statutes that
expressly exclude reputational claims. Thus, a decedent’s heirs may
not vindicate defamatory statements concerning a decedent unless
the claim is asserted before the direct victim’s death.56
C.
“Personal” Nature of the Right of Privacy
As the intentional tort of invasion of privacy evolved throughout
the twentieth century,57 the right of privacy was considered personal
to the individual whose right was violated.58 The only exception was
54

Insull v. N.Y. World-Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615, 636 (N.D. Ill.)
(applying Illinois law), aff’d, 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959).
55
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Times Herald Printing Co., 513 S.W.2d 124, 126
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (holding that plaintiff-widow had no claim against defendant-newspaper for reporting that her husband’s body was found in an area known
for drug trafficking, unless she personally had been subject of alleged defamatory
statements).
56
E.g., Fitch v. Voit, 624 So. 2d 542, 543–44 (Ala. 1993) (citing Smith v.
Doss, 37 So. 2d 118, 121 (Ala. 1948), and quoting Abernathy v. Thornton, 83 So.
2d 235, 237 (Ala. 1955)) (“As to the issue of privacy, the trial judge concluded
correctly that the right of privacy is a personal right, and that this Court has not
recognized a ‘relational right of privacy,’ under which the plaintiffs make their
claim.”); see also Lamonaco v. CBS, Inc., No. CIV. A. 93-1975(DRD), 1993 WL
556536, at *3 (D.N.J. July 29, 1993) (noting that “the tendency of most courts to
invoke and then dismiss [a claim for] relational privacy without ever defining it”),
aff’d, 27 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 1994). But see Weller v. Home News Publ’g. Co., 271
A.2d 738, 740 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970) (holding that, while New Jersey
law does not generally recognize a survivor’s claim implicating a relational right
of privacy, state survival statute preserved decedent’s own claim against defendant for falsely portraying her as a fictional charity patient).
57
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 488 (1975) (noting that “the
[twentieth] century has experienced a strong tide running in favor of the so-called
right of privacy”). By 1971, nearly every jurisdiction had recognized a claim for
invasion of privacy in one form or another. Id. (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS 804 (4th ed. 1971)).
58
See Leon Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237, 238–39, 253,
256–57 (1932) (noting that interests identified in the privacy cases qualify as “interests of personality,” rather than “property interests” or “interests in relations
with other persons,” and listing “privacy” as one of several “interests of
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the variation on the privacy right that would later become known as
the “right of publicity”—the right to prevent a third party’s commercial misappropriation of a person’s name or likeness without consent.59 Over time, this version of the privacy tort was increasingly
recognized as a right that could be vindicated by the individual during her lifetime—and even after death by her surviving heirs under
limited circumstances.60 The right of publicity, also known as the
personality,” including “physical integrity,” “feelings or emotions,” “capacity for
activity or service,” “name,” “likeness,” and “history”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652I (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“Except for the appropriation of one’s
name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a
living individual whose privacy is invaded.”); id. § 652I cmt. a (“The right protected by the action for invasion of privacy is a personal right, peculiar to the
individual whose privacy is invaded. The cause of action is not assignable, and it
cannot be maintained by other persons such as members of the individual’s family, unless their own privacy is invaded along with his.”); see also, e.g., United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 910 (1984) (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165, 174–75 (1969)) (stating that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and
may not be vicariously asserted); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (referring to “the individual’s interest in [informational] privacy”); Moore v. Charles
B. Pierce Film Enters., Inc., 589 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (restricting recovery for invasion of privacy to “the person about whom facts have been
wrongfully published, unless the Legislature sees fit to establish a right of action
in the relatives of such a person.”); Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 158 (1991)
(“The interest in informational privacy—the right to control personal information—belongs with the individual.”); cf. Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345
F.2d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 1965) (applying Illinois law and observing that “[i]t is
anomalous to speak of the privacy of a deceased person.”).
59
See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that right of publicity “protect[s] the property interest that an individual
gains and enjoys in his identity through his labor and effort”); Carson v. Here’s
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 1983) (concluding that
defendant had violated Johnny Carson’s right of publicity under Michigan law by
intentionally appropriating for commercial use the phrase “Here’s Johnny,” which
evoked the celebrity’s persona as the host of a long-running late-night television
program).
60
Compare, e.g., Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 462
(Cal. 1979) (refusing to permit a claim for violation of right of publicity for using
the identity of Rudolph Valentino, a deceased celebrity, in a film), and Groucho
Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 323 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding
that “California [law in 1982] would not recognize a descendible right of publicity
that protects against an original play using a [deceased] celebrity’s likeness and
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tort of misappropriation of name and likeness,61 evolved to become
what is today a heritable right in many, if not most, of the states that
recognize it.62 But the other variations on the common law right of
privacy presumably terminated immediately upon the death of the
individual whose “personal” privacy right was allegedly violated.63

comedic style.”), with, e.g., Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports & Exports,
Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 326 (6th Cir. 2001) (“We believe that the weight of authority
indicates that the right of publicity is more properly analyzed as a property right
and, therefore, is descendible.”), and Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc.
Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 705 (Ga. 1982) (holding that “the right of publicity survives the death of its owner and is inheritable
and devisable.”).
If a state’s own constitution independently recognizes a right of privacy, state
courts have held that those rights do not expire as a matter of law at the time of
death. For example, in Weaver v. Myers, the Florida Supreme Court held that
“[d]eath does not retroactively abolish [Florida’s] constitutional protections for
privacy that existed at the moment of death.” 229 So. 3d 1118, 1127–28 (Fla.
2017) (4-3 decision). The majority struck down as unconstitutional statutory
amendments to the state’s medical malpractice laws that had required the release
of a deceased patient’s medical records to “prying [defense] lawyers, insurance
companies, experts, and doctors” and authorized ex parte, “secret” interviews of
decedent’s medical providers. Id. at 1140–41; see also Brian W. Boelens, Weaver
v. Myers: The Future of Ex Parte Communication in Florida Medical Malpractice, FLA. B.J., July–Aug. 2018, at 22, 26.
61
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1977) (noting that the right of publicity “is in the nature of a property right”).
62
See State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d
89, 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (“The legal literature has consistently argued that
the right of publicity should be descendible. A majority of the courts considering
this question agree.”). In some states, the right of publicity is descendible not by
judicial declaration, but rather statutory enactment. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3344.1(a)–(b) (West 2012); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316(b)(3)
(West 2007).
63
The general common law rule is that, “[e]xcept for the appropriation of
one’s name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only
by a living individual whose privacy is invaded.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652I (AM. LAW INST. 1977); id. § 652I cmt. b (“In the absence of a statute, the action for the invasion of privacy cannot be maintained after the death of
the individual whose privacy is invaded.”); see, e.g., Swickard v. Wayne Cty.
Med. Exam’r, 475 N.W.2d 304, 309 (Mich. 1991).
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EARLY RECOGNITION OF “RELATIONAL” PRIVACY
INTERESTS

A.
Scholarly Recognition
As early as 1916, Roscoe Pound addressed relational interests of
individuals within the nuclear family,64 as distinguished from
64

Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L.
REV. 177, 177 (1916) [hereinafter Pound, Domestic Relations] (focusing on “individual interests of the individual parties to domestic relations in the maintenance
and integrity thereof and with the securing of these interests both against the world
at large and between the parties”). Pound viewed the family as an economic and
social unit. He explained,
[T]he law has to give effect to the right of the one party to the
relation against the other and enforce the corresponding [relational] duty toward the former, and also to give effect to the
right of each against the whole world not to have the relation
interfered with by outsiders.
Id. at 179. This latter aspect of family interests—the family unit’s rights against
external interference—is the underpinning of relational privacy rights. For example, early American common law claims for alienation of affections and loss of
consortium implicitly acknowledged relational interests in maintaining the integrity of the domestic family unit. See id. at 188–89. Another example is the common law concept of coverture, by which a married woman had no legal identity
apart from her husband. See Jones & Peterman, supra note 14, at 215. In the last
half of the nineteenth century, most states abolished coverture by enacting “married women’s statutes” following the lead of New York, the first state to do so in
1848. See J. Lyn Entrikin, The Death of Common Law, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 351, 458–59 (2019).
However, these traditional notions of “family” privacy focused on protecting
family autonomy rather than protecting against invasion of privacy by the misuse
or misappropriation of family-related information. See Jones & Peterman, supra
note 14, at 216; see also, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)
(referring to the “enduring American tradition” of parents’ autonomy to educate
their own children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (striking
down Massachusetts statutes regulating child labor based on respect for “the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter”); Pierce v. Soc’y of the
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (striking
down Oregon law requiring public education for “unreasonably interfer[ing] with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (deferring to parental authority to control education of their children).
Similar family autonomy interests, and by extension reproductive autonomy,
were the underpinnings of major Supreme Court cases. See Carey v. Population
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individual interests of “personality.”65 He explained that these relational interests are “wider than the individual personality [and] involve more than the individual body and life, and yet they are intimately related thereto.”66 Pound sought to distinguish relational
rights from “interests of personality” of the sort modern legal
thought characterizes as “personal” rights.67
American scholars have acknowledged the so-called “relational” right of privacy, albeit not uniformly.68 Beginning in the
Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693, 699–70 (1977) (unmarried minors’ “right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation”); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1972) (unmarried women’s right to use contraceptives);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–63 (1973) (women’s right to choose abortion, in
consultation with their physicians, during first trimester of pregnancy); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (married couples’ right to use contraceptives). But the evolution of reproductive autonomy has departed from what
was once a family-focused theme in favor of a woman’s individual procreational
autonomy. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
58 (1976) (holding that not even a pregnant woman’s husband could interfere with
her decision to terminate a pregnancy within the first twelve weeks).
While the Court has departed from its traditional focus on family privacy in
favor of personal and individual privacy in its decisional autonomy jurisprudence,
the Supreme Court’s concerns about protecting family and relational privacy continue to reverberate in its informational privacy cases. See infra Part IV.A (distinguishing privacy rights with respect to decisional autonomy from privacy rights
with respect to disclosure of sensitive personal information).
65
Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 349 (1915)
[hereinafter Pound, Personality].
66
Pound, Domestic Relations, supra note 64, at 177.
67
See Pound, Personality, supra note 65, at 350. While recognizing that “[a]ll
classifications are more or less arbitrary,” Pound’s 1915 article sorted “individual
interests” into three subcategories: “(a) interests of personality, — the individual
physical and spiritual existence; (b) domestic interests, — the expanded individual life; and (c) interests of substance, — the individual economic life.” Id. at 349
(internal quotation marks omitted). From a historical perspective, Pound surmised
that individual interests were relatively late in coming as distinguished from
“group rights.” Id. “This culminated in the eighteenth century in a working out of
individual interests as distinguished from public interests, to which our bill of
rights, in which the natural rights of the individual are solemnly asserted against
the state, still bear witness.” Id.
68
See, e.g., Ian Kerr, Schrödinger’s Robot: Privacy in Uncertain States, 20
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 123, 130 (2019) (“[T]he moniker of relational privacy
has been used to mean different things . . . .”); Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner,
Relational Privacy: Surveillance, Common Knowledge, and Coordination, 11 U.
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1930s, Leon Green, then Dean of Northwestern University Law
School, published a series of five articles on various categories of
“relational interests.”69 The first of these focused on relational interests within the family.70 The author devoted several pages to the relational interest of surviving family members with respect to the
“personality” of a decedent,71 acknowledging that courts considering those claims routinely focused on the “mental suffering of the
surviving relative as the chief element of recovery.”72 Green concluded that harm to these relational family interests, which he defined as “hurt to one member of a family by reason of conduct

ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 7 (2017) (defining relational privacy as “a variety of informational privacy,” meaning “the ability to determine for yourself
when others may collect and how they may use your information,” and explaining
that “[i]nformational privacy is relational when control over the flow of information is exercised collectively by a group, not unilaterally by individuals”); see
also Stuart Hargreaves, ‘Relational Privacy’ & Tort, 23 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 433, 463 (2017) (“[R]elational privacy accepts . . . that privacy has . . . a role
to play both in creating a personal zone of freedom from unwanted outside interference, [and] as a means of protecting one’s interactions within a broader community . . . .”); Bert-Jaap Koops et al., A Typology of Privacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L
L. 483, 528 (2017) (discussing relational privacy as a cluster of “privacy of relations”); Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV.
359, 388–89 (2000) [hereinafter Rao, Property, Privacy] (citing Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1077, 1078 (1998) [hereinafter Rao, Reconceiving Privacy] (referring to
right of relational privacy as one component of constitutionally protected privacy
that “casts a mantle of immunity from state interference around certain intimate
and consensual relationships”)); Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and
DNA Familial Searching, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 309, 364 (2010) (referring to
relational privacy as “protect[ing] the sanctity of the family by working to support
the relationships that are constitutive of the family”).
69
Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460 (1934) [hereinafter
Green, Relational Interests (1934)]; Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L.
REV. 1041 (1935); Leon Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1935);
Leon Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 314 (1935); Leon Green, Relational Interests, 31 ILL. L. REV. 35 (1936); see also Green, Basic Concepts, supra
note 2, at 65 (distinguishing interests in person and property, the focus of early
common law actions, from interests in “relations with other persons,” which he
characterized as “an entirely new group of interests”).
70
Green, Relational Interests (1934), supra note 69, at 464.
71
Id. at 485–90.
72
Id. at 486.
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[directed] towards some other member,”73 warranted legal protection to the same extent as other interests.74
Even earlier, the venerable William Blackstone had acknowledged “relative rights; or such as are incident to persons considered
as members of society, and connected to each other by various ties
and relations.”75 Of these “relative rights,” distinguished from the
“absolute” rights of the individual, Blackstone identified four specific categories of rights in private relations: “husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward, master and servant.”76
But none of these early scholars expressly identified what would
come to be known as “relational privacy” or “familial privacy” interests with respect to disclosures of sensitive information. That terminology would develop much later in the twentieth century.77 In
73

Id. at 490.
Id. at 460; see also Green, Basic Concepts, supra note 2, at 66 (distinguishing relational interests from interests of personality and property on the basis that
“[t]heir value lies in the fact that one person has an interest in the welfare and
conduct of some other person”); Pound, Domestic Relations, supra note 64, at
196.
75
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138–39.
76
Id.; see Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28
BUFF. L. REV. 205, 273–75 (1979) (explaining Blackstone’s distinctions between
absolute and relative rights of persons).
In the law of relative rights, Blackstone was primarily interested
in presenting English society as a set of hierarchies of persons.
Each hierarchy had a function, and each was composed of complex social roles heavily regulated by common law and statute.
Two of the hierarchies . . . had the function of exercising the
powers of the state, and Blackstone identified them as public.
At the other extreme, there were the “domestic” or “economical” hierarchies of employment and family. As with the state
hierarchies, Blackstone described these in terms of clusters of
legal rules all related to the functions and ranks of the people
involved, but here those were private, and he so identified them.
In the middle were people in public relations, with some private
and some public functions.
Id. at 288–89 (emphasis in original); see also Jones & Peterman, supra note 14,
at 200 n.36 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *422) (“The original sense of family privacy descended from the common law.”).
77
See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 38–39, 42 (1967).
Westin, a renowned privacy scholar, recognized the need for “emotional release
through privacy” at times of “loss, shock, or sorrow.” Id. at 36. “In such moments
74
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fact, the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) articulation of common
law “personal” privacy rights in the first two versions of the Restatement of Torts stymied the conceptual development of relational privacy rights recognized by early common law.78
B.

The Restatement of Torts and the Influence of William
Prosser
The first Restatement of Torts was published in 1939.79 It separately acknowledged claims for “interference with a dead body”80
and “interference with privacy.”81 Both, however, were articulated
society provides comfort both through communal support by gatherings of friends
and through respect for the privacy of the individual and his intimates.” Id.; see
also Rao, Reconceiving Privacy, supra note 68, at 1104 (distinguishing the “individual right of privacy—the right to be left alone, and the relational right of privacy—the right to connect with others”); Note, The Relational Right of Privacy
Theory—Recovery on the Basis of Conduct Directed at a Deceased or Living Relative, Friend or Associate, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 74, 74 (1966) (comprehensively
analyzing early cases dealing with “what is called a ‘relational right of privacy’”
and noting that use of the term “relational . . . perhaps heaps ambiguity upon ambiguity”).
78
See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed
Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1903, 1905 (2010) (explaining that Prosser’s
rendition of privacy claims took hold in the first and second Restatement of Torts
and was “clear and orderly[,]” a contrast to the “characteristic creativity and ad
hoc nature of the common law”).
79
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
80
Id. § 868 (“A person who wantonly mistreats the body of a dead person or
who without privilege intentionally removes, withholds or operates upon the dead
body is liable to the member of the family of such person who is entitled to the
disposition of the body.”). The Restatement commentary explained that “[t]he
cause of action is primarily for mental suffering caused by the improper dealing
with the body [and] includes also the right to recover damages for physical harm
resulting from such mental suffering.” Id. § 868 cmt. b; see supra text accompanying notes 35–37.
81
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (“A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another’s interest in not having his affairs
known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other.”).
Comment b to this section explained that the claim “has not been recognized until
recently, not only because it normally involves nothing more than mental distress,
but also because there is not a clear line of demarcation between what should and
what should not be permitted.” Id. § 867 cmt. b. Comment d elaborated on the
nature and scope of the nascent privacy claim, focusing on its concern with offensive informational disclosures:
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as personal rights: the first limited to the “member of the family of
such [deceased] person who is entitled to the disposition of the
body,”82 and the second limited to an individual whose “interest in
not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to
the public” is “unreasonably and seriously interfere[d] with.”83 At
the same time, another section of the Restatement of Torts expressly
foreclosed any claim for conduct, regardless of intention, that
caused “only mental or emotional disturbance to another.”84

[L]iability exists only if the defendant’s conduct was such that
he should have realized that it would be offensive to persons of
ordinary sensibilities. It is only where the intrusion has gone
beyond the limits of decency that liability accrues. These limits
are exceeded where intimate details of the life of one who has
never manifested a desire to have publicity are exposed to the
public, or where photographs of a person in an embarrassing
pose are surreptitiously taken and published. On the other hand,
there is no invasion of a right of privacy in the description of
the ordinary goings and comings of a person or of weddings,
even though intended to be entirely private, or of other publications to which people do not ordinarily seriously object. In determining liability, the knowledge and motives of the defendant, the sex, station in life, previous habits of the plaintiff with
reference to publicity, and other similar matters are considered.
A distinction can be made in favor of news items and against
advertising use. It is only when the defendant should know that
the plaintiff would be justified in feeling seriously hurt by the
conduct that a cause of action exists. If these conditions exist,
however, the fact that the plaintiff suffered neither pecuniary
loss nor physical harm is unimportant.
Id. § 867 cmt. d.
82
Id. § 868 (emphasis added).
83
Id. § 867.
84
Id. § 46.
The interest in mental and emotional tranquillity and, therefore,
in freedom from mental and emotional disturbances is not, as a
thing in itself, regarded as of sufficient importance to require
others to refrain from conduct intended or recognizably likely
to cause such a disturbance. Conduct, either of act or omission,
which is intended or likely to cause only mental or emotional
distress is not tortious. Therefore, it cannot subject the actor to
liability no matter what its consequences.
Id. § 46 cmt. c (emphasis added).
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William Prosser, selected in 1955 as the reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts,85 was highly influential in formulating
American common law privacy rights. In 1977, the four familiar
variations on the right of privacy found their origins in the second
Restatement,86 which largely tracked the definitions Prosser had articulated in a 1960 law review article.87 Prosser acknowledged that
one of the four privacy tort variations, intrusion on seclusion, was
essentially vindicating the same injury as a claim for intentional infliction of mental distress, which many courts had already recognized as a separate, limited basis for tort liability.88
But the Restatement (Second) of Torts expressly disclaimed any
relational privacy interest. Section 652I, captioned “Personal Character of Right of Privacy,” clarified that as a general rule, only the
person then living whose privacy has been violated could maintain
85

Laurence H. Eldredge, In Memoriam: William Lloyd Prosser, 23
HASTINGS L.J. xxxii, xxxv (1972).
86
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–E (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
They include (a) unreasonable intrusion on seclusion, (b) appropriation of another’s name or likeness, (c) unreasonable publicity given to another’s private life,
or (d) publicity that unreasonably casts another in a false light. Id. § 652A. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts continued to recognize a tort claim for interference
with a dead body, but expanded it to include unintentional conduct, setting it apart
from the four privacy torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (AM.
LAW INST. 1977) (“One who intentionally, recklessly or negligently removes,
withholds, mutilates or operates upon the body of a dead person or prevents its
proper interment or cremation is subject to liability to a member of the family of
the deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body.”).
87
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 422–23 (1960) (outlining the “four distinct and only loosely related torts”).
88
See id. at 422 (citing William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L.
REV. 40, 52 (1956)); William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 884 (1939).
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm
to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor
is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress (a) to a member of such person’s immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or (b) to any other person who is
present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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a cause of action for invasion of privacy.89 The only exception was
misappropriation of a person’s name or likeness, which could be
vindicated by a decedent’s surviving family members.90
C.
Judicial Recognition
The right to personal privacy is not confined . . .
to the right to control information about oneself. . . . Congress’ use of the term “personal privacy” [in FOIA] permit[s] family members to assert
their own privacy rights against public intrusions
long deemed impermissible under the common law
and in our cultural traditions.91
By the last third of the twentieth century, surviving family members increasingly sought civil remedies for perceived invasions of
privacy that contemporary common law had treated as personal to
the decedent.92 In 1965, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, interpreting Illinois law, considered whether the
widow and son of Al Capone had a relational privacy interest sufficient to support a claim against television broadcasters and
89

See, e.g., Fasching v. Kallinger, 510 A.2d 694, 702 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1986) (citing with approval RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I (AM.
LAW INST. 1977)) (declining to recognize a cause of action by an immediate family member of a decedent for invasion of relational privacy for publicizing private
information about decedent).
90
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I (AM. LAW INST. 1977))
(“Except for the appropriation of one’s name or likeness, an action for invasion
of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded.”). Comment a elaborates:
The right protected by the action for invasion of privacy is a
personal right, peculiar to the individual whose privacy is invaded. The cause of action is not assignable, and it cannot be
maintained by other persons such as members of the individual’s family, unless their own privacy is invaded along with his.
The only exception to this rule involves the appropriation to the
defendant’s own use of another’s name or likeness.
Id. § 652I cmt. a (citing id. § 652C cmt. a).
91
Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 165–67 (2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
92
See generally Robert P. Kennedy, Note, The Right to Privacy in the Name,
Reputation and Personality of a Deceased Relative, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 324,
324 (1965) (reviewing relevant case law).
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producers for portraying their deceased relative.93 The court rejected
the claim, relying on an analogous Illinois precedent holding that the
right of privacy did not support a surviving mother’s claim to redress
her mental anguish caused by the defendant’s publicizing her son’s
murder when the publication did not relate specifically to the
mother.94
In 1969, a federal court applying Ohio law rejected a class action
asserted by surviving family members against a popular television
production for defaming their recently deceased relative.95 The litigation was filed after the program published the following account
memorializing an elderly woman who had died just two weeks earlier: “Mrs. Katherine Young of Syracuse, New York, who died at 99
leaving 5 sons, 5 daughters, 67 grandchildren, 72 great-grandchildren, and 73 great-grandchildren, gets our First Annual Booby Prize
in the Birth Control Sweepstakes.”96 In rejecting the claim, the court
acknowledged that a few early cases had recognized “a so-called
‘relational’ right of privacy.”97 However, the court discounted those
cases, summarily reasoning that most were “not recent, and their

93

Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 1965).
Id. (citing Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 168 N.E.2d 64, 65, 66 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1960)).
95
Young v. That Was the Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337, 1337–38, 1343
(N.D. Ohio 1969) (granting summary judgment on the basis that surviving family
members had no cause of action under Ohio law), aff’d, 423 F.2d 265 (6th Cir.
1970).
96
Id. at 1338.
97
Id. at 1341 n.2. As examples of these “few cases,” the court cited Smith v.
Doss, 37 So. 2d 118, 121 (Ala. 1948); Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass’n,
17 P.2d 535, 535 (Colo. 1932); Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 155 S.E. 194,
195 (Ga. 1930); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849, 850 (Ky. 1912); and Schuyler
v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 24 (N.Y. 1895). Young, 312 F. Supp. at 1341 n.2. All of
these cases sought remedies for surviving family members whose decedents allegedly had been subjected to unwanted publicity. In some of these cases the
plaintiffs prevailed. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons, 17 P.2d at 537 (holding that plaintiff
widow stated a claim that mortician violated its contractual agreement that nothing would be done to outrage feelings of ordinary person or unnecessarily inflict
humiliation and mental suffering); Bazemore, 155 S.E. at 194 (holding that parents stated a claim against hospital, photographer, and newspaper for unauthorized publication and distribution of photograph of their deceased child); Douglas,
149 S.W. at 850 (upholding jury verdict in lawsuit by parents of deceased Siamese
twins against photographer).
94
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authority, even in the states which decided them, is questionable.”98
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, expressly rejecting the appellants’ alternative argument that even if the decedent’s personal privacy right had expired at death, the survivors should be able to sue
for “invasion of their own privacy and the privacy of the descendants whom they undertake to represent by class action.”99 The court
concluded that “no such right of action exists under the averments
of the complaint in the present case.”100
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue in
the more typical context of a criminal investigation.101 The plaintiff’s seventeen-year-old daughter, a rape victim, had died as a result
of the injuries she had sustained.102 Her father sued a broadcaster, as
authorized by a Georgia statute, for revealing the name of his daughter as the rape victim, claiming the disclosure had invaded his own
right of privacy.103 The Georgia Supreme Court upheld his claim.104
But the United States Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the
broadcasting company’s reporter was exercising his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by publishing information that he had lawfully gathered from court records and proceedings open to the general public.105
98

Young, 312 F. Supp. 1341 n.2 (citing Waters v. Fleetwood, 91 S.E.2d 344,
346–48 (Ga. 1956)).
99
Young, 423 F.2d at 266.
100
Id.
101
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471 (1975).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 474 (noting that the original action was brought under GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-9901 (1972)).
104
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 200 S.E.2d 127, 131 (Ga. 1973) (acknowledging the “head-on collision between the tort of public disclosure and First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and press”), rev’d, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). As a
state law claim, Cox Broadcasting did not involve a request under the federal
FOIA statute for access to public records held by a federal agency. Instead, a father asserted a claim based on a Georgia statute that barred disclosure of a rape
victim’s identity, which the defendant broadcaster challenged as unconstitutional.
Id. at 133–34.
105
Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 496–97. “Appellee has not contended that
the name was obtained [improperly] or that it was not on an official court document open to public inspection. Under these circumstances, the protection of freedom of the press . . . bars the State of Georgia from making appellants’ broadcast
the basis of civil liability.” Id. The Court did not disclaim the father’s privacy
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A Florida appellate court in 1981 addressed a claim by surviving
family members after an author had published a book including information about their deceased relative.106 The family claimed a
interests protected by the Georgia statute, but implicitly reasoned that First
Amendment considerations with respect to public records outweighed any privacy
concerns of family survivors. See id. at 494–95.
[E]ven the prevailing law of invasion of privacy generally recognizes that the interests in privacy fade when the information
involved already appears on the public record. The conclusion
is compelling when viewed in terms of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and in light of the public interest in a vigorous
press. The Georgia [statutory] cause of action for invasion of
privacy through public disclosure of the name of a rape victim
imposes sanctions on pure expression—the content of a publication—and not conduct or a combination of speech and nonspeech elements that might otherwise be open to regulation or
prohibition. The publication of truthful information available
on the public record contains none of the indicia of those limited
categories of expression, such as ‘fighting’ words, which [are
not entitled to First Amendment protection].
By placing the information in the public domain on official
court records, the State must be presumed to have concluded
that the public interest was thereby being served. Public records
by their very nature are of interest to those concerned with the
administration of government, and a public benefit is performed
by the reporting of the true contents of the records by the media.
The freedom of the press to publish that information appears to
us to be of critical importance to our type of government in
which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of
public business. In preserving that form of government the First
and Fourteenth Amendments command nothing less than that
the States may not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official court records open to public inspection.
Id. (citations omitted). In effect, the Court struck down as unconstitutional a state
statute restricting disclosure of rape victims’ identities, with the result that any
state law limiting free access to public information risks a challenge based on the
First and Fourteenth Amendment freedom of the press. But cf. Weaver v. Myers,
229 So. 3d 1118, 1141–42 (Fla. 2017) (4-3 opinion) (upholding analogous state
privacy claim on behalf of decedent’s estate grounded in Florida Constitution,
which protects confidentiality of decedent’s medical records).
106
Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Loft cited
the Georgia Supreme Court decision in Cohn as one of several cases illustrating
the rationale that “relatives of the deceased have their own privacy interest in
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violation of the right of privacy under both Florida statutory and
common law.107 Although the court rejected the relatives’ claim because they had not asserted “any independent violation of their own
privacy rights,” the court refused to reject all relational privacy
claims out of hand.108 As the court explained in dicta,
We are wary of a blanket rule barring all relatives of
a deceased from bringing a common law invasion of
privacy action simply because the relatives were not
directly involved in the publicity [pertaining to the
decedent]. However, . . . such relatives must shoulder a heavy burden in establishing a cause of action.
When there are unusual circumstances, . . . it may be
that a defendant’s conduct towards a decedent will
be found to be sufficiently egregious to give rise to
an independent cause of action in favor of members
of decedent’s immediate family.109
But in 1998, in Reid v. Pierce County, the Washington Supreme
Court recognized a common law relational privacy interest in several decedents’ immediate relatives, holding that they could assert
claims against county officials for misappropriating photographs of
the decedents’ corpses and displaying them to third parties.110 The
photographs had been taken during forensic investigations or during

protecting their rights in the character and memory of the deceased[,] as well as
the right to recover for their own humiliation and wounded feelings caused by the
publication.” Id. While noting that the Supreme Court had reversed Cohn “on
other grounds,” the Florida court did not address the potential conflict between its
dicta and the First Amendment. Id.
107
Id. at 621 (citing FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (1977)). The claim did not assert a
privacy right grounded in the Florida Constitution, which did not expressly grant
a personal right of privacy until four years after the 1976 publication of the book
that was the source of the family’s privacy claims. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23
(“Right of Privacy.—Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free
from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life except [that] [t]his section shall not be construed to limit the public’s right of access to public records
and meetings as provided by law.”).
108
Loft, 408 So. 2d at 624.
109
Id.
110
Reid v. Pierce Cty., 961 P.2d 333, 342 (Wash. 1998).
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autopsies.111 The court reasoned that if the defendants had physically
interfered with the corpses, liability certainly would have attached
under the state’s precedents.112 The court also cited a Washington
statute declaring that autopsy reports were confidential and generally prohibiting their disclosure to third parties, with limited exceptions such as the decedent’s personal representative, family members, and attending physician.113 Rejecting as “counterintuitive” the
county’s argument that the relatives’ claims were meritless “no matter how egregious the act,”114 the court concluded that “immediate
relatives of a decedent have a protectable privacy interest in the autopsy records of decedent [that] is grounded in maintaining the dignity of the deceased.”115 The Washington Supreme Court’s holding
in Reid has been followed by appellate courts in Delaware and Tennessee as a matter of state common law.116
111
Id. at 335. A concurring judge in a later California case addressing a similar
issue narrowly characterized the right recognized in Reid and analogous cases as
“a familial right of privacy in autopsy photographs.” Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal.
Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 391 (Ct. App. 2010) (Aronson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
112
Reid, 961 P.2d at 339–40 (citing Gadbury v. Bleitz, 233 P. 299 (Wash.
1925); Wright v. Beardsley, 89 P. 172 (Wash. 1907)).
113
Id. at 341 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.105 (1987)).
114
Id. at 342.
115
Id. at 342–43. The court reasoned that the county’s actions had been “sufficiently egregious to enable the families of the deceased to maintain their own
action.” Id. at 342. While the plaintiffs in Reid also asserted a claim for violation
of the state constitutional right of privacy, the court declined to address that issue,
reasoning “that Plaintiffs may obtain adequate relief under the common law and
that such actions are better addressed under the common law invasion of privacy
action.” Id. at 343. Notably, however, the Reid court expressly approved the dicta
in Loft v. Fuller, in which a Florida appellate court had declined to foreclose a
relational right of privacy claim if “a defendant’s conduct towards a decedent [is]
sufficiently egregious to give rise to an independent cause of action in favor of
members of decedent’s immediate family.” Id. at 342 (quoting with approval Loft
v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
116
See Lawson v. Meconi, 897 A.2d 740, 743, 747 (Del. 2006) (holding that
state statutes barring public disclosure of autopsy report and other death-related
information created privacy right on the part of decedent’s widow) (citing DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 29, §§ 4707(e), 4710(b), 4710(c)) (2003); Harris v. Horton, 341
S.W.3d 264, 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (“Plaintiffs may have a protectable privacy interest in photographs of their deceased relative . . . consonant with prior
Tennessee cases holding that the family of a decedent has a protectable interest in
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The various state court decisions addressing “relational privacy”
are difficult to harmonize, and, at least so far, not even the American
Law Institute has attempted to do so. The Restatement (Third) of
Torts, parts of which were published in final form in 2012, now expressly acknowledges a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
making certain that the decedent’s remains are not disturbed or mutilated.”) (citing with approval Reid, 961 P.2d at 335–36, 341, 342), overruled on other
grounds by Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 205 n.6 (Tenn. 2012).
In Lawson, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision
rejecting the widow’s claim, reasoning as follows:
In providing the statutory protections that have been invoked by
Mrs. Lawson, the General Assembly has recognized concepts
that have been respected in almost all civilizations from time
immemorial: “[f]amily members have a personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted
public exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief, tends
to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased person who was once their own.”
Lawson, 897 A.2d at 747–48 (quoting Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004)).
But other state courts have declined to follow Reid. E.g., Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 423 S.W.3d 548, 553–54 (Ark. 2012) (rejecting
mother’s claim that decedent’s right of privacy survived according to Arkansas’s
survival statute, but holding that decedent’s tort of outrage claim did survive and
that mother could assert a claim for outrage on her own behalf as a “relational
wrong”). In Cannady, the defendant hospital’s employees had pled guilty to felony violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d)(6) (2006) (the federal Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)), which prohibits obtaining or disclosing “individually identifiable health information.” 423 S.W.3d at 549. The
plaintiff’s counsel apparently did not argue that the mother had a derivative privacy right against the hospital based on its employees’ federal criminal convictions. See id. at 550–54. However, nearly all courts that have considered the issue
have held that HIPAA does not authorize a private cause of action to enforce its
privacy protections, even by a direct victim of the violation. E.g., Dodd v. Jones,
623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010) (“HIPAA does not create a private right of
action.”); cf. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 278, 290–91 (2002) (holding
that Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 creates no privacy rights
that an aggrieved individual can enforce in a private cause of action).
On remand, the Cannady trial court denied the hospital’s summary judgment
motion on the mother’s tort of outrage claim. Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary
Med. Ctr., 537 S.W.3d 259, 262–63 (Ark. 2018). The hospital argued in part that
“[the decedent’s mother] was not present when the allegedly outrageous conduct
occurred.” Id. at 262. Although the trial court certified the issue for immediate
appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court demurred, holding that the interlocutory order was non-appealable. Id. at 266.
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distress without regard to physical harm under two broad sets of circumstances.117 First, a defendant may be liable for emotional harm
as a result of actions that place the plaintiff “in danger of immediate
bodily harm.”118 Second, a defendant may be liable for a plaintiff’s
emotional harm resulting from conduct “in the course of specified
categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious emotional
harm.”119 The relevant comments demonstrate that the second set of
circumstances is broad enough in scope to cover the series of cases
addressing negligent handling of corpses or negligent transmission
of death-related information.120
But what of the relational right of privacy claim of the nature
recognized by the Washington Supreme Court in Reid v. Pierce
County?121 Many other courts have rejected an asserted relational or
familial right of privacy that survives the decedent, citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, published in final form in 1977.122 The
117

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 47
(AM. LAW INST. 2012).
118
Id. § 47(a).
119
Id. § 47(b) (emphasis added).
120
Id. cmt. f.
Historically, the rule stated in Subsection (b) originated in cases
involving telegrams announcing death or illness or caring for or
handling a corpse . . . . Even in the case of mishandling corpses,
one of the classic categories for permitting recovery of negligently inflicted emotional harm, courts have had to supervise
and limit those relatives who can sue for emotional
harm . . . . Now the rule has been extended by many jurisdictions to cover other activities or undertakings.”
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); cf. Cannady, 423 S.W.3d at 553 (holding
that decedent’s mother had no survival claim for invasion of a “relational right of
privacy” against hospital for its employees’ unlawful access to photographs in
decedent’s medical records, but mother could pursue a tort of outrage claim on
her own behalf as a “relational wrong”).
121
See supra notes 110–16 and accompanying text.
122
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I (AM. LAW INST. 1977)
(“Except for the appropriation of one’s name or likeness, an action for invasion
of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded.”); e.g., Boyd v. Thomson Newspaper Publ'g Co., 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1020, 1023 (W.D. Ark. 1980) (predicting that Arkansas courts would reject a
claim grounded in a relational privacy interest); Cannady, 423 S.W.3d at 552–53
(rejecting claim that mother had a relational right of privacy that survived

2020]

FAMILY SECRETS AND RELATIONAL PRIVACY

819

Restatement (Third) of Torts, now underway, has yet to address the
issue.123 Moreover, the four aspects of the right of privacy recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts all purport to limit the
tortious cause of action to intentional invasions of privacy.124 The
question remains whether a court would recognize a common law
claim for negligent or reckless invasion of privacy, akin to the one
the Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes for infliction of emotional distress with various degrees of culpability.125
In January 2019, the ALI approved development of the next part
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which will address both defamation and privacy claims.126 The next iteration is likely to address
significant issues, perhaps including the scope of relational privacy
decedent) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I). But cf. In re Estate
of Reynolds, 327 P.3d 213, 218 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-3110 (2014)) (holding that a surviving daughter’s Mother’s Day tribute
to her deceased parent did not violate decedent’s right of publicity, which had
survived her death notwithstanding Arizona survival statute that expressly excluded privacy claims).
123
As of this writing, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) has either issued or
embarked upon four subcomponents of the Restatement (Third) of Torts that supersede relevant parts of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Products Liability,
Apportionment of Liability, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, and Liability for Economic Harm. See Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Defamation
and Privacy, AM. LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/torts-defamation-and-privacy/#_status (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [hereinafter Restatement of
the Law Third, Torts]. Other Restatements address aspects of the right of privacy
in particular settings, such as employment. E.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
LAW ch. 7 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 5, 2012) (addressing “Employee
Privacy and Autonomy”).
As this Article went to press, the ALI website describes the forthcoming installment of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, on “Defamation and Privacy,” as
“address[ing] torts dealing with personal and business reputation and dignity, including defamation, business disparagement, and rights of privacy. Among other
issues, the updates will cover the substantial body of new issues relating to the
internet.” Restatement of the Law Third, Torts, supra (emphasis added).
124
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
125
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
126
Restatement of the Law Third, Torts, supra note 123. Currently underway
is the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons, but that component reportedly does not address privacy rights. See Kenneth W. Simons & W.
Jonathan Cardi, Restating the Intentional Torts to Persons: Seeing the Forest and
the Trees, 10 J. TORT L. 1, 15 (2018) (acknowledging that the intentional torts of
defamation and invasion of privacy are not addressed in Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons).
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interests. But most likely the next installment will not be soon in
coming.127 Time will tell, but in the meantime, courts will continue
to struggle with relational aspects of privacy interests in a rapidly
advancing technological age.128
III.

FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND FEDERAL
PRIVACY ACT PROTECTION OF “PERSONAL” PRIVACY
The federal Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),129 and many
comparable state open records acts,130 indirectly recognize “personal privacy” interests with respect to otherwise “public” records131
but do not articulate the source, nature, or scope of those privacy

127

See Project Life Cycle, AM LAW INSTI., https://www.ali.org/projects/project-life-cycle/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) (outlining the many steps of the process
from project announcement to project completion).
128
See, e.g., Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603-EFM, 2009 WL 3126229,
at *1–2 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009) (acknowledging a mother’s claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress against her daughter’s former paramour, who had
emailed sexually explicit photos of the daughter to her mother and other family
members). The court found little precedent or persuasive secondary authority for
this “revenge porn” issue. See id. at *4 (“Today, unlike 1977, the year that the
American Law Institute officially adopted the Restatement (Second), due to the
advent of the Internet, ‘the barriers of creating publicity are slight.’ Consequently . . . the Restatement offers little to no assistance to the Court in its effort
to resolve the present matter.”) See generally Eric Goldman & Angie Jin, Judicial
Resolution of Nonconsensual Pornography Dissemination Cases, 14 I/S: J.L. &
POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 283, 292–93 (2018); Elizabeth Williams, Cause of Action for
Internet Posting of “Revenge Porn”, 72 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 537 (2016) (discussing the causes of action through which a victim of “revenge pornography”
may obtain civil redress).
129
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018).
130
E.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 25-19-101 to -111 (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 45-215 to -223 (2019). While state open-records acts and the federal FOIA
serve similar public policy goals, state and federal acts reflect “stark differences
in scope and utility.” Christopher P. Beall, Note, The Exaltation of Privacy Doctrines over Public Information Law, 45 DUKE L.J. 1249, 1251 (1996).
131
Just what constitutes “public” information is a conundrum in its own right.
See Woodrow Hartzog, The Public Information Fallacy, 99 B.U. L. REV. 459, 465
(2019) (“[N]obody knows what ‘public’ means, because it has no set definition in
law or policy.”).

2020]

FAMILY SECRETS AND RELATIONAL PRIVACY

821

interests.132 In general, FOIA statutes provide that all “agency records” maintained by executive branch agencies must be disclosed
upon request—subject to certain restrictions and express exemptions.133 The exemptions are many, but two of them are particularly
relevant to personal privacy.134
132

See, e.g., Michael Hoefges et al., Privacy Rights Versus FOIA Disclosure
Policy: The “Uses and Effects” Double Standard in Access to Personally-Identifiable Information in Government Records, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3
(2003) (observing that FOIA’s privacy exemptions appear “to place the public
interest in full public disclosure of government-held information in an adversarial
relationship with the individual privacy interest in nondisclosure”).
133
The courts have acknowledged that FOIA’s “remedial purpose was to
pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of
public scrutiny.” Rose v. Dep’t of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974),
aff’d, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); see also Alirez v. N.L.R.B., 676 F.2d 423, 425 (10th
Cir. 1982) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (noting that FOIA’s “basic policy” favors disclosure and, accordingly, the Act “is to be broadly construed in
favor of disclosure . . . and, unless requested material in the possession of a federal agency falls within one of the statutory exemptions structured to protect specified confidentiality and privacy interests, it must be made available on demand
to any member of the general public . . . . These statutory exemptions are to be
narrowly construed with all doubts resolved in favor of disclosure . . . .”); Lauren
Bemis, Balancing a Citizen’s Right to Know with the Privacy of an Innocent Family: The Expansion of the Scope of Exemption 7(C) of The Freedom of Information
Act Under National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish, 25 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 507, 508 (2005) (noting that FOIA was designed as “a
full-disclosure statute”). FOIA places the burden on the agency “to show that certain pieces of information should not be released,” expressly limiting the circumstances under which an agency is authorized to withhold information. Id. Those
circumstances include when “the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure
would harm an interest protected by an exemption described in subsection (b).” 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I).
134
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (“personnel and medical files and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy”) (emphasis added); id. § 552(b)(7) (“records or information compiled for
law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law
enforcement records or information . . . (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”) (emphasis added). While
both exemptions purport to protect “personal privacy,” the Supreme Court has
carefully distinguished the language of the two exemptions, interpreting Exemption 7(C) to provide considerably more agency discretion to withhold sensitive
information that could infringe on personal privacy interests. See, e.g., Favish,
541 U.S. at 165–66; News-Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d 1173,
1198 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that while amendments to Exemption 7(C) eased
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The first exception pertains to “personnel and medical files and
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”135 The second pertains to
“records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes,”
which an agency may withhold from disclosure “only to the extent

the burden on a federal law enforcement agency to justify withholding a record
from disclosure on that basis, “Congress . . . steadfastly refused to yield as to Exemption 6” for personnel, medical, and similar records that would lead to a
“clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”).
135
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Bibles v. Oregon Nat.
Desert Ass’n, 519 U.S. 355, 355–56 (1997) (per curiam) (reversing Ninth Circuit’s holding that 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) did not justify the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) decision to withhold its mailing list from respondent environmental association, which had asserted “a perceived public interest in ‘providing
[persons on the BLM’s mailing list] with additional information’”) (alteration in
original). The Court observed that while the asserted reasons for requesting disclosure of public information are irrelevant, “the only relevant public interest in
the FOIA balancing analysis is the extent to which disclosure of the information
sought would shed light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let citizens know what their government is up to.” Id. at 355–56 (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted) (emphasis in original). Releasing the
mailing list to an environmental advocacy group, the Court reasoned, would not
advance the public policy goals underlying FOIA. Id.
The Ninth Circuit directed the trial court on remand to dismiss the association’s FOIA claim seeking the agency’s mailing list, presumably on the basis that
its disclosure would impose a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Oregon Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Bibles, 125 F.3d 1282,
1282 (9th Cir. 1997). Such a finding strains credulity, given the limited “personal”
information contained in the mailing list. See Oregon Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Bibles,
83 F.3d 1168, 1169 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the claim sought “the names and
addresses of persons who receive the BLM’s newsletter [that] provide[d] information about the BLM’s activities and plans affecting the Oregon desert”), rev’d, 519 U.S. 355 (1997).
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Bibles rested on a narrow interpretation
of FOIA’s disclosure mandate by confining it to its purported policy rationale
favoring government transparency, while at the same time broadly interpreting
the exemption under § 552(b)(6) authorizing BLM to withhold the mailing list.
See Bibles, 519 U.S. at 355–56. The Court’s interpretation thus directly conflicted
with the longstanding practice of narrowly construing FOIA’s “limited exemptions” in favor of disclosure, consistent with the statute’s “dominant objective.”
E.g., John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (citations
omitted).
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that the production . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”136
Does this federal statutory disclosure mandate that yields to perceived “personal privacy” interests refer to the federal constitutional
right of privacy? Or do the FOIA exemptions instead recognize a
federal statutory right of privacy by negative implication? Or does
the statutory term “invasion of personal privacy” refer to privacy
rights protected by state law, whether constitutional, statutory, or
common law?137 If the latter, how is a federal agency—or a federal
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (emphasis added); see, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice
v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989) (reaffirming
that “whether an invasion of privacy is warranted cannot turn on the purposes for
which the request for information is made”). Similar to the language in
§ 552(b)(7)(C), the otherwise mandatory disclosure subsections of FOIA generally provide the following:
To the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, an agency may delete identifying details when it makes available or publishes an opinion, statement
of policy, interpretation, staff manual, instruction, or copies of
records referred to in subparagraph (D) [with certain records to
be made available for public inspection in electronic format].
However, in each case the justification for the deletion shall be
explained fully in writing, and the extent of such deletion shall
be indicated on the portion of the record which is made available or published, unless including that indication would harm
an interest protected by the exemption in subsection (b) under
which the deletion is made. If technically feasible, the extent of
the deletion shall be indicated at the place in the record where
the deletion was made.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(E) (emphasis added).
137
Several states have incorporated privacy rights into their respective state
constitutions. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending
life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into
the person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall
not be construed to limit the public’s right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law.”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person shall be secure
in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.”) (emphasis added);
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or
his home invaded, without authority of law.”); see also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics
136
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reviewing court—to determine which state’s substantive privacy
law applies? These questions have no clear answers, and courts appear to take a multitude of different approaches in interpreting the
scope of the FOIA “personal privacy” exemptions.138
Moreover, some significant federal precedents suggest that one
or perhaps both of FOIA’s “personal privacy” exemptions from disclosure incorporate an expansive “relational” perspective on privacy—in contrast to state common law privacy rights, which are
generally thought to protect only individual privacy.139 This Part
considers those perplexing and confounding issues.
A.
Personnel, Medical, and Similar Records: Exemption 6
In 1996, in a closely divided en banc opinion, the Federal Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed whether a
federal agency had acted properly when it withheld an audiotape recording of the astronauts’ voices during the tragic launch of the
Challenger space shuttle from the press.140 The applicable federal
FOIA exemption pertained to “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”141 The lower court had held
v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 808 (Cal. 1997) (“[I]n many contexts, the scope and
application of the state constitutional right of privacy is broader and more protective of privacy than the federal constitutional right of privacy as interpreted by
the federal courts.”). See generally Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Right of Privacy in
State Constitutional Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 971, 988 (2006) (“State constitutional
conceptions of privacy independent of the federal model began to emerge at a relatively early date.”); Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 7, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/ privacy-protections-instate-constitutions.aspx.
138
Compare, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1004–10 (D.C.
Cir. 1990), with, e.g., McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 766 S.W.2d 909, 913–
16 (Ark. 1989).
139
But cf. McCambridge, 766 S.W.2d at 915 (recognizing that City’s intended
disclosure of criminal investigation photos and documents, including personal letters relating to son’s murder-suicide, implicated his mother’s asserted federal constitutional privacy right against disclosure; but mother’s informational privacy interests, while “very high,” were outweighed by government’s “highly valued governmental interest” in disclosure under Arkansas FOIA).
140
N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1003–04 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (6-5
opinion on rehearing en banc).
141
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6); see supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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that disclosure was mandatory because the audio recording did not
qualify as a personnel, medical, or similar file to which the exemption expressly applied.142
The disputed recording had captured the last remarks by the
seven ill-fated astronauts just before the Challenger space shuttle
exploded with all of them aboard.143 The National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (“NASA”) claimed that giving the press a
copy of the audiotape would subject the astronauts’ surviving family
members “to hearing the voices of their loved ones, an intrusion on
their grief which would certainly exacerbate feelings of hurt and
loss.”144 NASA responded to the FOIA request by supplying a transcribed readout of the tape, but the New York Times wanted a copy
of the audio recording itself.145
A slim majority of the en banc court of appeals held that the
audio recording met the threshold test of the FOIA exemption. The
court reasoned that the recording pertained to particular persons,
and therefore NASA had the statutory authority to withhold it from
disclosure, even if the astronauts personally were not the subjects of
the recording.146 The majority directed the trial court to give NASA
an opportunity on remand to establish that releasing the recording
would indeed invade the privacy of either the decedents themselves
or their surviving families.147 The majority rejected the dissenters’
argument that, to avoid the FOIA disclosure mandate, NASA
needed to establish that the recording included personal information
about the surviving family members, who argued that disclosure
would implicate their own personal privacy interests.148 The dissenters, reasoning that the subject of the recording was the safety of the
Challenger space shuttle, not the personal lives of the ill-fated astronauts, concluded that NASA’s rationale for withholding it from the

142
N.Y. Times Co., 920 F.2d at 1003. The district court therefore did not initially address whether the recording’s disclosure would have amounted to a
“clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Id. at 1004.
143
Id. at 1004.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 1009–10.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 1007–09.
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press did not satisfy the precondition for invoking the FOIA exemption.149
On remand, NASA persuaded the district court that the surviving family members’ “personal privacy” interests outweighed the
public interest in disclosing the audio recording, which would
amount to a clearly unwarranted invasion of the family members’
privacy.150 In reaching that conclusion, the district court expressly
acknowledged that the Supreme Court had narrowly interpreted the
public interest in disclosure of government records protected by
FOIA’s mandate.151
B.
Criminal Investigation Records: Exemption 7(C)
The most significant case that expansively interpreted the federal FOIA disclosure exemption for criminal investigation records152 was the 2004 Supreme Court decision in National Archives
& Records Administration v. Favish.153 Allan J. Favish, a California
lawyer, filed a federal FOIA request with the National Archives
seeking photographs of the corpse of Vince Foster, who had died in
1993 as an apparent victim of a self-inflicted gunshot wound during
his tenure as President Clinton’s Deputy White House Counsel.154
149

See id. The majority and dissenting opinions of the D.C. Circuit on rehearing en banc reflect the controversy inherent in the language Congress used in
drafting the FOIA privacy exemptions: Do they purport to protect individual “personal privacy,” consistent with the traditional understanding of personal privacy
rights? Or do they reasonably extend to “personal privacy” interests of the individual subject’s family members? See id. at 1006 (reasoning that the threshold for
invoking Exemption 6 “was set at a low level”); see also id. at 1010–11 (Edwards,
J., dissenting) (“The majority now holds that if an identifiable individual is somehow connected with a Government file, that file automatically becomes a ‘similar
file’ under Exemption 6. That is not what the statute says.”).
150
N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 782 F. Supp. 628, 633 (D.D.C. 1991).
151
Id. at 632 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)).
152
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2018).
153
541 U.S. 157 (2004). The Court’s decision cited with approval the district
court’s opinion on remand in New York Times Co. v. NASA, in particular its focus
on the privacy interests of the astronauts’ surviving family members. Id. at 170–
71.
154
See id. at 161. See generally KENNETH W. STARR, REPORT ON THE DEATH
OF VINCENT W. FOSTER, JR., BY THE OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL IN RE:
MADISON GUARANTY SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION 1–28 (1997),
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The relevant federal agencies had denied the FOIA request, asserting that releasing the death scene photographs would amount to an
“unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”155 Although the decedent’s own “personal privacy” was certainly not at stake, Vince Foster’s surviving family members intervened, objecting to the photographs’ release.156
The Court held that the statutory exemption relating to unwarranted invasions of “personal” privacy for disclosure of criminal investigation records was broad enough to extend to Foster’s surviving family members because they had objected to releasing photographs showing the condition of Foster’s body at the scene of his
death.157 The Court reasoned,
[W]e think it proper to conclude from Congress’ use
of the term “personal privacy” that it intended to permit family members to assert their own privacy rights
against public intrusions long deemed impermissible
under the common law and in our cultural traditions.
This does not mean that the family is in the same position as the individual who is the subject of the disclosure. We have little difficulty, however, in finding
in our case law and traditions the right of family
members to direct and control disposition of the body
of the deceased and to limit attempts to exploit pictures of the deceased family member’s remains for
public purposes . . . . Family members have a personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and
objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by
intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the

https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=federal_documents.
155
See id. at 160 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2000) and explaining that
it “excuses from disclosure ‘records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes’ if their production ‘could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’”).
156
See id. at 167.
157
Id. at 165.
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rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased
person who was once their own.158
The Court reiterated that the privacy right attributed to Foster’s
family members was a statutory right by implication, foreclosing
any inference that it rested on a constitutionally protected privacy
right.159
We have observed that the statutory privacy right
protected by [FOIA] Exemption 7(C) goes beyond
the common law and the Constitution . . . . It would
be anomalous to hold in the instant case that the statute provides even less protection [for personal privacy] than does the common law.160
158

Id. at 167–68 (emphasis added).
See id. at 170 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 n.13 (1989)). In Reporters Committee, however, the
Court had distinguished the scope of FOIA’s “personal privacy” protections from
those protected by state common law and the Constitution, suggesting that the
FOIA statutory privacy protections are significantly narrower. See Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. at 763 (referring to “the individual's control of information concerning his or her person”). In the footnote cited in Favish,
the Reporters Committee majority observed that “[t]he question of the statutory
meaning of privacy under the FOIA is, of course, not the same as the question
whether a [common law] tort action might lie for invasion of privacy or the question whether an individual’s interest in privacy is protected by the Constitution.”
Id. at 762 n.13 (emphasis added).
160
Id. at 170 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Marzen v.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 825 F.2d 1148, 1152 (7th Cir. 1987) (observing
that “the privacy interest protected under FOIA extends beyond the common
law”).
What is unclear, however, is just what the federal courts mean by the “common law” privacy interest beyond which the FOIA exemptions purportedly reach.
Of course, the federal courts have no power to create federal common law. Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal general common law.”). And until a century ago, most states did not recognize a “common
law” right of privacy. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY
AND PRIVACY 836–37 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining that the “rights of privacy and
publicity were unknown to the early common law of England or the
United States” and that Georgia in 1905 was the first state to judicially recognize
the right of privacy). Even fewer recognized a state constitutional right of privacy
until the latter part of the twentieth century. See Ken Gormley, One Hundred
159
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Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1423 (1992) (“Few of the states recognized anything approaching an identifiable right of privacy under their own
constitutions during the first two centuries of this nation’s history.”). But cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (recognizing a constitutional right
to marital privacy, “a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than
our political parties, older than our school system”).
The Court has declared that FOIA’s several express exemptions from compelled agency disclosure were “plainly intended to set up concrete, workable
standards for determining whether particular material may be withheld or must be
disclosed.” Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973). However, in the
years since FOIA’s first enactment in 1966, the Supreme Court has been characteristically nebulous in mapping the boundaries of FOIA’s informational “right of
privacy,” articulating its legal foundations, and explaining how it applies. See,
e.g., FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 408–10 (2011) (holding that federal courts
have interpreted FOIA’s “personal privacy” exemptions to apply to an “individual’s right of privacy”; thus, FOIA’s personal privacy protection “against disclosure of law enforcement information . . . does not extend to corporations”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 777–79, 779 n.22
(holding that balancing private and public interests to determine whether to disclose criminal investigation records does not require an “ad hoc,” individualized
approach; rather, a categorical approach employing “discrete categor[ies] of exempt information” represents a “workable” rule that advances FOIA policy favoring expedited disclosure) (citations omitted); U.S. Dep’t of State v. Washington
Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599, 602 (1982) (“House and Senate Reports . . . suggest
that Congress’ primary purpose . . . was to protect individuals from the injury and
embarrassment that can result from the unnecessary disclosure of personal information . . . . When disclosure of information which applies to a particular individual is sought from Government records, courts must determine whether release
of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of that person’s privacy.”) (emphasis added); id. at 602 n.5 (explaining that (1) information
exempted from mandatory disclosure in “similar files” is not “limited to [that]
containing intimate details about individuals such as might also be contained in
personnel or medical files,” and (2) scope of exemption may extend to information
contained in public records if disclosure could result in a “clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy”); Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372
(1976) (“Congress sought to construct an exemption [for personnel and medical
records] that would require a balancing of the individual’s right of privacy against
the preservation of the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act ‘to open
agency action to the light of public scrutiny.’ The device adopted to achieve that
balance was the limited exemption, where privacy was threatened, for ‘clearly unwarranted’ invasions of personal privacy.”) (emphasis added). But see Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167 (2004) (interpreting “personal privacy” in exemption for criminal investigation records to include privacy
rights of family members “against public intrusions long deemed impermissible
under the common law and in our cultural traditions,” but sidestepping whether
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Thus, the so-called “right” of Vince Foster’s immediate family
members that the Court presumably recognized and enforced in
Favish was expressly grounded solely in FOIA’s disclosure exemption for information in criminal investigation records that, if released, could amount to an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”161 While the Court disclaimed reliance on the federal Constitution as the source of the relational right of privacy, the statutory
right of privacy the Court attributed to Foster’s surviving family
members was interpreted as broader than, but at least coterminous
with, the common law right of privacy.162 The question Favish left
open was the nature, scope, and relational reach of the surviving
family’s statutory privacy “right” that the Court extrapolated from
the FOIA exemption for certain information in criminal investigation records.163
Finally, the Favish Court held that under the circumstances, the
surviving family’s statutory privacy interests outweighed the requester’s asserted public interest in favor of securing access to the
photographs.164 Therefore, the Court upheld the federal agencies’

“the family is in the same position as the individual who is the subject of the
disclosure”).
161
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2000).
162
Favish, 541 U.S. at 170.
163
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C); see also Jeffrey R. Boles, Documenting
Death: Public Access to Government Death Records and Attendant Privacy Concerns, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 237, 271 (2012). For example, had the National Archives elected to disclose the photographs of Foster’s corpse over the
objection of his widow and sister, the statutory privacy protection the Court extrapolated by negative implication from § 552(b)(7)(C) would not support a private cause of action by the survivors against the federal government for infringing
their relational right of privacy. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 166. While the Privacy
Act authorizes a private claim to redress a violation of that Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(g)(1) (2018), FOIA does not. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
And under the Privacy Act, surely the surviving family members could not have
reasonably argued that the photos of the decedent they sought to withhold included information pertaining to them, either individually or collectively. See 5
U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (allowing an individual to bring a claim, not an individual’s
family).
164
See Favish, 541 U.S. at 174–75.
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decision invoking the judicially expanded Exemption (7)(C) to
avoid the judicially narrowed FOIA disclosure mandate.165
C.
Distinguishing the Judicially Implied FOIA Privacy
“Right” from Agency Discretion to Prevent Unwarranted
Invasions of “Personal Privacy”
Various state and federal courts considering the scope of state
common law and statutory privacy rights have distinguished Favish
on the rationale that the FOIA privacy exemptions recognize a federal statutory right of privacy.166 However, courts have not been inclined to rely on Favish to expand the purported statutory “right” the
Court articulated. For example, the Supreme Court in 2011 declined

165

See id. at 170; see also Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of Information Act 1966-2006: A Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection over the Public Interest in Knowing What the Government's Up to, 11
COMM. L. & POL'Y 511, 514 (2006) (“In effect, the Court has tipped the scales
significantly in favor of a broadly construed and vaguely framed right to privacy
over the public's right of access to government-held information.”).
166
E.g., Showler v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 222 F. App’x 755, 761–62
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 825 (2007) (distinguishing Favish as “rel[ying]
on a statutory privacy right under the FOIA, not a cause of action for invasion of
privacy” in rejecting survivors’ Oklahoma privacy claim alleging wrongful photographing of decedent’s open casket and later publishing and selling photographs); Graham v. Ala. State Emps. Ass’n, 991 So. 2d 710, 720 (Ala. Civ. App.
2007) (“Favish . . . was interpreting and applying only the statute before it—the
FOIA—not some general privacy right recognized or created by the United States
Constitution or by the common law . . . . In this case, we are dealing with [state]
statutes that do not include the same language found in the FOIA.”); Mercer v.
S.D. Attorney Gen. Office, 864 N.W. 2d 299, 304 (S.D. 2015) (holding Favish inapplicable absent any state statutory language similar to FOIA exemption that
might result in “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”); Lawson v. Meconi,
No. 1183-N, 2005 WL 5755653, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 27, 2005) (addressing
widow’s claim to enjoin release of autopsy information concerning spouse’s accidental death; explaining that cases interpreting federal FOIA exemptions were
“not dispositive as to whether [decedent’s] common law right of privacy survives
death, especially since . . . the overwhelming weight of authority . . . holds that it
does not”); cf. Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 871 A.2d 523, 533 (Me.
2005) (distinguishing Favish on its facts because “records requested in this case
involve allegations of abuse alleged to have occurred twenty to seventy years ago
[by now-deceased priests],” so the case posed no risk of “unwarranted public exploitation of grieving family members that was central to the outcome in Favish ”).
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to hold that FOIA’s “personal privacy” exemptions extend to corporations.167

FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 409–10 (2011) (holding that the “protection in FOIA against disclosure of law enforcement information on the ground
that it would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy does not extend to corporations”). Chief Justice Roberts included a helpful summary of the
legislative history of the two FOIA exemptions, which were both designed to protect “personal privacy.” Id. at 407–09; see also Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network
v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t Agency, 811 F. Supp. 2d 713, 737–38
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (as amended on reconsideration).
And yet the Chief Justice, writing for a unanimous Court, emphasized the
individual nature of “personal privacy” recognized by FOIA Exemption 6. See
AT&T, 562 U.S. at 408 (“Although the question whether Exemption 6 is limited
to individuals has not come to us directly, we have regularly referred to that exemption as involving an ‘individual’s right of privacy.’”) (citations omitted). But
that reasoning expressly undercuts the Court’s 2004 (pre-Roberts) holding in Favish, which expansively interpreted “personal privacy” in Exemption 7(C) to encompass a decedent’s close relatives. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 170.
On the other hand, the AT&T majority opinion explained that “‘[p]ersonal’ in
the phrase ‘personal privacy’ conveys more than just ‘of a person.’ It suggests a
type of privacy evocative of human concerns—not the sort usually associated with
an entity like . . . AT&T.” AT&T, 562 U.S. at 406 (emphasis added). Chief Justice
Roberts cited Favish with apparent approval, specifically its reliance on a 1974
Department of Justice [DOJ] Memorandum issued soon after Congress enacted §
552(b)(7)(C). AT&T, 562 U.S at 409. The Court referred to the 1974 DOJ Memorandum as a “reliable guide” to interpreting FOIA. Id. (noting that Congress later
reprinted the memorandum in a 1975 joint committee print).
Because the DOJ Memorandum sheds light on the Court’s interpretation of
Exemption 7(C), the relevant section is reprinted below. Although the Court is
increasingly reluctant to rely on legislative history (especially subsequent legislative history) to interpret federal statutes, in this case it probably best explains why
the Court has generously interpreted agency discretion to withhold public records
from disclosure out of respect for a decedent’s surviving “relatives or descendants.”
167

(C) INVASION OF PRIVACY
Clause (C) [of § 552(b)(7)] exempts law enforcement investigatory records to the extent that their production would “constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The comparable provision in [a Senate] amendment referred to “clearly
unwarranted” invasions, but “clearly” was deleted by the Conference Committee.
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Except for the omission of “clearly,” the language of clause
(C) is the same as that contained in the original Act for [Exemption 6], the exemption for personnel, medical and similar files.
Thus, in determining the meaning of clause (C), it is appropriate
to consider the body of court decisions regarding [Exemption
6]—bearing in mind, of course, that the deletion of “clearly”
renders the Government’s burden somewhat lighter under the
new provisions. In applying clause (C), it will also be necessary
to take account of the Privacy Act of 1974, Public Law 93-579,
which takes effect in September 1975.
The phrase “personal privacy” pertains to the privacy interests of individuals. Unlike clause (B), clause (C) does not
seem applicable to corporations or other entities. The individuals whose interests are protected by clause (C) clearly include
the subject of the [criminal] investigation and “any [other] person mentioned in the requested file.” In appropriate situations,
clause (C) also protects relatives or descendants of such persons.
While neither the legislative history nor the terms of the Act
and the 1974 Amendments comprehensively specify what information about an individual may be deemed to involve a privacy interest, cases under [Exemption 6] have recognized, for
example, that a person’s home address can qualify. It is thus
clear that the privacy interest does not extend only to types of
information that people generally do not make public. Rather,
in the present context it must be deemed generally to include
information about an individual which he could reasonably assert an option to withhold from the public at large because of its
intimacy or its possible adverse effects upon himself or his family.
When the facts indicate an invasion of privacy under clause
(C), but there is substantial uncertainty whether such invasion
is “unwarranted,” a balancing process may be in order, in which
the agency would consider whether the individual’s [privacy]
rights are outweighed by the public’s interest in having the material available.
The Conference Report states (p. 13) that “disclosure of information about a person to that person does not constitute an
invasion of his privacy.” It must be noted, however, that records
concerning one individual may contain information affecting
the privacy interests of others. Of course, when information
otherwise exempt [from disclosure] under clause (C) is sought
by a requester claiming to be the subject of the information, the
agency may require appropriate verification of identity.
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Regardless of what Congress may have intended in 1974, the
plain language of FOIA’s statutory exemptions from mandatory disclosure of public records does not come close to creating a statutory
“right” of privacy for anyone, let alone an individual’s relatives. If
such a privacy “right” exists at all, it is nothing more than a creature
of judicial “gloss” on the plain language of the statute.
Indeed, FOIA’s personal privacy exemptions from mandatory
disclosure expressly grant only discretionary authority to a federal
agency holding public records to override what is otherwise a statutory duty to disclose those records upon request.168 The exemptions
qualify a federal agency’s statutory duty to disclose, but they do not
confer an independent right of privacy on anyone, including the person to whom the information directly and specifically pertains.169
As virtually every court has held, the language that Congress employed in FOIA imposes a broad duty to disclose information in
public records,170 unless the agency exercises its statutory authority
to withhold certain records (or parts of records) under the specific
conditions outlined in each enumerated exemption.171 Nor does either privacy exemption prohibit agency disclosure to protect
Attorney General’s Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments to the FOIA, U.S.
DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/oip/attorney-generals-memorandum-1974amendments-foia (last updated July 23, 2014) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
168
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(E) (2018) (stating that an agency may delete
information that can identify an individual).
169
See id.
170
E.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 910 F.3d 1232,
1235 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Freedom of Information Act . . . vests the public
with a broad right to access government records.”) (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(3)(A)) (2012); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2018) (“Each agency shall make
available to the public information as follows: . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also
id. § 552(d) (“This section does not authorize withholding of information or limit
the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section.”) (emphasis added).
171
See FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: Discretionary Disclosure and Waiver, U.S.
DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-guide-2004-edition-discretionarydisclosure-and-waiver#N_9 (last updated July 23, 2014) [hereinafter FOIA
Guide] (explaining that because “FOIA’s exemptions are discretionary, not mandatory, agencies may make ‘discretionary disclosures’ of exempt information, as
a matter of their administrative discretion, where they are not otherwise prohibited
from doing so”); cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979) (“Congress did not design the FOIA exemptions to be mandatory bars to disclosure.”).
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anyone’s personal privacy, regardless of whether the person or the
person’s family might object. As the Court explained in 1979,
[t]he organization of the Act is straightforward. Subsection (a), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), places a general obligation on the agency to make information available
to the public and sets out specific modes of disclosure for certain classes of information. Subsection
(b), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), which lists the exemptions,
simply states that the specified material is not subject
to the disclosure obligations set out in subsection (a).
By its terms, subsection (b) demarcates the agency’s
obligation to disclose; it does not foreclose disclosure.172
Contrary to the Court’s reasoning in Favish,173 and the District
of Columbia Circuit Court’s interpretation in New York Times Co.
v. NASA,174 the longstanding interpretation of the federal FOIA exemptions is that they grant discretionary authority to federal agencies to withhold records from disclosure under specified circumstances, but they impose no duty to do so.175 Absent a statutory duty
172

Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 291–92 (emphasis added); see also Doe v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 920 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2019). But see Boles, supra note
163, at 246–47 (opining that “the [FOIA] exemptions direct an agency to withhold
particular types of records if certain conditions are met” and that FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C) “block the release of government records to prevent unwarranted
invasions of privacy”) (emphasis added). In support of the statement that FOIA’s
exemptions direct an agency to withhold particular types of records, Boles cited
Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 293–94. See Boles, supra note 163, at 246 n.45. However, the Court in Chrysler Corp. expressly stated that FOIA privacy exemptions
do not bar agency disclosure: “[T]he exemptions were only meant to permit the
agency to withhold certain information, and were not meant to mandate nondisclosure.” 441 U.S. at 293–94 (emphasis added).
173
See discussion supra Section III.B.
174
N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1003–04 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
175
See, e.g., Doe, 920 F.3d at 872. “FOIA is a disclosure statute. If an agency
wrongly withholds information in the face of a proper FOIA request, it violates
that statute. But if an agency discloses information pursuant to other statutory
provisions or regulations, the agency cannot possibly violate FOIA.” Id.; see also
Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 293–94 (citing statements in congressional record
reflecting that Congress intended exemptions to permit agencies to withhold certain kinds of information without mandating withholding).
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to withhold information, FOIA creates no correlative privacy
“right.”176 For that reason, under any reasonable interpretation of the
statute’s plain language, it is difficult to justify the Supreme Court’s
generous reading of the FOIA exemptions to support any so-called
statutory “right” of privacy.177 That is particularly true because
FOIA expressly grants a federal agency the discretion to withhold
information it reasonably foresees could (or would) pose an unwarranted invasion of “personal privacy.”178
Moreover, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the FOIA
exemption from the disclosure mandate for information in medical,
personnel, and similar records (“Exemption 6”) offers even less
agency discretion to withhold sensitive information than does the
exemption for information in criminal investigation records (“Exemption 7(C)”).179 But notwithstanding the Favish Court’s interpretation to the contrary, neither FOIA exemption confers a statutory
right of personal privacy on anyone, let alone the relatives of a decedent whose common law personal privacy rights terminated at
death.180
On the other hand, the federal Privacy Act of 1974, discussed in
Section III.E, created a limited statutory privacy right to prevent
government disclosure of individual information without the written
consent of the person to whom that information pertains.181 In fact,
the Privacy Act’s statement of legislative purpose expressly
176

As the next Subpart will explain, the Privacy Act of 1974 does arguably
create a limited statutory “right” of personal privacy, but any such right is expressly subject to the disclosure mandate of FOIA. See infra notes 189, 207–11
and accompanying text.
177
Cf. Favish, 541 U.S. at 170 (holding that “FOIA recognizes surviving family members’ right to personal privacy with respect to their close relative’s deathscene images . . . consistent with the unanimous view of the Courts of Appeals
and other lower courts that have addressed the question”) (emphasis added).
178
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (d) (2018) (explaining in subsection
(d) that “[t]his section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the
availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section”)
(emphasis added).
179
See Favish, 541 U.S. at 166. “Exemption 7(C)’s comparative breadth is no
mere accident in drafting. We know Congress gave special consideration to the
language in Exemption 7(C) because it was the result of specific amendments to
an existing statute.” Id.
180
See Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 293–94; see also Doe, 920 F.3d at 872.
181
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018).
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declared that “the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental
right protected by the Constitution of the United States.”182 But Favish had nothing to do with the Privacy Act; it involved a FOIA request by a third party for Foster’s death-scene photographs held by
a federal agency.183 Moreover, Foster’s family members who supported the agency’s decision to withhold the photographs were intervenors, not parties to the litigation.184 That is because FOIA, unlike the Privacy Act, does not authorize a private cause of action
against the government to protect anyone’s privacy interests that
might be implicated by mandatory disclosure of public records.185
Instead, FOIA authorizes a claim only by the requester of a public
record to enforce the FOIA disclosure mandate.186 And, even if the
agency exercises its statutory authority to withhold a public record
under one of the privacy-related exemptions, the burden is on the
agency itself—not a third party whose privacy might be implicated—to justify that discretionary decision.187
The Favish Court’s declaration that a statutory right of privacy
exists based solely on the language of FOIA’s two privacy-related
exemptions simply lacks a sound legal footing. The majority opinion adopted a non-textual interpretation based on a 1974 Department
182

Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a)(4), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896
(1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a) (emphasis added); see also id. § 2(b) (protecting individual privacy by authorizing an individual to preclude an agency from
disclosing “records pertaining to him . . . without his consent; [and authorizing]
civil suit for . . . willful or intentional [agency] action” that violates an individual’s
rights under the Act).
183
See Favish, 541 U.S. at 161. FOIA was enacted in 1966, predating the Privacy Act by several years. Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 165, at 512.
184
See Favish, 541 U.S. at 166–67.
185
See FOIA Guide, supra note 171.
186
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2018).
On complaint, the district court of the United States . . . has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court
shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether
such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of
the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and
the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.
Id. (emphasis added).
187
See id.
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of Justice Memorandum issued soon after Congress added Exemption 7(C) pertaining to medical, personnel, and similar records.188
While Congress arguably created a limited statutory “right of
personal privacy” by enacting the 1974 Privacy Act, the federal
courts have repeatedly acknowledged that an individual’s qualified
privacy right conferred by that Act is expressly subject to FOIA’s
pre-existing disclosure mandate.189 Thus, only by a federal agency’s
discretionary act—and, if challenged by a requester, a federal
court’s endorsement of that discretion—does anyone enjoy privacy
by an agency’s nondisclosure of a public record based on either
FOIA Exemption 6 or Exemption 7(C).190
Judicial Interpretation of “Personal” Privacy to
Encompass Surviving Relatives
While some courts have tread lightly in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of FOIA’s reference to “personal privacy” in
favor of statutory relational privacy interests, the Ninth Circuit has
not. In Marsh v. County of San Diego, Judge Kozinski, writing for
the panel, expansively interpreted Favish to recognize a constitutional right to relational privacy grounded in substantive due process.191 In doing so, the Marsh panel’s dicta reached well beyond
the reasoning expressed in Favish and the legislative history supporting the Supreme Court’s holding.
In Marsh, a surviving mother filed a statutory tort claim against
the county under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, objecting to the county’s publication of photographs of her son’s death scene and autopsy.192
D.

188

See Favish, 541 U.S. at 169; Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 165, at
539-40 (noting that Congress added FOIA Exemption 7(C) in 1974).
189
See, e.g., Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 293 n.14 (comparing FOIA and the
Privacy Act).
190
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
191
Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2012) (“For
precisely the same reasons [cited by the Court in Favish], we conclude that this
right is also protected by substantive due process.”).
192
Id. at 1152 (noting that the basis for Marsh’s claim was the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause); see also Williams v. Baker, 464 F. Supp. 2d
46, 49 (D. Me. 2006) (“A violation of an individual’s [constitutional] right of privacy can form the basis for a cause of action under § 1983.”) (citing Borucki v.
Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 847 (1st Cir. 1987)).
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Declaring the issue a matter of first impression, the panel held that
the common law right to non-interference with a family’s remembrance of a decedent is so ingrained in tradition that it is constitutionally protected as a matter of substantive due process. 193 The
court recognized family members’ well-established common law
privacy right to protect a loved one’s death images from publication:
The long-standing tradition of respecting family
members’ privacy in death images partakes of both
types of privacy interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. First, the publication of death images
interferes with “the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters . . . .” Few things are
more personal than the graphic details of a close family member’s tragic death. Images of the [decedent’s]
body usually reveal a great deal about the manner of
death and the decedent’s suffering during his final
moments—all matters of private grief not generally
shared with the world at large.
Brenda Marsh’s toddler son died in 1983 as a result of physical injuries while
in the care of Marsh's then-partner, Kenneth Marsh. Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1152.
Kenneth Marsh served two decades in state prison for homicide before he was
ultimately released. Id. After his release, Brenda married Kenneth Marsh, who
was later awarded $756,000 in compensation by the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board for the time he spent in prison. Mark Martin, $756,900 for 21 Years Wrongly Held in Prison / Dead Child's Mom Always
Said Convict Didn't Kill Her Son, SFGATE (Jan. 20, 2006, 4:00 AM),
https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/756-900-for-21-years-wrongly-held-inprison-2506317.php (“The compensation would mark the ending of a story worthy of a Hollywood script.”).
193
Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1154. A sister circuit described substantive due process
claims as follows:
A substantive due process claim can be stated two different
ways. One, substantive due process is violated when the state
infringes “fundamental” liberty interests without narrowly tailoring that infringement to serve a compelling state interest.
Two, substantive due process is offended when the state’s actions either “shock[ ] the conscience” or “offend[ ] judicial notions of fairness . . . or . . . human dignity.”
Riley v. St. Louis Cty. 153 F.3d 627, 631 (8th Cir. 1998) (alterations in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir.
1998) (en banc)).
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Second, a parent's right to control a deceased
child's remains and death images flows from the
well-established substantive due process right to
family integrity.194
While the Marsh panel’s dicta squarely declared that the surviving mother’s asserted privacy rights were grounded in substantive
due process, the court held that her § 1983 claim was nevertheless
barred by qualified immunity because the new-found substantive
due process right had not been “clearly established” at the time of
the county’s alleged violation.195 The case was remanded to address
a host of other state law claims, including intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress.196
Marsh was wrongly decided, and it appears to be generating a
circuit split on the issue of relational privacy interests that will require either Supreme Court intervention or congressional action to
resolve.197 Favish and the relational privacy rights the Marsh panel
194

Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1154 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599
(1977)); see also Roberts v. Bell, 281 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1086 (D. Mont. 2018)
(rejecting § 1983 claim by decedent’s daughter and her children against the county
for posting photographs on Facebook depicting decedent’s death; acknowledging
Marsh but concluding that the county’s “alleged conduct [did] not rise to the level
of a substantive due process violation”); Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573, 588,
591–92 (6th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging Marsh but holding that county defendants’ conduct did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected rights that would “shock the conscience”). But cf. Olejnik
v. England, 147 F. Supp. 3d 763, 778 (W.D. Wis. 2015) (declining to follow
Marsh, noting that “[t]he Seventh Circuit has not recognized any constitutionally
protected interest in the ‘right to remembrance’ or to the non-interference with a
loved one’s remains”; pointing out that the Supreme Court has expressly limited
the scope of substantive due process rights) (citing Gen. Auto Serv. Station v. City
of Chicago, 526 F.3d 991, 1000 (7th Cir. 2008)).
195
Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1159–60.
196
See Marsh v. County of San Diego, No. 37201200099693CUCRCT, 2013
WL 12144732, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 21, 2013).
197
See, e.g., Granato v. Davis, 2014-Ohio-5572, 2014 WL 7224556, at *1–5,
*15 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (rejecting a widow’s substantive due process claim
based on Marsh for interfering with her “right of sepulcher” stemming from coroner’s failure to correctly identify decedent’s body); see also, e.g., Riley, 153 F.3d
at 630 & n.5 (describing the Missouri common law right of sepulcher as the nextof-kin’s right “to perform a ceremonious and decent burial of the nearest relative—and an action for the breach of that right,’” which “typically involves a
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recognized as the “long-standing tradition of respecting family
members’ privacy in death images” involved informational privacy
interests—meaning the right to control the dissemination of personal
information.198 The Supreme Court has long distinguished informational privacy interests from decisional and autonomy privacy interests, such as reproductive decision making and parenting decisions
about children’s religious and academic education.199 While both aspects of privacy have relational components, Favish and other FOIA
cases addressed only informational privacy, the focus of this Article.
E.

Federal Privacy Act of 1974: Nondisclosure of Personal
Information; Exceptions
American privacy law took a decided turn in favor of protecting
personal informational privacy on the eve of 1975, when the federal
Privacy Act of 1974200 became law. The Act’s expressed purpose
was “to protect the privacy of individuals identified in information
physical intrusion, mishandling, or manipulation of the deceased’s body”) (citations omitted). The Riley panel rejected the plaintiff’s substantive due process
claim. Id. at 631 (“We are generally hesitant to extend substantive due process
into new arenas.”).
198
Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1154.
199
See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 (1977). “The cases sometimes characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.” Id.; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923) (freedom in raising and educating children); Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d
492, 517–19 (7th Cir. 2003), as amended on denial of reh’g (May 15, 2003); Indus. Found. of the S. v. Tex. Indus. Acc. Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 679 (Tex. 1976).
Several commentators have suggested that the right of privacy protected by the U.S. Constitution actually has two meanings: first, the ability of individuals to determine for themselves
whether to undergo certain experiences or to perform certain
acts—Autonomy; and second, the ability of individuals ’to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others’—the right to
control information, or Disclosural privacy . . . . Most privacy
cases decided by the Supreme Court to date have concerned autonomy. Little has been said of the constitutional dimensions of
disclosural privacy.
Id. (emphasis added).
200
Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, 1896 (1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018)).
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systems maintained by Federal agencies, . . . [by] regulat[ing] the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information by
such agencies.”201 In outlining the Act’s purposes, Congress declared that “the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right
protected by the Constitution of the United States.”202 Read in historical context, Congress surely meant to declare a personal right to
informational privacy, not decisional autonomy, which was still
very much in judicial flux in the mid-1970s.203
The federal Privacy Act sought to ensure that a person to whom
personal information pertains has the right to consent—or refuse
consent—to a third party’s request for personal information in any
“record”204 maintained by a federal agency.205 As the Supreme
201

Id. § 2(a)(5) (emphasis added).
Id. § 2(a)(4).
203
See infra notes 214–15 (discussing the constitutional right to privacy with
respect to decision-making autonomy). The 1974 Privacy Act predated Whalen v.
Roe by three years. Whalen was the first Supreme Court case that acknowledged
(in dicta) that informational privacy might have constitutional underpinnings.
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive government files . . . . The
right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to
avoid unwarranted disclosures . . . . [I]n some circumstances
that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution . . . .
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
204
See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (2018) (defining “record” for purposes of the
Privacy Act to mean “information about an individual that is maintained by an
agency”) (emphasis added)). “Agency” is separately defined to mean an agency
in the executive branch. See id. § 552a(a)(1); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (defining “agency”). Section 551(f)(1) expressly excludes Congress and the courts from
the definition. See id.
205
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). “CONDITIONS OF DISCLOSURE.—No agency shall disclose any record . . . to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a
written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom
the record pertains . . . .” Id. However, the Privacy Act lists 12 exceptions, including one that expressly makes the Act’s prohibition on disclosure (absent the subject’s written consent) subject to the mandatory disclosure provisions of 5 U.S.C.
§ 552. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (“No agency shall disclose any record . . . unless
disclosure of the record would be . . . required under section 552 of this title . . . .”). Thus, if a third party requests public information that is part of a federal
agency “record,” disclosure is mandatory under FOIA, unless one or more of the
FOIA exemptions authorize withholding. See Cochran v. United States, 770 F.2d
949, 955 (11th Cir. 1985).
202
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Court once described the Privacy Act of 1974, “Congress explicitly
require[d] agencies to withhold records about an individual from
most third parties unless the subject gives his permission.”206
The interplay between the federal Privacy Act and the federal
Freedom of Information Act is confusing at best.207 While the Privacy Act generally prohibits disclosure of personal information in
public records without the person’s written consent, FOIA generally
mandates disclosure of information in public records, whether personal or not.208 Each statute enumerates several exceptions, often
denominated “exemptions.”209 Privacy Act exemptions from the
general rule of nondisclosure authorize a federal agency to disclose
a record even without the subject’s written consent.210 In contrast,
FOIA exemptions to the general rule of disclosure authorize a federal agency to withhold information from a requester under specified
circumstances, notwithstanding the broad statutory mandate

206

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 n.14 (1979).
The convoluted drafting and codification of the two statutes, FOIA enacted
in 1966 and the Privacy Act in 1974, are no doubt among the reasons the FOIA
exemptions have generated so much litigation. See Cochran, 770 F.2d at 957 (referring to “the Privacy Act and the FOIA [as] two statutes between which there is
great tension”); see also Julia P. Eckart, The History of the Freedom of Information Act’s Apparent Failure to Define “Record,” and the Disconcerting Trend
of Applying Electronic Discovery Protocols to the FOIA, 11 ALB. GOV’T L. REV.
313, 313 (2018) (referring to FOIA jurisprudence as “a convoluted and complex
area of law” and noting that “this complexity began at the FOIA’s inception”).
But see Porter v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 717 F.2d 787, 797 (3d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he
[Privacy Act’s] language in section 552a(b)(2) could hardly be clearer. This nondisclosure provision expressly excepts disclosures required under the Freedom of
Information Act.”) (emphasis added); see also Cochran, 770 F.2d at 954–55.
[T]he relationship between the two acts is clearly established.
Subsection (b)(2) of the Privacy Act expressly defers to the
mandatory disclosure requirements of the FOIA by prohibiting
the nonconsensual release of personal information unless the
information is required to be disclosed under the FOIA.
Id. (emphasis added). To this reader (and probably most other critical legal readers), the relationship between the two statutes and their many exceptions is hardly
“clear.”
208
See Cochran, 770 F.2d at 954–55, 955 n.7 (summarizing relevant legislative history).
209
See id. at 954.
210
See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
207
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favoring disclosure of information in a federal agency’s records.211
Reconciling the terms of the companion statutes is nothing short of
a legal mindbender.212
211

See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); Cochran, 770 F.2d at 954. The Privacy Act purports
to address the potential for conflict in the two statutes’ respective exemptions, 5
U.S.C. § 552a(t), but that subdivision, like the others, is hardly a model of legislative clarity.
(1) EFFECT OF OTHER LAWS.— No agency shall rely on any exemption contained in section 552 of this title [FOIA] to withhold from an individual any record which is otherwise accessible to such individual under the provisions of this section [the
Privacy Act].
(2) No agency shall rely on any exemption in this section [the
Privacy Act] to withhold from an individual any record which
is otherwise accessible to such individual under the provisions
of section 552 of this title [FOIA].
Id. When read together, these subsections support the congressional purpose favoring disclosure of public records. If an individual requester may otherwise obtain access to a record containing personal information under the Privacy Act, the
agency cannot invoke one of the FOIA disclosure exemptions as a reason to withhold it. Id. § 552a(t)(1). Similarly, if an individual may obtain access to a public
record under FOIA’s disclosure mandate, the agency cannot invoke one of the
Privacy Act’s nondisclosure exemptions as a reason to withhold the record. Id.
§ 552a(t)(2); see Martin v. Office of Special Counsel, Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 819
F.2d 1181, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The two acts explicitly state that access to
records under each is available without regard to exemptions under the other.”).
This interpretation, as codified in § 552a(t), is also consistent with 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(b)(2), which expressly makes the Privacy Act’s general rule of nondisclosure subject to FOIA’s mandatory disclosure provisions. See Doe v. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, 790 F. Supp. 17, 19 n.1 (D.D.C. 1992). “It is well established that the
Privacy Act and FOIA provide separate routes for obtaining information.
Where . . . a person files requests under both Acts, an exemption must apply from
each Act in order for the material to be withheld.” Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(t)
(1988)).
To illustrate, assume that Requester A seeks an FBI record that contains personal information about Person B. Assume further that Person B declines to give
written consent to the FBI to disclose the record to Requester A, which the Privacy
Act requires as a precondition of disclosure. The FBI is nevertheless obligated by
FOIA’s general disclosure mandate to hand over the record to Requester A, unless
one of the privacy-related FOIA exemptions applies and the FBI elects to invoke
its discretion to withhold the record from Requester A. Even then, if Requester A
challenges that decision, the FBI must shoulder the burden of defending its discretionary decision to withhold Person B’s FBI record. Nothing in FOIA bars the
FBI from disclosing the record to Requester A, even though it contains personal

2020]

FAMILY SECRETS AND RELATIONAL PRIVACY

IV.

845

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

A.

Distinguishing Informational Privacy from Decisional
Privacy Rights
When judges and scholars debate the constitutional right of privacy, they typically speak of either the implied Fourth Amendment
right of individual privacy against unreasonable search and seizure,213 or the right of autonomy to make personal decisions regarding intimate consensual conduct, procreation, childrearing, and the
like.214 Outside the law enforcement context, the Supreme Court has
information pertaining to Person B. On the other hand, if Person B consents to
the release of the record to Requester A, the FBI cannot invoke one of the privacy
exemptions in FOIA to withhold the record. In other words, § 552a(t) imposes
additional constraints on an agency’s discretion to withhold personal information
that is otherwise available to third parties.
212
Cf. United States v. Saya, 247 F.3d 929, 940 (9th Cir. 2001) (coining the
descriptive term “semantic mindbender” in referring to defendant’s argument
challenging his sentence as a career offender).
213
E.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (holding that
allowing unrestricted government access to information of a “deeply revealing
nature” in a wireless carrier’s database of physical location information gleaned
from cell phones was subject to Fourth Amendment protection, even if a third
party had gathered the information); Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66
(2013) (5-4 opinion) (“When officers make an arrest [for a serious offense] supported by probable cause . . . , taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s
DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (expanding the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment to protect not just places, but personal privacy as well, holding that
what a person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected”).
214
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (addressing
the constitutional right to make “certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs”); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Right of Privacy in State Constitutional
Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 971, 972 (2006) (“One of the more significant branches of
the right of privacy concerns the right of an individual to make personal decisions
about his or her life free from government control; that is, the right of individual
autonomy.”); cf. Rao, Reconceiving Privacy, supra note 68, at 1123 (1998) (positing that the constitutional right of privacy with respect to decisional autonomy
should be reconceived “as a relational right that attaches to entire associations rather than to isolated individuals,” a right that is “bounded by the countervailing
interests of others [and] ends at the point when individuals within a protected
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grappled with the “constitutional right of privacy”—generally
meaning the right to autonomy in decision making—in a long line
of decisions over the last several decades.215
In what was perhaps the first of these decisions, the Supreme
Court considered whether a District of Columbia public utility commission violated public transit passengers’ constitutional privacy
right by broadcasting amplified radio programs in passenger cars.216
The Court rejected the claim after balancing the complaining passengers’ asserted privacy interests against the desires of other passengers who apparently enjoyed the radio broadcasts.217
relationship assert contradictory interests”). On occasion, a court erroneously refers to a constitutional right of informational privacy, even in factual and legal
contexts that implicate the constitutional right to decision-making autonomy. See,
e.g., Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1116 (10th Cir. 2006) (enjoining
enforcement of a Kansas statute requiring professionals to report minors’ voluntary sexual activity with other minors after holding, as a matter of first impression,
that “the right of informational privacy extends to minors”) (emphasis added).
The trial court’s decision on remand was vacated as moot by the Tenth Circuit
after the 2006 Kansas Legislature repealed the challenged statute. See Aid for
Women v. Foulston, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1102 (D. Kan. 2006), vacated, No.
06-3187, 2007 WL 6787808 (10th Cir. Sept. 20, 2007) (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. §
38-1522 (repealed 2006)). See generally Aliya Haider, Adolescents Under International Law: Autonomy as the Key to Reproductive Health, 14 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 605 (2008).
215
See supra note 214 and accompanying text; infra notes 216–39 and accompanying text.
216
Pub. Utilities Comm’n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 453, 463 (1952).
217
Id. at 463–64. The Court’s reasoning harkened back to the Lochner era,
when it held that “[t]he supervision of such practices by the Public Utilities Commission in the manner prescribed in the District of Columbia meets the requirements both of substantive and procedural due process when it is not arbitrarily
and capriciously exercised.” Id. at 465. Justice Frankfurter wrote separately to
express his admittedly biased reasons for recusing from the case: “My feelings
are so strongly engaged as a victim of the practice in controversy that I had better
not participate in judicial judgment upon it.” Id. at 467 (Frankfurter, J., writing
separately).
Justice Douglas dissented, noting first that the passengers’ assertion of a Fifth
Amendment liberty interest presented an issue of first impression. Id. (Douglas,
J., dissenting). Perhaps in light of the post-World War II times, he wrote eloquently of the possibility that the government could require radio broadcasts on
public transit systems to achieve ill motives:
If liberty is to flourish, government should never be allowed to
force people to listen to any radio program. The right of privacy
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However complete [a passenger’s] right of privacy
may be at home, it is substantially limited by the
rights of others when its possessor travels on a public
thoroughfare or rides in a public conveyance. Streetcars and busses are subject to the immediate control
of their owner and operator and, by virtue of their
dedication to public service, they are for the common
use of all of their passengers. The Federal Government in its regulation of them is not only entitled, but
is required, to take into consideration the interests of
all concerned.218
B.

Constitutional Basis for a Right to Informational Privacy
In a few cases, the Supreme Court has considered an asserted
constitutional right to informational privacy219—specifically, a right
to prevent government disclosure or misuse of sensitive personal information.220 However, to date, the Court has never expressly
should include the right to pick and choose from competing entertainments, competing propaganda, competing political philosophies. If people are let alone in those choices, the right of
privacy will pay dividends in character and integrity. The
strength of our system is in the dignity, the resourcefulness, and
the independence of our people. Our confidence is in their ability as individuals to make the wisest choice. That system cannot
flourish if regimentation takes hold. The right of privacy, today
violated, is a powerful deterrent to any one who would control
men’s minds.
Id. at 469 (Douglas, J., dissenting). However compelling Justice Douglas’s concerns, the constitutional “right of privacy” he asserted is more closely aligned with
the modern judicial conception of the First Amendment right of free expression,
including a right not to listen or a right not to know, rather than general due process liberty interests. Id.; see Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right
Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 980 (2009) (“[T]he [proposed]
right against compelled listening is most strongly grounded in the First Amendment values of autonomy, self-realization, and self-determination.”).
218
Pollak, 343 U.S. at 464.
219
Larry J. Pittman, The Elusive Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 19 NEV. L.J. 135, 150–67 (2018) (discussing the right to informational privacy and the recognition of such a right in Supreme Court case law).
220
See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977) (concluding that a state
statute creating a centralized computer file of individuals taking certain
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declared the existence of a right of informational privacy grounded
in the federal Constitution.221 In fact, as explained in more detail
below, the Supreme Court’s most recent opinion addressing the issue sidestepped it once again.222
Whalen v. Roe,223 decided in 1977, is the Supreme Court case
most often cited for the premise that the right to informational
prescription drugs impaired neither their interest in nondisclosure of personal information nor their interest in making personal decisions independently); see also
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965) (reasoning that while the
Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the Bill of
Rights provisions create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy,
including the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on access to contraception); Leiser v. Moore, 903 F.3d 1137, 1140 (10th Cir. 2018) (noting that
the asserted “right not to have one’s private affairs made public by the government
[is] sometimes referred to as a right to informational privacy”); Ellen Wright
Clayton et al., The Law of Genetic Privacy: Applications, Implications, and Limitations, 6 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 5 (2019) (“Informational privacy is a particularly important dimension of genetic privacy.”).
221
Lisa Anne Albinger, Personal Information in Government Agency Records: Toward an Informational Right to Privacy, 1986 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 625,
626, 626 n.12 (1986); Guy J. Sternal, Comment, Informational Privacy and Public
Records, 8 PAC. L.J. 25, 28 (1977).
222
See, e.g., NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011) (assuming, without
deciding, that “the Constitution protects [an informational] privacy right of the
sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon”). Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion was
more forthright:
Like many other desirable things not included in the Constitution, “informational privacy” seems like a good idea—wherefore the People have enacted laws . . . restricting government
collection and use of information. But it is up to the People to
enact those laws, to shape them, and, when they think it appropriate, to repeal them. A federal constitutional right to “informational privacy” does not exist.
Id. at 159–60 (Scalia, J., concurring).
223
429 U.S. 589 (1977). Whalen was a facial constitutional challenge to the
New York Controlled Substances Act, which provided for a centralized database
recording the names, addresses, and ages of anyone for whom a physician had
prescribed certain pharmaceutical drugs. Id. at 591. Various prescribing physicians, patients, and associations sought to enjoin the Act’s enforcement, claiming
that it violated their constitutional “rights of privacy.” Id. After taking pains to
give a detailed description of the Act’s legislative history and its provisions designed to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the collected information, the Court
concluded, “The New York statute . . . represents a considered attempt to deal
with . . . a problem” of vital local concern, and the statute “was a reasonable
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privacy is grounded in the federal Constitution.224 There, the Court
acknowledged—in dicta—the possibility that informational privacy
interests enjoy a constitutional foundation, but the Court declined to
articulate the parameters of the asserted right.225 Nor has the Court
ever held that an asserted constitutional right to informational privacy was violated, although scholars have observed that the asserted
right has “flourished by assumption over the decades [in the lower

exercise of New York’s broad police powers.” Id. at 597–98. Turning to the constitutional issues, the Court acknowledged that the New York statute was challenged on dual grounds: first, the asserted right of individuals to avoid disclosure
of personal matters, and second, the interest in decisional autonomy. Id. at 599–
600. The Court rejected both arguments, concluding that “neither the immediate
nor the threatened impact of the patient-identification requirements in the New
York [Act] on either the reputation or the independence of patients for whom
Schedule II drugs are medically indicated is sufficient to constitute an invasion of
any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 603–05; see
id. at 600.
224
See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Constitutionalizing Informational Privacy by Assumption, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 953, 955–56 (2012) (describing Whalen as “the
genesis of the assumed right”).
225
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605–06.
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive government files. . . . The
right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to
avoid unwarranted disclosures. Recognizing that in some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution,
nevertheless New York’s statutory scheme, and its implementing administrative procedures, evidence a proper concern with,
and protection of, the individual’s interest in privacy. We therefore need not, and do not, decide any question which might be
presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private
data whether intentional or unintentional or by a system that did
not contain comparable security provisions [to those provided
by the New York Controlled Substances Act].
Id. (emphasis added); see also Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457–
58, 465 (1977) (rejecting President Nixon’s asserted claim to informational privacy with respect to presidential papers and recordings, which it held was “weaker
than that found wanting in the recent decision of Whalen v. Roe”); cf. Pittman,
supra note 219, at 156 (interpreting Nixon as providing “strong support that the
Court affirmed the existence of a constitutionally protected right to informational privacy”).
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courts].”226 One scholar who canvassed federal and state court decisions addressing the issue concluded that “the majority of the federal
courts of appeals and a number of state courts have gone further
[than the Supreme Court] and accorded the idea of informational
privacy constitutional stature.”227
In 2011, the Court revisited the issue.228 Several contract employees who had worked for years at a NASA worksite challenged
the government’s recently adopted requirement that NASA complete and submit detailed employment questionnaires as part of the
agency’s background check process.229 When first hired, the contract employees had not been required to complete the background
check otherwise required for civil service employees.230 But after
the 9/11 Commission recommended improvements in security
measures, President George W. Bush issued a directive imposing a
new identification process for all federal employees, including contract employees.231 The Department of Commerce, which houses
NASA and its research facilities, complied with the presidential order by “mandating that contract employees with long-term access to
federal facilities complete a standard background check.”232 The
plaintiffs protested, arguing that the directive requiring them to disclose detailed personal information violated their constitutional
right to informational privacy grounded in the Fifth Amendment.233

226
Fan, supra note 224, at 956; see also id. at 972 (“In producing decisions
that could not quite decide if the constitutional right [to informational privacy]
exists and offering a Rorschach blot of standards that might govern if it did, the
Court punted to the lower courts to sort things out.”).
227
Id. at 974–75, 974 n.121 (citing illustrative cases by various federal and
state appellate courts); e.g., Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983).
228
See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (2011) (6-2 opinion; Kagan, J., not
participating).
229
Id. at 138.
230
Id. at 139.
231
Id. at 139–40.
232
Id. at 140.
233
Id. at 142. The Court noted that all of the information gathered in the government’s background check was subject to the nondisclosure provisions of the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 142; see supra note 204–06 and
accompanying text.
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The Court rejected the claim, once again sidestepping whether
the Constitution supports a right to informational privacy.234 After
carefully reiterating its dicta in both Whalen and Nixon, the Court
concluded that none of its other decisions had “squarely addressed
a constitutional right to informational privacy.”235 Following its reasoning in Whalen, the Court assumed, without deciding, the existence of the constitutional right but held that regardless of its hypothetical scope, the right “does not prevent the Government from asking reasonable questions of the sort included . . . in an employment
background investigation that is subject to the Privacy Act’s safeguards against public disclosure.”236
Justice Scalia concurred, joined by Justice Thomas, but they
threw cold water (figuratively speaking) on the very notion that the
Constitution protects informational privacy.237 They declared
bluntly that a “federal constitutional right to ‘informational privacy’
does not exist.”238 Thus, the Court declined to address the controversial issue any further than it already had in Whalen and Nixon,
decided more than three decades earlier, and two justices disclaimed
any constitutional basis whatsoever for the claimed right to informational privacy.239
In summary, Supreme Court precedents suggest that any federal
right to informational privacy is grounded in the Privacy Act, not

234

Nelson, 562 U.S. at 159.
Id. at 146.
236
Id. at 148. The Court stressed that the plaintiffs had challenged only the
collection of the information, not any risk of its improper dissemination to third
parties. Id. at 156. Even if they had, the Court reasoned that all information gathered was subject to the Privacy Act’s “protections against disclosure,” which it
considered sufficient to “evidence a proper concern” for the contract employees’
individual privacy. Id. (citations omitted). The Court, however, failed to
acknowledge that the Privacy Act's "safeguards" for personal information are expressly subject to FOIA's general disclosure mandate for information in public
records. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a), 552a(t).
237
Id. at 159–69 (Scalia, J., concurring).
238
Id. at 160; see also id. at 169 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice
Scalia that the Constitution does not protect a right to informational privacy. . . .
[T]he notion the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is a wellspring of
unenumerated rights against the Federal Government strains credulity for even
the most casual user of words.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
239
See supra notes 223–38 and accompanying text.
235
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the Constitution, and certainly not FOIA.240 The Favish Court incorrectly set the foundations of a federal right to informational privacy
in FOIA’s discretionary exemptions from the disclosure mandate.
Instead, the narrow scope of the federal right to informational privacy—at least for now—rests exclusively on the limited protections
granted by the Privacy Act of 1974, which are expressly subject to
FOIA’s disclosure requirements.
C.

First Amendment Constraints on Informational Privacy
Rights
Even if a constitutional basis exists for the right to informational
privacy, the Supreme Court has carefully circumscribed it, recognizing its inherent tension with the First Amendment freedom of
speech,241 freedom of the press,242 and even the freedom of association.243 For example, in 1975, the Court explained that invasion of
privacy claims for disclosure and dissemination of information
“most directly confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and
press.”244
Indeed, the Court has recognized that “the creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First
Amendment.”245 Thus, if any constitutional right to informational
privacy exists, the Court would necessarily need to address its inherent conflicts with the many well-established individual rights
See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004).
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460 (2011).
242
See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975).
243
See, e.g., NAACP v. State of Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460
(1958) (setting aside lower court’s contempt order and fine against NAACP for
failure to produce its membership list, which infringed NAACP members’ First
Amendment freedom of association “for the advancement of beliefs and ideas[,]
an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment”); cf. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 460 (holding that Maryland privacy and other common law rights of a deceased soldier’s grieving father must
yield to First Amendment rights lawfully exercised by anti-homosexual funeral
picketers, regardless of the hateful content of defendants’ message).
244
Cohn, 420 U.S. at 488–89 (“[T]he century has experienced a strong tide
running in favor of the so-called [common law] right of privacy.”).
245
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011) (striking down on
First Amendment grounds a Vermont statute restricting sale and dissemination of
information held by private pharmacies that revealed individual physicians’ drugprescribing practices).
240
241

2020]

FAMILY SECRETS AND RELATIONAL PRIVACY

853

protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.246 No doubt that
is among the primary reasons, if not the primary reason, the Court
has been reluctant to squarely address the issue.247
Given the wide gap that remains in the Court’s informational
privacy jurisprudence, lower federal courts are understandably mystified about how to resolve these increasingly complex issues.248
State courts too are left to resort to their own state constitutions,
statutes, or common law protections for informational privacy, without any clear guidance about First and Fourteenth Amendment constraints on those state rights.249
D.
Substantive Due Process and Privacy
In the early decades of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
resorted to the doctrine of “substantive due process” to strike down
state regulatory statutes that a majority of the Court thought intruded
too far into the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests of

246

See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1461, 1501, 1523–24 (2000) (explaining how First Amendment jurisprudence
constrains effective legal responses to “privacy-destroying technologies,” as illustrated by “the relatively limited protection against data acquisition provided by
existing privacy rules”); Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation of the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1061 (2009)
(“By the 1960s, . . . privacy and press rights had each gained sufficient strength
that the tension [between them] could no longer be ignored.”); see also Fla. Star
v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989) (acknowledging the “tension between
the right which the First Amendment accords to a free press, on the one hand, and
the protections which various statutes and common-law doctrines accord to personal privacy against the publication of truthful information, on the other”);
Cohn, 420 U.S. at 490 (explaining that if a privacy tort claim seeks to redress
publication of false or misleading personal information, the plaintiff must establish that information pertaining to a “‘matter[] of public interest’” qualifies as a
“knowing or reckless falsehood”) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–
88 (1967)).
247
See Froomkin, supra note 246, at 1523–24.
248
See Pittman, supra note 219, at 167–82 (discussing the federal courts’ various interpretations of informational privacy).
249
See Fan, supra note 224, at 974–75 & n.121 (citing illustrative cases by
various federal and state appellate courts); see also, e.g., Barry v. City of New
York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983).
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commercial businesses and even families.250 But since the midtwentieth century, the Supreme Court has repeatedly discredited
Lochner and its articulation of substantive due process as a rationale
for striking down state statutes on federal constitutional grounds.251
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court came perhaps as
close as it has in several decades to deciding a case on substantive
due process grounds.252 A sharply divided Court held that same-sex
couples have a constitutional right to marry.253 Justice Kennedy,
writing for a slim majority, cobbled together a host of constitutional
interests, including the constitutional right to autonomy in relational

250
E.g., Muller v. State of Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (upholding Oregon statute restricting working hours of women to a 10-hour workday, reasoning
“that [a] woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal functions
place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence”).
[T]here is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power by
the state . . . . Otherwise the 14th Amendment would have no
efficacy and the legislatures of the states would have unbounded power, and it would be enough to say that any piece of
legislation was enacted to conserve the morals, the health, or
the safety of the people; such legislation would be valid, no matter how absolutely without foundation the claim might be.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905), abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism,
92 GEO. L.J. 1, 10–11 (2003) (explaining that the Lochner era spanned from approximately 1897 to the mid-1930s, when “the Court was dominated by Justices
who expanded Lochner by voting to limit the power of government in both economic and noneconomic contexts”).
251
See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner . . . and like cases—that
due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional
when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely—has long
since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are
elected to pass laws.
Id.; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2616 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“The need for restraint in administering the strong medicine of substantive due process is a lesson this Court has learned the hard way.”).
252
See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616, 2618–19.
253
Id. at 2607 (“The Court, in this decision, holds same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States.”).
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decision-making,254 that support the “fundamental right to marry”
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.255 However, the majority
carefully avoided holding that the right was grounded in substantive
due process, notwithstanding the dissenters’ rather hyperbolic protestations to the contrary.256
More recently, however, the Court held that even the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry must yield to First Amendment protections for the exercise of religious freedom, at least when
a private businessperson asserts religious beliefs as the reason for
declining to transact business with a same-sex couple who plans to
marry.257 Thus, in any constitutional analysis, the courts must strike

Id. at 2597–98 (Kennedy, J., writing for a 5-4 majority) (“[T]hese liberties
[protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] extend to
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”) (citing Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86
(1965)).
255
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05.
[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the
same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The
Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied
to them.
Id.
256
See id. at 2618–19 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (referring to the majority’s
“aggressive application of substantive due process [that] breaks sharply with decades of precedent and returns the Court to the unprincipled approach of Lochner”); id. at 2632 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority clearly uses equal
protection only to shore up its substantive due process analysis, an analysis both
based on an imaginary constitutional protection and revisionist view of our history
and tradition.”). Justice Thomas opined that “[i]n its haste to reach a desired result,
the majority misapplies a clause focused on ‘due process’ to afford substantive rights, disregards the most plausible understanding of the ‘liberty’ protected
by that clause, and distorts the principles on which this Nation was founded.” Id.
at 2640 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
257
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1732 (2018) (Kennedy, J.) “[T]hese disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting
gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.”
Id.
254
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a balance among rights that are inherently in tension with one another.258
Returning to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Marsh articulating a
relational right of informational privacy grounded in substantive due
process, discussed supra in Section III.D, the rationale in that case
is questionable. The Supreme Court’s decisions have closely cabined, if not dismissed altogether, substantive due process as a constitutional foundation for striking down state laws.259 Judge
Kozinski’s substantive due process reasoning in Marsh directly contradicted the Supreme Court’s informational privacy jurisprudence.
V.

RELATIONAL PRIVACY INTERESTS AND DNA BIOBANKS260
[A] family history belongs to a collective of individuals, each one of whom has an informational privacy

258
See supra notes 241–49 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment constraints on the recognition of a constitutional right of informational privacy).
259
See, e.g., Olejnik v. England, 147 F. Supp. 3d 763, 778 (W.D. Wis. 2015)
(declining to follow Marsh in part because it “represents an expansion in substantive due process law not augured in Seventh Circuit precedent”; noting that “[t]he
Supreme Court . . . has been reluctant to enlarge the list of rights protected by
substantive due process . . . .”) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
720 (1997)).
260
DNA biobanks collect and link DNA samples with health information for
research purposes. Kelly E. Ormond et al., The Views of Participants in DNA Biobanks, 1 STAN. J.L., SCI. & POL’Y 80, 81–82 (2010). More than just a database,
a “biobank” is a unique type of repository that collects, stores, processes, and distributes biospecimens, such as DNA and other tissue samples, along with the associated data. Karen J. Maschke, Biobanks: DNA and Research, in FROM BIRTH
TO DEATH AND BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING
BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 11, 11–12 (Mary
Crowley ed., 2008). DNA biobanks are largely unregulated in the United States.
See id. at 12 (“Because the United States has no comprehensive regulatory framework that addresses these issues, there is confusion about when the rules governing research with humans apply to research with biospecimens and their data.”);
cf. Sarah Zhang, What Happens When You Put 500,000 People’s DNA Online,
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
6,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/11/what-happens-when-you-put-500000-peoples-dnaonline/543747/.
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interest in the security of the information and a spatial privacy interest in not knowing information.261
Recent developments with respect to the public availability of
genetic information pose serious risks for informational privacy
rights—whatever their source—not only for individuals, but also
their family members.262 In 2003, the scientific community announced that the Human Genome Project had successfully
“mapped” the entire human genome.263 Currently underway is the
Personal Genome Project, initiated in 2005, which seeks to collect
individual genomic data from volunteers for the purpose of sharing
it with the public “for the greater good.”264
261

GRAEME LAURIE, GENETIC PRIVACY: A CHALLENGE TO MEDICO-LEGAL
NORMS 146 (2002).
262
As scholars have noted, mapping the human genome, along with the increasing availability and affordability of direct-to-consumer genetic testing, has
unprecedented implications for family privacy. See, e.g., id. at 93.
The potential impact of the uses of genetic information on families, in addition to individuals, is often perceived as being
unique to this area of inquiry. Indeed, this is frequently held out
to be the case irrespective of the kind of genetic knowledge involved. The implications of this are far-reaching. The historical
focus of both ethics and law in the United Kingdom and the
United States – as paradigm examples of communities nurtured
in the Western liberal tradition – has been the rights of the individual to determine for herself the course of her life, with minimal interference by others. This notion is challenged by increased availability of genetic information. At least, this is so if
we take as our premise that genetic information relates not only
to the person from whom it is derived, but also to blood relatives
of that person. . . . [W]e cannot ignore the fact that genetic information derived from [a genetic] sample might also reveal information about the relatives of the sample source.
Id.; see also id. at 3 (“[I]ndividual genetic information can unlock many secrets
within the wider genetic family.”).
263
International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project, NAT’L
HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Apr. 14, 2003), https://www.genome.gov/11006929/2003-release-international-consortium-completes-hgp. The
Institute reported that “[t]he finished sequence produced by the Human Genome
Project covers about 99 percent of the human genome's gene-containing regions,
and it has been sequenced to an accuracy of 99.99 percent.” Id.
264
The Personal Genome Project, PERS. GENOME PROJECT, https://www.personalgenomes.org/us#about (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). For the national locus of
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The public interest in the results and implications of genome
mapping is arguably widespread.265 For example, the Public Broadcasting Service recently announced a forthcoming Ken Burns documentary titled The Gene: An Intimate History,266 based on a bestselling book by the same name.267 Direct-to-consumer genetic testing268 will soon become a billion-dollar commercial enterprise that
is projected to grow rapidly in coming years both in the United
States and abroad.269 For example, the DNA database maintained by
Ancestry, the largest commercial service offering genetic testing in
the global project, see The Harvard Personal Genome Project, HARV. MED. SCH.,
https://pgp.med.harvard.edu/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). The project “invite[s]
willing participants to publicly share their personal data for the greater good” for
the purpose of “creating public genome, health, and trait data.” The Personal Genome Project, supra.
265
See, e.g., Jamie Ducharme, A Major Drug Company Now Has Access to
23andMe’s Genetic Data. Should You Be Concerned?, TIME (July 26, 2018),
https://time.com/5349896/23andme-glaxo-smith-kline/.
266
Ken Burns Presents The Gene: An Intimate History, PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/show/gene/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
267
See SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE GENE: AN INTIMATE HISTORY (2016).
268
See, e.g., RB Altman, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Failure Is Not
an Option, 86 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 15, 15 (2009).
“[D]irect-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing . . . has arisen precisely because genotyping is sufficiently inexpensive and straightforward that it is easy for a company to set up shop. The cat is out of the bag: genotyping is already a commodity,
and full-genome sequencing is well on the way.” Id.
269
See Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Market to Hit $2.5 Bn by
2024: Global Market Insights, Inc., CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Dec. 11, 2018, 6:00
AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/direct-to-consumer-genetictesting-market-to-hit-2-5-bn-by-2024-global-market-insights-inc-830436085.html.
In 2010, with whole-genome sequencing becoming increasingly affordable, the promise of large-scale human genomic research studies involving hundreds, thousands, and even hundreds of thousands of individuals is rapidly becoming a reality.
The next generation of human genomic research will occur on
a scale that would have been nearly unfathomable [in 2000],
when the publication of the Human Genome Project’s first draft
results was still pending.
Jeantine E. Lunshof et al., Personal Genomes in Progress: From the Human Genome Project to the Personal Genome Project, 12 DIALOGUES CLINICAL
NEUROSCIENCE 47, 47 (2010); see also International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project, supra note 263 (“The international consortium announced
the first draft of the human sequence in June 2000.”).
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the United States, includes DNA samples submitted by more than
fifteen million “DNA customers.”270 So great is the public interest
in using DNA data to trace family history that some commentators
have referred to the “genealogy craze” that has fueled public demand for these services.271
The rapid proliferation of DNA biobanks by nonprofit organizations and commercial enterprises is a direct result of increasingly
affordable DNA sequencing.272 While some commentators long ago
anticipated the privacy issues associated with massive collections of
DNA samples,273 only a few legal scholars paid heed to the multi270

Ancestry Surpasses 15 Million DNA Customers, ANCESTRY (May 31,
2019), https://blogs.ancestry.com/ancestry/2019/05/31/ancestry-surpasses-15million-dna-customers/; see Antonio Regalado, More than 26 Million People
Have Taken an At-Home Ancestry Test, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612880/more-than-26-million-peoplehave-taken-an-at-home-ancestry-test/.
271
E.g., Ashley Barnwell, The Genealogy Craze: Authoring an Authentic
Identity Through Family History Research, 10 LIFE WRITING 261, 261–62 (2013);
Neil Genzlinger, TV’s Genealogy Craze Yields Game Shows and Paper Chases
but Also Interesting Lessons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/02/arts/television/tvs-genealogy-craze-yields-game-showsand-paper-chases-but-also-interesting-lessons.html.
272
See, e.g., C.W. Knetsch et al., DNA Sequencing, in MOLECULAR
DIAGNOSTICS PART 1: TECHNICAL BACKGROUNDS AND QUALITY ASPECTS 339,
339 (E. van Pelt-Verkuil et al. eds., 2019) (noting the “substantial reductions in
the cost of DNA sequencing” over the last 15 years); James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?: A Survey of the Privacy Policies
Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies,
28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 57 (2018). See generally The Cost of Sequencing a Human Genome, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost
(last
updated Oct. 30, 2019) (explaining the rapidly declining costs of both whole-genome sequencing and targeted, or partial, genome sequencing).
273
A few commentators foresaw the privacy risks to close family members of
disclosing highly sensitive personal information. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin,
Genetic Privacy, 23 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 320, 327–28 (1995).
Genomic information can wield considerable influence, affecting the decisions of health care professionals, patients and their
families, employers, insurers, and the justice system. How does
society control this information without stifling the real potential for human good that it offers? The answer to this question
must be in recognizing that trade-offs are inevitable. Permitting
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dimensional risks to relational privacy associated with the rapid expansion of commercial DNA biobanks.274
This Part explores some of the developing privacy issues implicating relational privacy, all of which warrant further research and
analysis. We have a pressing need for scholars and policymakers to
develop innovative legal approaches to balance legitimate privacy
interests against both the “public good” and the proprietary commercial interests associated with collecting, storing, accessing, and
disseminating DNA data. Because of its unique implications for
identifying known and unknown genetic relatives, revealing family
secrets, and affecting family relationships, genomic information in
the developing era of biotechnology turns out to be not so “personal”
to the individual after all. How policymakers balance the respective
interests in genetic data may prove to be one of the most confounding issues of our time.
A.
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Contract Rights
and Informed Consent
[T]he popular definition of privacy as an individual
control over personal information, does not result in
the protection of the interests commonly expressed

the Human Genome Initiative to proceed unabated will have
costs in personal privacy.
Id.; see also, e.g., Graeme T. Laurie, Challenging Medical-Legal Norms: The Role
of Autonomy, Confidentiality, and Privacy in Protecting Individual and Familial
Group Rights in Genetic Information, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 10–11 (2001); Leornard L. Riskin & Phillip P. Reilly, Remedies for Improper Disclosure of Genetic
Data, 8 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 480, 488 (1977); Note, The Relational Right of
Privacy Theory—Recovering on the Basis of Conduct Directed at a Deceased or
Living Relative, Friend or Associate, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 74, 75 (1966) (suggesting that the “distinct legal interest” in relational privacy arguably warrants common law protection, whether or not the relative to whom the defendant directs the
“encroaching acts” is living or dead).
274
See, e.g., Suter, supra note 68, at 362–63 (discussing implications for relational aspects of family privacy); Michael Avery, Landry v. Attorney General:
DNA Databanks Hold A Mortgage on Privacy Rights, 44 BOS. B.J. 18, 18 (2000)
(“The personal information disclosed [by DNA analysis] may violate the privacy not only of the subject whose DNA is analyzed, but also that of close relatives.”).
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regarding genetic databases and therefore needs to
be redrawn.275
In the United States, the most common approach to protecting
consumers’ privacy rights in genomic data is rooted in traditional
contract law.276 An individual willing to pay for commercial genetic
testing services can simply purchase a testing kit for a modest fee
and mail in a DNA sample, generally a small tube of the individual’s
saliva.277 Several weeks later, the direct-to-consumer genetic testing
provider sends back the individual’s digitized DNA profile, which
may take various forms depending on the consumer’s purposes for
seeking the information.278
Commercial genetic testing providers generally market their
DNA analysis services with a strong assurance of privacy.279 But as
a practical and legal matter, the provider’s fine-print “terms and conditions” govern the scope of the consumer’s “informed consent.”280
275

Salvör Nordal, Privacy, in THE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN
GENETIC DATABASES: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 181, 182 (Matti Häyry et. al eds.,
2007).
276
See Dana A. Elfin, DNA Testing? You Might Want to Wait for More Legal
Protection, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 7, 2019, 5:40 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-sciences/dna-testing-you-might-want-to-wait-formore-legal-protection.
277
ADAM RUTHERFORD, A BRIEF HISTORY OF EVERYONE WHO EVER LIVED:
THE HUMAN STORY RETOLD THROUGH OUR GENES 167 (2017) (describing similar features shared by direct-to-consumer genetic testing kits).
278
See id. at 167–68 (describing results); Jackson Ryan, What AncestryDNA
Taught Me About DNA, Privacy and the Complex World of Genetic Testing,
CNET (Mar. 22, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/ancestrydnataught-me-about-my-dna-privacy-and-the-complex-world-of-genetic-testing/
(describing the process of submitting a DNA sample and receiving results).
279
See,
e.g.,
Privacy
Is
in
Our
DNA,
23ANDME,
https://www.23andme.com/privacy/?%20vip=true (last visited Mar. 18, 2020)
(“Everyone deserves a secure, private place to explore and understand their genetics. At 23andMe, we put you in control of deciding what information you want
to learn and what information you want to share. See our privacy statement for
more info.”); Origins, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/origins (last visited Mar. 18, 2020) (“Your privacy and security are at the core of everything we
do. From the second you open your kit to the minute you get your results, you’re
in control of your DNA data.”).
280
E.g., Ancestry Terms and Conditions, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/termsandconditions (last visited Mar. 18, 2020) [hereinafter
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The concept of informed consent has a long history in United
States tort law.281 From a privacy perspective, the notion of “informed consent” represents the intersection between the right of personal autonomy (to make intimate decisions about one’s body or interpersonal relationships) and the right of informational privacy (to
regulate both the subject’s access to relevant information and its disclosure to third parties).282
The terms and conditions that apply to direct-to-customer genealogical services, which appear only online, also set out any restrictions on the service provider’s authority to retain the consumer’s DNA sample. More importantly, the terms and conditions
also govern whether the service provider may either disclose or sell
the DNA data to third parties, which may occur with or without the
individual’s informed consent.283 Ancestry’s “Privacy Statement”
Ancestry Terms and Conditions]; Terms of Service, 23ANDME,
https://www.23andme.com/about/tos/ (last updated Sept. 30, 2019) [hereinafter
23andMe Terms of Service] (“In order to use the Services, you must first agree to
the TOS [Terms of Service]. You may not use the Services if you do not accept
the TOS.”).
281
See Martin R. Struder, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: Protecting the
Patient’s Right to Make Informed Health Care Decisions, 48 MONT. L. REV. 85,
86–88 (1987). The traditional notion of “informed” consent developed in response
to paternalistic medicine—physicians making decisions they believed were in the
patient’s best interest and often without fully informing the patient. See Jørgen
Husted, Autonomy and a Right Not to Know, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE
RIGHT NOT TO KNOW: GENETIC PRIVACY AND RESPONSIBILITY 24, 32–33 (Ruth
Chadwick et al. eds., 2d ed. 2014). Some contemporary scholars have proposed
the more modern concept of “open consent” to describe the willingness of individual participants to include their DNA profiles in a public domain database with
open access, without any guarantee of privacy or confidentiality. See, e.g., Jeantine E. Lunshof et al., From Genetic Privacy to Open Consent, 9 NATURE
REVIEWS GENETICS 406, 406 (2008).
282
See supra notes 198–99 (distinguishing privacy right to autonomous decision making from privacy right to control access to and disclosure of personal
information).
283
See Jacob Brogan, Who Owns Your Genetic Data After a Home DNA Test?,
SLATE (May 23, 2017, 2:18 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2017/05/ancestrydnas-terms-and-conditions-sparked-a-debate-about-ownership-of-genetic-material.html (discussing the ownership implications of terms and conditions).
More than 12 million Americans have sent in their DNA to
be analyzed to companies like 23andMe and AncestryDNA.
The spit-in-tube DNA you send in is anonymized and used for
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assures customers that “[a]t Ancestry®, your privacy is a top priority.”284 But its terms and conditions include an indemnity provision,
by which the customer expressly waives any claim against Ancestry
for invasion of privacy, among other specified tort claims.285 If an
Ancestry consumer does assert a claim, mandatory arbitration provisions apply.286 And the customer must pay a fee of $250 to initiate
the arbitration process, which far exceeds the cost of the basic genetic testing service.287 Terms and conditions for direct-to-consumer
genetic drug research and both sites have been selling the data
to third-party companies . . . for some time. . . . Both companies
say this is not without consent.
When you sign up to share your DNA with Ancestry, you
opt-in for “informed consent research.” However, you have the
ability to opt out of this when you first agree to the service. Both
23andMe and Ancestry said that they will not share genetic information freely, without a court order, but people are welcome
to share the information online themselves sometimes in order
to find lost relatives or biological parents.
Nicole Martin, How DNA Companies Like Ancestry and 23andMe Are Using Your
Genetic Data, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2018, 2:49 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicolemartin1/2018/12/05/how-dna-companies-like-ancestry-and-23andme-are-using-your-genetic-data/#1b6bbfa36189.
284
Your Privacy, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/
privacystatement (last visited Mar. 19, 2020).
285
Ancestry Terms and Conditions, supra note 280 (“In addition, you release
Ancestry from all claims, demands, actions, or suits in connection with your User
Provided Content, including any liability related to our use or non-use of your
User Provided Content, claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, right of publicity, emotional distress or economic loss.”); see Clayton et al., supra note 220,
at 18 (“[C]onsumers typically agree to terms and conditions that contain exclusion
clauses that limit a company’s liability or provisions that limit the remedies and
damages available to the consumer.”) (citing Andelka M. Phillips, Reading the
Fine Print When Buying Your Genetic Self Online: Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing Terms and Conditions, 36 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 273, 282 (2017)).
286
Ancestry Terms and Conditions, supra note 280 (“If any dispute between
us is not resolved within 30 days after contacting us, then you and Ancestry agree
that we will resolve it through final and binding arbitration . . . .”).
287
Id. (“Fees: You will be required to pay $250 to initiate an arbitration
against us. If the arbitrator finds the arbitration to be non-frivolous, Ancestry will
pay all other fees invoiced by JAMS, including filing fees and arbitrator and hearing expenses. You are responsible for your own attorneys' fees unless the arbitration rules and/or applicable law provide otherwise.”). As of March 2020, the undiscounted retail cost of an AncestryDNA genetic test is $99. Your DNA Reveals
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genetic testing services also often allow access to customers’ genomic data by third parties, including law enforcement.288
While the direct-to-consumer genetic testing industry is booming, it remains largely unregulated.289 For certain kinds of healthrelated diagnostic tests, specifically those offered by 23andMe, the
Food and Drug Administration has asserted regulatory authority
over genetic testing services.290 But on the whole, the direct-to-consumer genetic testing is essentially self-regulating with respect to
genetic data collection and dissemination.291
More than Ever Before—From Your Origins to Your Family’s Health, ANCESTRY,
https://www.ancestry.com/dna/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2020).
288
See Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 272, at 54–57; Natalie Ram, Genetic
Privacy After Carpenter, 105 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1424 (2019) [hereinafter Ram,
Genetic Privacy].
[T]he rapidly growing use of consumer and other genetic testing
services will soon make third-party access to an individual’s
genetic data commonplace and nearly unavoidable. Courts
should act now . . . to protect the important Fourth Amendment
interests implicated when the government seeks to access genetic data in third-party hands.
Id.
289
Clayton et al., supra note 220, at 19.
290
Id. at 16–18; see Catherine M. Sharkey, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: The FDA’s Dual Role as Safety and Health Information Regulator, 68
DEPAUL L. REV. 343, 358–59 (2019) (describing the FDA’s evolving “hybrid”
regulatory model); Direct-to-Consumer Tests, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/vitro-diagnostics/direct-consumer-tests
(last updated Dec. 20, 2019); see also Lindsey Jones, FDA Regulation Defines
Business Strategy in Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, BIOTECH CONNECTION
BAY AREA (Oct. 30, 2017), https://biotechconnectionbay.org/view-points/fdaregulation-defines-business-strategy-in-direct-to-consumer-genetic-testing (explaining the various ways the FDA has regulated the industry, including current
and future developments). “As the field of genomics advances, genetic and genomic tests are becoming more common . . . . Yet most genetic tests today are not
regulated, meaning that they go to market without any independent analysis to
verify the claims of the seller.” Regulation of Genetic Tests, NAT’L HUM. GENOME
RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/policy-issues/Regulationof-Genetic-Tests (last updated Nov. 20, 2019) (explaining the limited scope of
federal regulation).
291
See Jean-Raphaël Champagne & Eliane Ellbogen, Genetic Testing and
Privacy: What is the Code to Regulating Ours?, FASKEN (Sept. 13,
2018), https://www.fasken.com/en/knowledge/2018/09/privacy-cybersecuritybulletin-genetic-testing-and-privacy/ (noting that the growth in the industry is in
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A 2018 study of the direct-to-consumer genetic testing industry
concluded that customers are generally provided insufficient information to make an informed decision about whether to purchase genetic testing services from a particular testing provider.292 The study
concluded,
[T]he privacy policies of genetic testing companies
are evidence of a larger problem with e-commerce,
big data, and the internet of things. Arguably all of
these industries might benefit from enhanced consumer privacy protections. . . . The goal should be
achieving the right balance between consumer protection and informed consent so that privacy can be
protected without unduly inhibiting the personal and
research benefits that come from the free flow of genetic information.293
The industry is beginning to respond, in part to deflect policymakers’ concerns about whether and how to regulate these services.294 In 2018, an American privacy protection think tank known
as the “Future of Privacy Forum” issued “best practices” guidelines
for the direct-to-consumer genetic testing industry.295 Those

part due to the “lack of government regulation in countries where the majority of
these companies are located, notably the United States and China”); Clayton et
al., supra note 220, at 18. Some states have enacted statutes that regulate various
aspects of these services, but limited federal regulation means that state regulations may have little practical effect on nationwide genetic testing services, especially if their terms and conditions include choice-of-law provisions and onerous
waiver and arbitration clauses. See generally Helen C. Dick, Note, Risk and Responsibility: State Regulation and Enforcement of the Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Industry, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 167, 184, 189 (2012).
292
See Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 272, at 66.
293
Id.
294
See, e.g., Champagne & Ellbogen, supra note 291.
295
See FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, PRIVACY BEST PRACTICES FOR
CONSUMER GENETIC TESTING SERVICES 1–2 (2018), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Privacy-Best-Practices-for-Consumer-Genetic-TestingServices-FINAL.pdf. The guidelines include detailed provisions for seeking a
customer’s express consent for collecting, analyzing, sharing, or reporting genetic
data. Id. at 4–6.
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guidelines encourage consumer education on the implications and
consequences of genetic testing.296 Several major companies have
signaled their willingness to follow the guidelines, which are designed to ensure that industry practices are responsive to the increasingly complex privacy issues relating to genetic testing.297 And in
2019, three of those genetic testing companies—Ancestry,
23andMe, and Helix—joined forces as the Coalition for Genetic
Data Protection to support best practices and to “promote the industry in Washington as lawmakers put more scrutiny on their privacy
practices.”298

As the industry continues to expand and the technology becomes more accessible, it is vital that the industry acknowledges and addresses the risks posed to individual privacy when
Genetic Data is generated in the consumer context. Given the
potential benefits that consumer genetic and personal genomic
testing can provide to Consumers and society, it is important
that this data is subject to privacy controls and used responsibly.
Id. at 1 (emphasis added). Note that nothing in this purpose statement acknowledges the inherent privacy implications for nonconsenting genetic relatives of
those individuals who, knowingly or not, give the genetic test provider “informed”
consent to digitize their own DNA profiles. Id.
296
See id. at 10 (“Companies should inform Consumers about the basics of
genetics and genetic testing; the risks, benefits, and limitations of genetic testing;
and the appropriate interpretation and use of results.”).
297
Carson Martinez, Privacy Best Practices for Consumer Genetic Testing
Services, FUTURE PRIVACY F. (July 31, 2018), https://fpf.org/2018/07/31/privacybest-practices-for-consumer-genetic-testing-services/ (listing 23andMe, Ancestry, Helix, MyHeritage, Habit, African Ancestry, and Living DNA as having
pledged to comply).
298
Alex Gangitano, DNA Testing Companies Launch New Privacy Coalition, HILL (June 25, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://thehill.com/regulation/lobbying/450124-dna-testing-companies-launchnew-privacy-coalition. But see David Lazarus, Column: DNA-Testing Firms Are
Lobbying to Limit Your Right to Genetic Privacy, L.A. TIMES (July 2, 2019, 5:00
AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-fi-lazarus-dna-geneticprivacy-20190702-story.html (reporting that the coalition is actually run by a
prominent lobbying firm that seeks to shape privacy laws and largely abides by
an “honor system”). See generally About CGDP, COALITION FOR GENETIC DATA
PROTECTION (last visited Mar. 12, 2019),
https://geneticdataprotection.com/about/ (“While we recognize the significant opportunities genetic testing and research present, we also support and advocate for
reasonable and uniform privacy regulation that will ensure the responsible and
ethical handling of every person's genetic data.”).
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While voluntary guidelines are a step in the right direction, they
may not be enough to ensure that consumers are well informed about
their rights to control access to their genetic data, including the
rights they expressly waive—probably unknowingly—when purchasing genetic testing services and their digitized results.299 If indeed the industry is not willing to self-regulate to better protect the
privacy interests of consumers, Congress should step in with federal
legislation to fill the void.300
But any yet-to-be-devised federal regulatory framework should
also address the relational implications of the individual customer’s
“informed consent.” The customer’s decision implicates the privacy
of genetic relatives, including those then unknown to the customer.
Biological relatives’ genetic identity and privacy are inherently
compromised because of the proliferation of partial DNA matching
techniques, not only in private DNA databases, but also in federal

299
See Terms and Conditions May Apply, YOUTUBE (July 13, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fzDgBITDaRY
(cautioning consumers about carefully reading lengthy terms and conditions
posted online and stating that “[a]nything digitized is not private, and that’s frightening”); see also Lily Rothman, New Documentary Tackles Online Privacy, TIME (July 11, 2013), http://entertainment.time.com/2013/07/11/new-documentary-tackles-online-privacy/ (reviewing the documentary film Terms And
Conditions May Apply).
300
See Sarah F. Sunderman, The Need for Regulation of Direct-to-Consumer
Genetic Testing in the United States: Assessing and Applying the German Policy
Model, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 357, 373, 378 (2013) (calling for the
United States to “follow Germany’s example by requiring satisfactory genetic
counseling and enacting standardized laboratory procedure requirements” but not
Germany’s requirement that only physicians trained in genetic counseling may
order genetic testing); Caroline F. Wright et al., Regulating Direct-to-Consumer
Genetic Tests: What Is All the Fuss About?, 13 GENETICS MED. 295, 295, 300
(2011) (reporting “a lack of consensus as to the extent to which regulators should
be involved, what minimum standards should and could be required across an
international and predominantly internet-based market, and the role of legislation
versus self-governance or voluntary guidance within an appropriate regulatory
framework”; and recommending five “overarching principles” of regulation); cf.
L. Kalokairinou et al., Legislation of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing in Europe: A Fragmented Regulatory Landscape, 9 J. COMMUNITY GENETICS 117, 119
(2018) (reviewing regulations adopted by numerous European nations to regulate,
restrict, or prohibit direct-to-consumer genetic testing).

868

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:781

and state forensic DNA databases.301 As commentators have observed, “it is not possible to rely on individual informed consent to
do all the ethical work in the context of developments such as genetic databases.”302
B.

Forensic and Genetic Genealogy: Cold Cases and Partial
DNA Matches
Familial searching builds on one of the most basic
facts of genetics: DNA is shared among family members. As a result, a forensic DNA profile ‘not only
reveal[s] extensive genetic information about the individual whose “genetic fingerprint” is on file, but
also about his or her close relatives.’ Familial
searching uses this principle to infer that someone
whose DNA is a close, but not perfect, match to a

301

See, e.g., Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender
Databases to Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 249, 255–59
(2006) (considering the legal and policy implications of using partial matches in
forensic DNA databases to identify and investigate relatives, while acknowledging that “[t]he legal and policy implications of this kind of [familial forensic DNA
searching] have been discussed only rarely and briefly”); Natalie Ram, The Mismatch Between Probable Cause and Partial Matching, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 182, 183 (2009) (“[B]ecause close genetic relatives have similar ‘genetic
motifs,’ a partial match between a crime scene sample and a stored genetic profile
may also implicate family members.”); Mary McCarthy, Note, Am I My Brother’s
Keeper?: Familial DNA Searches in the Twenty-First Century, 86 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 381, 398 (2011); Heather Murphy, Sooner or Later Your Cousin’s DNA
Is Going to Solve a Murder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/us/golden-state-killer-dna.html; Heather Murphy, How
Your DNA Could Solve a Murder, WEEK (May 19, 2019), https://theweek.com/articles/841864/how-dna-could-solve-murder (“If you are an American, it is likely
that your name can be extrapolated even if you have never taken a DNA test. In
the hands of an advanced genealogical sleuth, often all that is needed to identify
someone from a drop of saliva, blood, or semen are the DNA profiles of two third
cousins.”).
302
Ruth Chadwick, The Philosophy of the Right to Know and the Right Not to
Know, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW: GENETIC PRIVACY
AND RESPONSIBILITY supra note 281, at 13, 21–22 (emphasis in original).
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crime scene sample might be related to the offender.303
In 2018, DNA evidence was used to identify the elusive Golden
State Killer as Joseph James DeAngelo.304 He was arrested and prosecuted for committing a series of heinous rapes and murders during
the 1970s and 1980s in six counties surrounding Sacramento, California.305 Investigators uploaded the killer’s DNA profile, generated
by analyzing decades-old crime scene tissue samples, to a public
domain genealogy website known as GEDmatch,306 and then traced
the DNA profile to two distant cousins using “partial match”

303

Suter, supra note 68, at 311 (citing Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks:
Law Enforcement's Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767,
782 (1999); Alice A. Noble, DNA Fingerprinting & Civil Liberties, 34 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 149, 150 (2006)).
304
See Wamsley, supra note 7.
305
See Darrell Smith, Golden State Killer/East Area Rapist Suspect in Court
as His Lawyers Call for Long Delay, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 22, 2019, 3:39
PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article234280297.html. As this
Article went to press, DeAngelo offered to plead guilty in exchange for a life
sentence. He faces the death penalty if convicted. Michael Levenson & Heather
Murphy, Golden State Killer Suspect Offers to Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/04/us/golden-state-killer-trial.html.
306
See Zoë Corbyn, How Taking a Home Genetics Test Could Help Catch a
Murderer, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/dec/01/how-home-dna-tests-are-solving-cold-casesgolden-state-killer (describing the controversy surrounding the use of the public
domain GEDmatch database to identify the Golden State Killer). Once the story
broke in the media in April 2018, the owner of GEDmatch, Curtis Rogers, faced
a small exodus of users for allowing law enforcement access to the database without subscribers’ consent. See id. In May 2019, GEDmatch changed its policy to
disallow law enforcement use of the database unless a subscriber expressly opts
in to permit that use. See Natalie Ram, The Genealogy Site That Helped Catch the
Golden State Killer is Grappling with Privacy, SLATE (May 29, 2019, 7:30 AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2019/05/gedmatch-dna-privacy-update-law-enforcement-genetic-geneology-searches.html; Judy G. Russell, GEDmatch Reverses Course, LEGAL GENEALOGIST (May 19, 2019), https://www.legalgenealogist.com/2019/05/19/gedmatch-reverses-course/ (“The change came after a firestorm over the decision of the site owners . . . to allow an exception to their published terms of use in a Utah case without informing site users or obtaining informed consent to such an exception.”).
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methodology.307 Having narrowed down the possible suspects to
one male with the expertise of a genetic genealogist,308 investigators
secured a paper cup DeAngelo had discarded, analyzed the DNA
from the saliva sample, and found a direct match with the stored
DNA that police had taken from the Golden State Killer’s crime
scenes.309
Law enforcement investigators have used DNA as a forensic
tool for decades.310 Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Federal Bureau
307

See Adhiti Bandlamudi, Tactics Used to Find Golden State Killer Raise
Privacy and Legal Questions, NPR (Apr. 27, 2018, 4:22 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/04/27/606580162/tactics-used-to-find-golden-statekiller-raise-privacy-and-legal-questions (explaining how law enforcement compared DNA crime scene samples to online digitized DNA profiles uploaded by
DeAngelo’s genetic relatives to GEDmatch, a public domain genealogy website,
to identify DeAngelo without first securing a search warrant); Partial Matches:
CODIS Searches and Partial Matches, Cont., NAT’L INST. JUST., https://projects.nfstc.org/fse/12/12-03.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2020) (“A partial match
occurs when the [individual DNA database profile] is excluded as the perpetrator
because it does not match the crime scene profile, but the analyst identifies a sufficient number of alleles in common between the [individual DNA profile] and
crime scene profile to believe that a family member [of the individual] may be the
true perpetrator.”); Jeremy W. Peters, New Rule Allows Use of Partial DNA
Matches,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
24,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/25/nyregion/25dna.html (reporting the adoption of a New
York rule in December 2009 allowing partial DNA matches to identify perpetrators and quoting forensic experts as explaining that “[s]ince family members share
genetic traits, a partial DNA match allows investigators to narrow searches to relatives of people whose DNA is already in the state database”); see also Ram,
Genetic Privacy, supra note 288, at 1359–60 (explaining the forensic use of partial match methodology); Ram, DNA by the Entirety, supra note 5, at 882
(“[S]ource-excluding partial matches may . . . inculpate the offender’s close genetic relatives as possible perpetrators of a crime.”).
308
See Corbyn, supra note 306. While the two distant cousins were each genetically related to DeAngelo, they were not related to one another. See id. Tracing them to the killer required a genetic genealogist to research the respective
family histories of both distant cousins to identify an intermarriage between the
two family lines. See id. Once that marriage was identified, other records led to a
family with four offspring, including one male. See id. Ms. Corbyn explains more
about the genetic genealogy process of “triangulation” in her Guardian article.
See id.
309
Roberta Estes, The Golden State Killer and DNA, DNAEXPLAINED (Apr.
30, 2018), https://dna-explained.com/2018/04/30/the-golden-state-killer-anddna/.
310
See generally, e.g., Hibbert, supra note 303, at 773–78.
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of Investigation (“FBI”) and its state counterparts built DNA profile
databases using samples taken from convicted criminals, crime
scenes, and unidentified human remains.311 The “familial searching”
methodology using partial DNA matches was first used in the mid2000s.312 In 2006, investigators in the United Kingdom used the
technique to identify the “Dearne Valley Shoe Rapist,” who had
committed a series of offenses two decades earlier using a unique
modus operandi—tying up the victims with their stockings and then
absconding with their stiletto heels.313
In February 2005, a variation of familial searching was used to
identify, prosecute, and eventually convict the “BTK Killer,” who
had eluded police in Wichita, Kansas, for decades.314 He was identified after he sent local police a message on a floppy computer disk,
which was digitally traced to a local church’s computer. Police narrowed the investigation to Dennis Rader, who attended the
church.315 To confirm his identify, investigators obtained a warrant
to recover a biological tissue sample taken from Rader’s daughter,
Kerri Rawson, during a routine diagnostic test at a university health
clinic.316 The BTK Killer’s identity was confirmed by the partial
match of his daughter’s DNA with the perpetrator’s crime scene

311

See id.; see also DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 210304, 108 Stat. 2065, 2069 (1994) (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §
12592).
312
See, e.g., Suter, supra note 68, at 310 (“[I]n 2006, investigators turned
to a new technology called familial searching to identify local individuals
in the DNA database whose genetic profile closely matched the crime scene
evidence, suggesting they might be related to the rapist.”).
313
See id.
After visiting two of the forty-three individuals with partial
matches, a police officer knocked on the door of June Lloyd and
told her, “We’re running a cold case investigation and there are
some similarities between your DNA and the offender’s DNA.
Do you mind telling me, have you got any brothers?”
Id. To her surprise, June Lloyd’s only brother, James Lloyd, turned out to be the
rapist. Id. He was later convicted for four rapes and two attempted rapes. Id.
314
See Mark Hansen, How the Cops Caught BTK: Playing to a Serial Killer’s
Ego Helped Crack the Case, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2006, at 44, 45, 47–48. “BTK Killer”
was the moniker adopted by the unidentified serial murderer himself based on his
modus operandi: to “bind, torture, and kill” his victims. Id. at 45.
315
Id. at 48.
316
Id.

872

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:781

DNA.317 At the age of twenty-six, Rawson learned from an FBI
agent, who visited her home unannounced, that her beloved father
was the serial killer known as BTK, whom police had been searching for since the mid-1970s.318
Id. See generally KERRI RAWSON, A SERIAL KILLER’S DAUGHTER: MY
STORY OF FAITH, LOVE, AND OVERCOMING (2019).
318
See RAWSON, supra note 317, at 6–7; see also A Serial Killer’s Daughter:
Watch the Trailer, THOMAS NELSON, https://www.thomasnelson.com/p/a-serialkillers-daughter/#trailer (last visited Mar. 13, 2020) (promoting the book release).
Familial searching like that used to confirm the identity of the BTK Killer
raises other ethical and legal questions, such the rightful owner of a biological
tissue sample taken from a medical patient. See Suter, supra note 68, at 251. The
ethical and legal issues concerning excised human tissue were the subject of a
best-selling book telling the story of Henrietta Lacks, a young mother who died
of cervical cancer in 1951. See REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF
HENRIETTA LACKS 3 (2010). While Lacks was still living, and apparently without
her express consent, tissue samples were taken from her tumor by a Johns Hopkins
University Hospital physician. See id. at 33. The tumor cells were later used to
develop a cell line that has been the source of numerous innovative therapeutic
medical interventions, all highly lucrative. See id. at 99–104. Her surviving spouse
and children were never told by anyone in the medical community, and they never
shared in the profits derived by medical researchers from the resulting “HeLa”
cell line. See id. at 194–95.
Courts have seldom addressed disputes about the ownership rights to biological tissue samples. See, e.g., Ram, DNA by the Entirety, supra note 5, at 891. The
few that have done so address the question from a variety of perspectives, but no
court has held that the individual from whom the tissue is taken retains any ownership interests. See, e.g., Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 673–74 (8th
Cir. 2007) (applying Missouri law to hold that medical research participants made
an “informed decision” and expressly intended to make a gift of their biological
materials, and the University accepted them); Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990) (applying California law to find that tissue donor
failed to state a claim against University and its physician for conversion of tissue
samples, but he could pursue his claims against his physician for breach of fiduciary duty and failure to obtain his informed consent); see also E. RICHARD GOLD,
BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN BIOLOGICAL
MATERIALS 23–40 (1996) (discussing Moore and the “property debate” over biological tissue). See generally Gary E. Marchant, Property Rights and BenefitSharing for DNA Donors?, 45 JURIMETRICS 153, 153 (2005) (challenging the “traditional assumption” that “the donors of genetic material used in research act altruistically and are entitled to no property rights or direct benefit-sharing in the
fruits of the research”).
But in the context of DNA testing, the issue is not who owns the tissue sample
itself, but rather who controls the use and dissemination of the DNA profile—the
317
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In 2013, the Supreme Court held that taking a DNA sample from
an arrestee, even if only for identification purposes, qualifies as a
Fourth Amendment “search.”319 However, the Court held that no
warrant was necessary to conduct a relatively non-intrusive DNA
cheek swab search in a hospital setting after the defendant had been
arrested for a serious felony offense for which he was later convicted.320 Some courts have followed similar reasoning to uphold
information derived from an individual’s biological tissue. See Suter, supra note
68, at 332–34 (highlighting the importance that information can have on protecting “personhood interests”). The ability or inability to control that information
raises serious privacy implications for the DNA subject and arguably her biological relatives, whether known or unknown. See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d 1085, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging in
dicta professional baseball players’ “strong privacy interests” in urine specimens
and associated drug test results); Norman–Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab.,
135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding invasion of privacy claim by government employees whose blood and urine samples were tested for sickle cell
anemia and syphilis without their consent); Havasupai Tribe of Havasupai Reservation v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1076 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (stating
in dicta that “invasions of privacy relating to tissue samples such as the Tribe described in its claim notices naturally give rise to subjective personal injury, even
when, as here, the samples are given voluntarily”); Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc.,
972 P.2d 1060, 1064 (Colo. App. 1998) (upholding invasion of privacy claim by
student whose blood sample was tested for HIV virus without his consent), as
modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 6, 1998).
Similarly, when law enforcement seizes tissue samples to create DNA profiles, inchoate and abstract informational privacy issues are implicated—of the
sort that cannot be resolved by concepts of property law and economics. See, e.g.,
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2177 (2016) (holding that police may
administer a breath test, but not a blood test, during a warrantless search incident
to an arrest for drunk driving; analogizing a blood sample to a DNA sample “from
which a wealth of additional, highly personal information could potentially be
obtained,” while a breath test leaves nothing for police to retain); United States v.
Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 243–44 (4th Cir. 2012) (observing that “an analysis required
to obtain a DNA profile . . . generally qualifies as a search, because an individual
retains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the information obtained from the
testing”).
319
See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446 (2013) (“It can be agreed that
using a buccal swab on the inner tissues of a person’s cheek in order to obtain DNA samples is a search.”).
320
Id. at 451 (analogizing the use of DNA for identifying an arrestee to “the
accepted use of fingerprint databases,” while acknowledging that DNA provides
“unparalleled accuracy” and that “DNA collected from arrestees is an irrefutable
identification of the person from whom it was taken”).
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body-tissue samples taken from a broad array of criminal offenders
or suspects, including “nonviolent felons, misdemeanants, and even
arrestees.”321 On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit has held that a
DNA profile generated from a tissue sample taken from a crime victim’s clothing at the scene is an unconstitutional search.322 The court
reasoned that a crime victim has a higher expectation of privacy than
a criminal suspect.323
The Justice Department has recently initiated a proposed rule
amendment that would effectively require DNA testing of non-U.S.
citizens. In October 2019, the Trump Administration announced its
intent to take DNA samples from immigrants detained when crossing the United States border.324 That new policy suggests that
321

Suter, supra note 68, at 311.
See Davis, 690 F.3d at 246 (“[A] victim retains a privacy interest in his or
her DNA material, even if it is lawfully in police custody.”).
323
See id. at 245–46 (noting that “a court's constitutional analysis may differ
depending on whether the person is an arrestee or a ‘free person,’” and that “extraction of DNA and the creation of a DNA profile result in a sufficiently separate
invasion of privacy that such acts must be considered a separate search . . . even
when there is no issue concerning the collection of the DNA sample”) (citations
omitted).
324
See Bobby Allyn & Joel Rose, Justice Department Announces Plan to Collect DNA From Migrants Crossing the Border, NPR (Oct. 21, 2019, 5:20 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/10/21/772035602/justice-department-announces-planto-collect-dna-from-migrants-crossing-the-bord. A current Department of Justice
regulation provides that “[a]ny agency of the United States that arrests or detains
individuals or supervises individuals facing charges shall collect DNA samples
from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted, and from nonUnited States persons who are detained . . . .” 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(b) (2019) (emphasis added). “Non-United States persons” are defined as “persons who are not
United States citizens and who are not lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” Id. However, the DNA sampling requirements “do not include, except to
the extent provided by the Secretary of Homeland Security . . . aliens with respect
to whom the Secretary . . . , in consultation with the Attorney General, determines
that the collection of DNA samples is not feasible because of operational exigencies or resource limitations.” Id. § 28.12(b)(4). The proposed new rule would rescind subsection (b)(4). See DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 84 Fed. Reg. 56397, 56398 (proposed Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. § 28.12). The proposed rule would effectively require DNA sampling from
most non-citizen detainees except those lawfully admitted for permanent residence. See id. The justification for amending the rule was explained, in part, as
follows:
322
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federal courts will soon confront thornier questions about the propriety, under the Fourth Amendment, of DNA sampling by immigration law enforcement officers without individualized suspicion
of criminal activity.325 The most troubling aspect of the Justice Department’s rationale for amending the rule is its expressed assumption that immigrants, other than those who enter lawfully for permanent residence, categorically pose a risk of criminal activity as great
as federal arrestees or convicted offenders.326 Moreover, categorical
[In 2010,] Secretary of Homeland Security Janet A. Napolitano advised . . . that categorical DNA collection from aliens in
this class was not feasible, on the grounds described in §
28.12(b)(4). However, subsequent developments have resulted
in fundamental changes in the cost and ease of DNA-sample
collection. DNA-sample collection from persons taken into or
held in custody is no longer a novelty. Rather, pursuant to the
mandate of § 28.12(b), it is now carried out as a routine booking
measure, parallel to fingerprinting, by Federal agencies on a
government-wide basis. The established DNA-collection procedures applied to persons arrested or held on criminal charges
can likewise be applied to persons apprehended for immigration
violations.
Id. at 56398–99.
[The] proposed rule’s removal of the authorized exception
to DNA collection for certain detained aliens appearing in 28
CFR 28.12(b)(4) will help to ensure that . . . DNA technology
will be consistently utilized to further public safety and the interests of justice in relation to immigration detainees, as has
long been the case in relation to [federal] criminal arrestees, defendants, and convicts . . . .
Id. at 56400.
325
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (“The Court
usually requires ‘some quantum of individualized suspicion’ before a search or
seizure may take place.’”) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 560–61 (1976)); see also United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 244 (4th Cir.
2012) (“[O]ur precedent and . . . decisions of our sister circuits . . . uniformly
recognize that persons who have not been arrested [such as crime victims] have a
greater privacy interest in their DNA than would persons who have been arrested
. . . .”).
326
See DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 84 Fed. Reg. at
56399.
[D]istinguishing the treatment of criminal arrestees and immigration detainees with respect to DNA identification is largely
artificial, in that most immigration detainees are held on the
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DNA testing of non-U.S. citizens at the border will undoubtably advance the Trump Administration’s ability to identify, investigate,
and prosecute a detainees’ relatives who may have already immigrated to the United States, whether lawfully or unlawfully.
As this Article went to press, law enforcement access to private
DNA databases took yet another turn. As noted above, GEDmatch
took steps in May 2019 to protect the privacy of non-consenting
subscribers by barring law enforcement access to their DNA profiles
while allowing consenting subscribers to expressly opt in.327 Nevertheless, in late October 2019, a Florida trial court judge issued a
search warrant that authorized a detective to search the entire GEDmatch database, including the DNA profiles of subscribers who had
not consented to law enforcement access.328 Reporters sought a
comment from New York University Law Professor Erin Murphy,
who noted that “[t]he company made a decision to keep law enforcement out, and that’s been overridden by a court. It’s a signal that no
genetic information can be safe.” 329
basis of conduct that is itself criminal. Aliens who are apprehended following illegal entry have likely committed crimes
under the immigration laws, such as 8 U.S.C. [§§] 1325(a) and
1326, for which they can be prosecuted. . . . The practical difference between criminal arrestees and immigration detainees,
for purposes of DNA-sample collection, has been further
eroded through policies favoring increased prosecution for immigration violations.
Id. Of course, “policies favoring increased prosecution for immigration violations” are code words for the Trump Administration’s onerous policies deterring
immigration. See, e.g., Priscilla Alvarez, ICE Ramps up DNA Testing for Migrant
Families Along the Southern Border, CNN (July 22, 2019, 6:51 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/22/politics/ice-deploys-dna-testing-at-border/index.html (“The implementation of DNA testing along parts of the US-Mexico
border is part of a concerted effort by the Trump administration to crack down on
illegal immigration, as the number of apprehensions at the border continue to outpace recent years.”).
327
See Russell, supra note 306.
328
Kashmir Hill & Heather Murphy, Your DNA Profile is Private? A Florida
Judge Just Said Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/business/dna-database-search-warrant.html?auth=loginemail&login=email.
329
Id.; see also Scott Simon, Privacy and DNA Tests, NPR (Nov. 9, 2019,
8:12 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/09/777888000/privacy-and-dna-tests
(interviewing Professor Erin Murphy regarding the privacy ramifications of the
Florida search warrant).
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As this discussion demonstrates, forensic familial searching using partial DNA matches has become a powerful law enforcement
tool. If extended to private DNA databases, whether public domain
or proprietary, the use of forensic genealogy significantly expands
the universe of DNA profiles accessible to law enforcement. That
universe potentially includes millions of individuals who are merely
genetically related to a suspect, arrestee, or detainee, but who are
not themselves suspected of any criminal activity.
The possible public benefits of solving “cold cases” using these
techniques should neither eclipse nor overshadow the serious privacy implications. Those who willingly share DNA with proprietary
genealogy databases are most likely unaware that without clear restrictions, criminal investigators have the ability to access their
DNA profiles, without customers’ knowledge, for use in identifying
genetic relatives who are (or may be) suspected of criminal conduct.
The latest move by the Trump Administration threatens to further
expand the DNA universe accessible to law enforcement, raising the
specter that the United States will one day have a “de facto” national
DNA database from which none of us—including our genetic identities—can ever escape.330
330

See Ram, U.S. DNA Database, supra note 5.
[Law enforcement use of consumer genetics platforms for the]
identification of individuals who are not directly included in a
genetic database runs afoul of any given reason [justifying] law
enforcement use of such databases [as] legally and ethically acceptable. These individuals have not previously been arrested
or convicted of a crime. Nor have they “volunteered” their DNA
on a consumer genetics platform. Instead, like millions of ordinary Americans, these individuals are identifiable to police
through the genetic data of their kin. Few genetic relationships,
however, are voluntary. Even if parents can be said to voluntarily choose to have children, children plainly do not choose their
parents. Nor do we choose our siblings, cousins, or more distant
relatives—if we even know who they are.
Id.; cf. Havasupai Tribe of Havasupai Reservation v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204
P.3d 1063, 1076 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing Native American tribe’s privacy interests when members’ blood samples were used for population research
beyond the scope of written consent); Donna M. Gitter, The Ethics of Big Data in
Genomics: The Instructive Icelandic Saga of the Incidentalome, 18 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 351, 354 (2019) (providing a fascinating account of the
ethical and legal issues arising from a DNA database, built by a private firm under
a twelve-year government license, that included virtually all Icelandic citizens).
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C.
Assisted Reproductive Technology: Balancing a Child’s
Right to Know, a Donor’s Right to Anonymity, and the Parents’
Right to Keep Family Secrets
When author Dani Shapiro was in her mid-fifties, her husband
decided to order a DNA profile from a popular genealogical testing
service to learn more about his family’s medical history.331 He
prompted her to do the same, and she agreed. Little did she know
that the results would reveal a family secret that her deceased parents had taken to their graves several years before. Shapiro’s only
sibling was an older half-sister Susie, born to their father and his
first wife years before he married Shapiro’s mother. While she never
felt close to her mother, Shapiro had always been particularly fond
of her late father, who had descended from a long line of European
Ashkenazi Jews. Shapiro took pride in the religious and ethnic heritage she shared with her father, and she treasured the family mementos and stories about her paternal ancestors.
Several weeks after sending in her saliva sample, Shapiro’s
DNA profile arrived. The results showing her statistically-probable
ethnicity raised some nagging questions. She contacted her half-sister Susie to inquire whether she had ever had a genetic test and
learned that she had. Susie located her own DNA profile and
emailed it to Shapiro. To her shock, a side-by-side comparison of
the two DNA profiles unequivocally reflected that the two women
were not half-sisters after all. The only plausible conclusion that
would reconcile the results was that Shapiro was not the biological
child of her father.
Shapiro then remembered a fleeting conversation with her
mother decades before when Shapiro was twenty-five years old. Her
father had recently died in a car accident, and her mother was still
recovering from the serious injuries she had suffered in the same
accident. In response to Shapiro’s question about something her
mother had let slip in a casual conversation with an acquaintance,
her mother mentioned that Shapiro had been conceived by means of
artificial insemination at a “world-famous institute” after her parents
had difficulty conceiving a child. Her mother, then in her late 30s,
331

See generally DANI SHAPIRO, INHERITANCE: A MEMOIR OF GENEALOGY,
PATERNITY, AND LOVE (2019). The author’s story, briefly summarized in this section, is well documented in the book.
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had suffered a series of miscarriages, and her father was told he had
“slow sperm.” Shapiro’s mother described how the doctor had carefully monitored her ovulation cycles to identify the optimum moment for conception, and then summoned her father away from work
to provide a sperm sample for his wife’s insemination procedure.
Eventually her mother became pregnant and gave birth to Shapiro
in the late 1950s.
Over the nearly three decades since that conversation with her
mother, Shapiro had adjusted to the idea that she had been conceived
with the assistance of a then-experimental clinical procedure. The
family’s traditional religious beliefs would never have entertained
the possibility that Shapiro’s conception was not the product of her
father’s own sperm sample. But now, she was stunned to learn from
her DNA profile that she was not the half-sister of her father’s only
other child.
Shapiro would soon learn from comparing her own DNA results
against the online database that she had a biological first cousin with
an unfamiliar name. After a flurry of activity over the next twentyfour hours, Shapiro and her husband were able to trace her DNA
results against partial matches from family trees that others had uploaded to the genealogy website. She also found an obituary online.
With the help of a genealogist friend, Shapiro was able to narrow
down the possible candidates who might be her biological father to
the two uncles of her biological first cousin. One turned out to be a
retired surgeon who had graduated from medical school in the 1950s
in the same city where the “world-famous” fertility institute had
been located.
After Shapiro and her husband tracked the surgeon down online,
they found an internet video of a presentation he had given at an
Oregon college. To their shock, the retired surgeon’s facial features,
coloring, and mannerisms were nearly mirror-images of Shapiro’s
own.
The rest of Shapiro’s story details the personal identity upheaval
and mixed emotions she experienced over many months as a result
of learning that her long-deceased beloved father was not her biological father after all. Her experience raises questions about
whether a child conceived by artificial insemination has a right to
know her origins, and whether she has a right to know the identity
of her biological parents and their medical history. It also raises
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serious issues about her biological father’s right to remain anonymous, consistent with the assurances sperm donors typically receive
by sperm banks in exchange for a waiver of parental rights and a
disclaimer of parental responsibilities for the prospective child.
Shapiro eventually worked up the courage to contact her biological father by email, expressing her desire to meet him. Long married with a family of his own, the retired surgeon at first politely
declined. But many months later, after she reached out again, he reconsidered. Ultimately, Shapiro’s biological father and his wife
agreed to meet Shapiro and her husband over lunch at a neutral location, and they have enjoyed a cordial relationship since then.
Dani Shapiro’s 2019 book, Inheritance: A Memoir of Genealogy, Paternity, and Love,332 chronicles her devastating emotional reaction when she learned from her DNA results what she probably
never expected to learn nor ever wanted to know: that she was not
the biological daughter of her long-deceased father, but rather the
offspring of her parents’ decision to conceive by artificial insemination. For a long time after she learned the truth, she felt betrayed by
both her parents and the family secret they had kept from her about
her true identity. But eventually, she came to realize that they had
both wanted a child of their own so much that after her birth, they
had simply refused to consciously acknowledge that she was not her
father’s biological child.
*
*
*
The various methods of biological procreation that some scholars have aptly called “collaborative reproduction” raise a number of
provocative issues about the potentially conflicting rights of the participants.333 Most scholarship to date has focused on the prospective

332

Id.; see also Grow Through It, Dani Shapiro on Growing Through a Family
Secret, YOUTUBE (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=g61SQM3ppwo (describing the “crisis of personhood” Shapiro experienced after learning the truth—that secrets are “corrosive and toxic” and that “we
can be formed by what we don’t know as well as what we do know”); Politics and
Prose, Dani Shapiro, "Inheritance”, YOUTUBE (July 13, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNUsQvhj-xg (book promotional interview).
333
See, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be A “Parent”? The
Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 357
(1991).
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parents’ rights to procreational autonomy,334 and the possible tension between those rights and the interests of third-party contributors of biological material.335 Third-party contributors facilitate couples’ nontraditional procreational choices by contributing gametes
or embryos,336 or, in the case of surrogacy parenting, by providing a
We now live in an era where a child may have as many as five
different “parents.” These include a sperm donor, an egg donor,
a surrogate or gestational host, and two nonbiologically related
individuals who intend to raise the child. Indeed, the process of
procreation itself has become so fragmented by the variety and
combinations of collaborative-reproductive methods that there
are a total of sixteen different reproductive combinations, in addition to traditional conception and childbirth.
Id. at 355 & tbl.10 (representing the various combinations of collaborative reproduction).
334
See, e.g., Allison Morse, Good Science, Bad Law: A “Multiple Balancing”
Approach to Adjudication, 46 S.D. L. Rev. 410, 425–26, 425 n.83 (2001) (noting
that, among many others, relational interests are aspects of the right of privacy
and citing cases in support); Rao, Reconceiving Privacy, supra note 68, at 1102–
03 (“Privacy should be viewed as a relational right that ‘afford[s] the formation
and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial
measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State.’”) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984)); John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 915 (1996) (positing that the fundamental constitutional right to procreational privacy should apply
equally to ART); see also supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text (distinguishing the right to make autonomous decisions about exercising fundamental
rights such as marriage and procreation and the more nebulous legal foundations
for the right to informational privacy); cf. Sirpa Soini et al., The Interface Between
Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Genetics: Technical, Social, Ethical and
Legal Issues, 14 EUROPEAN J. HUM. GENETICS 588, 591, 601 (2006) (observing
that genetic tests potentially have “far-reaching repercussions for the patients, and
sometimes for immediate and extended family,” and that “[g]enerally agreed principles on the extent and quality of the family history asked from a prospective
donor do not exist”).
335
See, e.g., Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate,
60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1148–67 (2008); I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a
Genetic Parent, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1145–61 (2008); Browne Lewis, Two
Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations Between the Men Involved
in the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 949, 972–79
(2009).
336
Recent calls have been made for the Commission on Uniform State Laws
to study the need for a uniform law or model legislation that would regulate the
disposition of human embryos and gametes. See, e.g., Richard Vaughn, Uniform
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natural environment for bringing an implanted embryo to a healthy
birth.337
But scholarship is relatively sparse with respect to the informational privacy rights of either the offspring338 of assisted
Laws Needed to Regulate Abandoned Embryos, INT’L FERTILITY L. GROUP (Aug.
26, 2019, 4:10 PM), https://www.iflg.net/laws-needed-abandoned-embryos/;
Memorandum from JEB UFL Chair Barbara Atwood & Reporter Linda Elrod to
Unif. L. Comm’n Comm. on Scope & Program (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=324180e7-0408-9fdf-28a6-bdec13bb7fbb (citing In re Marriage of
Rooks, 429 P.3d 579 (Colo. 2018); Gary A. Debele & Susan L. Crockin, Legal
Issues Surrounding Embryos and Gametes: What Family Law Practitioners Need
to Know, 31 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 55 (2018)).
Some courts have treated preserved embryos differently than other kinds of
human tissue.
Courts have always struggled with characterizing embryos in
disputes over their possession or use; the context of the dispute
matters and often leads directly to the outcome. A number of
courts have considered them a special kind of property or in
some cases, sui generis, stating they are deserving of special
treatment; in the divorce context most courts have considered
them a unique form of joint or marital property that could not
simply be valued and divided down the middle, with equal
shares going to each party.
Id. at 68 (citing and discussing cases).
337
See generally Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Collaborative Family-Making: From
Acquisition to Interconnection, 64 VILL. L. REV. 223, 224 (2019).
338
For examples of scholarship about the offspring of ART, see generally
Helen M. Alvaré, The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children’s Rights Perspective, 40 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1 (2003); Pamela LauferUkeles, The Lost Children: When the Right to Children Conflicts with the Rights
of Children, 8 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 219 (2014); J. Brad Reich & Dawn
Swink, You Can’t Put the Genie Back in the Bottle: Potential Rights and Obligations of Egg Donors in the Cyberprocreation Era, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1
(2010); Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the Law Protect Them from Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57; Catherine A. Clements, What About the Children? A Call for Regulation of Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 84 IND. L.J. 331 (2009); cf. Kathryn Webb Bradley, Surrogacy and Sovereignty: Safeguarding the Interest of Both the Child and
the State, 43 N.C. J. INT’L L. 1 (2018). Scholars in other fields, however, have
recognized the unique effects on children who are conceived by ART and on their
interrelationships with parents and gamete donors. See generally, e.g., Susan
Golombok et al., Children Conceived by Gamete Donation: Psychological Adjustment and Mother-Child Relationships at Age 7, 25 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 230
(2011).
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reproductive technology (“ART”),339 or third-party contributors
such as gamete donors or surrogate mothers.340 As one author has
observed,
[t]here are multiple levels of secrecy and disclosure
in the donor world. First, many donor-conceived offspring simply do not know that they are donor-conceived. A second level concerns the layers of secrecy
between offspring, donors, and parents who have
used donor gametes. The secrecy that pervades this
world is the product of cultural norms and contracts,
not constitutional principles or legislative decision
making. While donors and parents may have signed
agreements pertaining to anonymity, very few court
opinions have interpreted the validity, and applicability, of these documents.341
United States caselaw is even more sparse than legal scholarship
pertaining to the respective informational privacy interests of the
various participants in collaborative reproduction. The California
Supreme Court tangentially addressed the issue in 2000 in the context of a discovery dispute.342 Acknowledging that the case

The two principal types of ART are in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) and donorassisted artificial insemination (“AID”). See JUDITH DARR, THE NEW EUGENICS:
SELECTIVE BREEDING IN AN ERA OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 9–13 (2017).
Together, IVF and AID account for three percent of the births in the United States.
Id. at 9. AID alone accounts for some 60,000 births annually. Id. at 8.
340
See Alvaré, supra note 338, at 1, 42–44 (noting that while interests of children warrant consideration in analyzing parents’ rights to elect these alternatives,
“the effects on children born through collaborative reproduction are, at best, unknown because so few studies have addressed the topic”); Terra Ziporyn, ‘Artificial’ Human Reproduction Poses Medical, Social Concerns, 255 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 13, 14 (1986) (describing issues pertaining to donor privacy).
341
Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 391 (2012) [hereinafter
Cahn, The New Kinship]; see Sonia M. Suter, Giving in to Baby Markets: Regulation Without Prohibition, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 217, 261 (2009) (“From the
inception of artificial insemination, anonymity and secrecy have been the
norm.”).
342
See Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Ct. App. 2000), disapproved on other grounds by Williams v. Superior Court, 398 P.3d 69 (Cal.
2017).
339
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presented an issue of first impression, the court defined the issue in
terms of the parties’ respective privacy rights:
whether parents and their child, conceived by the
sperm of an anonymous sperm donor, may compel
the donor's deposition and production of documents
in order to discover information relevant to their action against the sperm bank for selling sperm that [allegedly] transmitted [a specific genetic disorder] to
the child.343
The court concluded that the “alleged sperm donor” was required to “submit to a deposition and answer questions, as well as
produce documents . . . but that his identity should remain undisclosed to the fullest extent possible.”344 The court reasoned that the
fertility clinic’s contract with the donor assuring his anonymity conflicted with public policy by going “too far in precluding disclosure
of the donor's identity and related information under all circumstances.”345 While the court also recognized the sperm donor’s constitutional “right of privacy in his medical history and his identity,”
any such right did not preclude the court from compelling his deposition and production of the records requested by the plaintiffs.346
At least for now, protecting donor anonymity appears to remain
the default practice in the United States.347 But recent scholarship
demonstrates that the international trend clearly favors laws that not
only permit children to access relevant information about their biological parentage, but also prohibit gamete donors from remaining
anonymous.348
343

Id. at 867.
Id.
345
Id. at 873 (emphasis in original).
346
Id. at 875 (referring to the right of privacy granted by the California Constitution, which is “broader than the implied federal right to privacy”).
347
See Ashley Fetters, Finding the Lost Generation of Sperm Donors,
ATLANTIC (May 18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/
2018/05/sperm-donation-anonymous/560588/.
348
See Gaia Bernstein, Unintended Consequences: Prohibitions on Gamete
Donor Anonymity and the Fragile Practice of Surrogacy, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV.
291, 292–93, 300 (2013) (explaining that “U.S. law does not prohibit anonymous
gamete donation”).
344
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A few U.S. scholars have acknowledged that alternative reproductive technologies implicate the right of relational or family privacy,349 the boundaries of which are said to be “delineated by the
countervailing interests of others within the protected relationship.”350 While adopted children face similar personal identity and
Prohibiting gamete donor anonymity is a growing global trend.
In jurisdictions prohibiting anonymity, egg and sperm donors
are not anonymous. Instead, typically, when the child reaches
the age of eighteen he can find out the identity of the egg or
sperm donor – his genetic parent. The main goal driving the
movement toward an open identity system are beliefs that children need to develop their own identity, and that possession of
information regarding their genetic origins is crucial for that
purpose.
Id. at 299. See generally Maya Sabatello, Disclosure of Gamete Donation in the
United States, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 29, 29 (2014) (considering whether the
United States should follow the international trend favoring reversal of the policy
of anonymity for gamete donors). Countries that bar anonymous gamete donations
include Austria, Australia (only the states of Victoria, Western Australia, and New
South Wales), Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Bernstein, supra, at 300. In Canada, the issue
has raised controversy about whether gamete donors’ option to remain anonymous discriminates against children conceived by artificial insemination by barring them from knowing their family history and allowing the destruction of records that would help identify biological parents. See Vanessa Gruben & Angela
Cameron, Donor Anonymity in Canada: Assessing the Obstacles to Openness and
Considering a Way Forward, 54 ALBERTA L. REV. 665, 665 (2017) (“Donor anonymity has been hotly debated in Canada.”). See generally Matt Malone, Gamete
Donor Anonymity in Canada: An Overview of Potential Policy Solutions, 38
WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 71, 78 (2017).
349
See, e.g., Alvaré, supra note 338, at 1, 42–44 (discussing the Supreme
Court’s recognition that constitutional rights of some family members necessarily
implicate other family members’ interests (citing, among others, Smith v. Org. of
Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846 (1977); Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 n.4 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973);
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992)).
350
Rao, Reconceiving Privacy, supra note 68, at 1106; see Rao, Property, Privacy, supra note 68, at 399 (“Privacy not only guarantees individuals a certain
degree of autonomy over their bodies, but it also safeguards the freedom to create
and maintain intimate and consensual relationships apart from the state.”); Lainie
M. C. Dillon, Conundrums with Penumbras: The Right to Privacy Encompasses
Non-Gamete Providers Who Create Preembryos with the Intent to Become Parents, 78 WASH. L. REV. 625, 628 (2003) (arguing that “the constitutional right
to privacy broadly protects intimate decisions related to procreation, marriage and
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family history issues, children conceived by ART are born into
uniquely complex family relationships. They are typically the genetic offspring of one legal parent but not the other, and the child
also shares a genetic identity with a third-party donor whom the
child may never know.351
family life,” and therefore “a non-gamete provider's intimate decision to create
preembryos falls squarely within the zone of privacy protected by the federal
Constitution”); Lucy R. Dollens, Artificial Insemination: Right of Privacy and
the Difficulty in Maintaining Donor Anonymity, 35 IND. L. REV. 213, 223, 227
(2001) (asserting that because ART conception “occurs within the confines of a
close and personal association, it is afforded constitutional protection by the [associational] right of privacy,” and addressing the right of a sperm donor to remain
anonymous) (citing Johnson, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875); cf. Pamela LauferUkeles, The Relational Rights of Children, 48 CONN. L. REV. 741, 769 (2016)
(advocating that “any conception of individualized rights of children that does not
also consider the interests of parents and society in providing care for children
does not appropriately reflect the nature of childhood, parent-child relationships,
and children as rights-holders”; and that “only through a relationship-focused perspective can children’s rights be accurately calibrated, and parent and state interests be appropriately limited”); Susan L. Crockin & Gary A. Debele, Ethical Issues in Assisted Reproduction: A Primer for Family Law Attorneys, 27 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 289, 297 (2015) (noting that, unlike other means of conception, “IVF separates the woman from the conceptus and thus introduces a
novel element into any discussion of [constitutional] procreative rights”); John A.
Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction,
30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 20 (2004) (noting that reproductive rights are not absolute
but rather subject to restriction for cause, and that “[r]estricting ARTs might be
marginally more acceptable [than regulating] coital reproduction,” while acknowledging many disputes about acceptable reasons for banning or restricting
ART).
Some legal scholars have addressed the issue from a comparative perspective.
See, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Timing, Uncertainty, and Donor Anonymity, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1189, 1207 (2010) (analyzing data
from Sweden, United Kingdom, and Victoria (Australia) as jurisdictions that prohibit anonymity for sperm and egg donors). See generally Andreas S. Voss, The
Right to Privacy & Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A Comparative Study of
the Law of Germany and the U.S., 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 229, 232
(2002) (comparing United States and Germany law on “the development of the
right to privacy and its potential to solve new problems caused by modem assisted
reproductive technologies”).
351
See Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Threat to the
Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 959 (1996); see also Vasanti Jadva,
Why Search for a Sperm Donor Online? The Experiences of Women Searching
for and Contacting Sperm Donors on the Internet, 21 HUM. FERTILITY 112, 118
(2018).
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The dearth of legal scholarship addressing the informational
rights of ART children is surprising given its clinical use in the
United States for several decades,352 as well as its increasingly frequent use by prospective parents.353 Artificial insemination was first
used in the 1950s to assist human procreation, although at first the
practice was condemned by religious leaders and some judges.354
ART came into general use for human reproduction in the United
States in the 1970s, when a “thriving sperm-bank industry” led to
the “commercialization” of artificial insemination.355 The first “testtube baby” conceived by IVF was born in 1978.356 At first, artificial
insemination was used primarily to allow infertile couples to bear
children, or to prevent conception of children who would be carriers

352

See generally JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
LAW 26–38 (2d ed. 2013) (summarizing the historical development of ART);
Kara W. Swanson, Adultery by Doctor: Artificial Insemination, 1890–1945, 87
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 591, 595–62 (2012).
353
E.g., Jenna Casolo et al., Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 20 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 313, 354 (2019) (referring to “[t]he increasing popularity and success rates of ART”).
354
DARR, supra note 339, at 28 (noting that in 1953 researchers reported pregnancies using frozen sperm samples) (citing R. Bunge & J. Sherman, Fertilizing
Capacity of Frozen Human Spermatazoa, 172 NATURE 767 (1953)); CARL
ZIMMER, SHE HAS HER MOTHER’S LAUGH: THE POWERS, PERVERSIONS, AND
POTENTIAL OF HEREDITY 502 (2018) (explaining that the Pope declared artificial
insemination adulterous, and an Illinois judge opined that a child conceived by a
mother using donor sperm had been born out of wedlock); Hollace S.W. Swanson, Donor Anonymity in Artificial Insemination: Is It Still Necessary?, 27
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 151, 157 (1993) (explaining that courts considered
donor-conceived children “illegitimate” as not born “in wedlock”) (citing Doornbos v. Doornbos, 139 N.E.2d 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956)).
355
W. Ombelet & J. Van Robays, Artificial Insemination History: Hurdles
and Milestones, 7 FACTS, VIEWS & VISION OBGYN 137, 142 (2015); see DARR,
supra note 339, at 5.
Beginning with the birth of Louise Brown in 1978, the first
child conceived through in vitro fertilization (IVF), assisted reproduction has grown and evolved, becoming an indispensable
player in contemporary family life. In three-plus decades, ART
has blossomed from a nascent technology into a multi-billiondollar industry responsible for the births of over five million
children worldwide.
Id.
356
DARR, supra note 339, at 5.
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of genetic diseases linked to the male sex chromosome.357 More recently, however, it has become more common for single women or
lesbian couples to conceive children by artificial insemination using
donor sperm, known in the medical community as AID.358 The field
of assisted reproduction technology in the United States, in contrast
to other nations, remains largely unregulated.359
A comprehensive discussion of the many fascinating privacy issues surrounding ART is beyond the scope of this Article. But Dani
Shapiro’s personal experience, detailed in Inheritance, illustrates
how readily accessible DNA profiles stored in commercial databases can reveal long-held family secrets. If and when revealed,
those secrets have the capacity to dramatically up-end an individual’s sense of personal identity,360 to potentially raise conflicting
emotions about predeceased loved ones that can never be resolved,361 and to dramatically alter a person’s intimate personal and
familial relationships.362 On the other hand, her parents’ careful efforts to keep the family secret that a third party might have been her
biological father effectively prevented both Shapiro and the sperm
donor from learning intimate information about each other’s identity, family history, and medical history, and from building a meaningful relationship of their own.
The story illustrates the inherent complexities of commercialized DNA profiles at a time when family configurations have long
since exceeded the boundaries of the traditional nuclear family. And
it poses questions about whether closely held family secrets are

357

Ombelet & Van Robays, supra note 355, at 137.
Id.
359
See Naomi Cahn, The New “ART” of Family: Connecting Assisted Reproductive Technologies & Identity Rights, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1443, 1447 [hereinafter Cahn, The New “ART”] (“There are few laws in the United States directly
concerned with donor conception, apart from health and safety regulations relating to gamete testing and parentage determinations for a donor-conceived child
or a child born through surrogacy.”); Cahn, The New Kinship, supra note 341, at
386 (“Gamete donation remains a largely private transaction that is handled
through contract and intention with virtually no substantive regulation.”); Sabatello, supra note 348, at 31 (“[A]ssisted reproductive technologies . . . are hardly
regulated in the United States.”).
360
See SHAPIRO, supra note 331, at 60–61.
361
See id. at 99–102.
362
See id. at 105–09.
358
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permanently at risk of inadvertent disclosure, and if so, the potential
ramifications for individuals and families.
In the past few years, a growing number of scholars have questioned the practice of keeping children who have been conceived by
collaborative reproduction techniques from learning truthful and
complete information about their families and medical histories.363
Those who promote full disclosure assert that children have a “right
to know” the circumstances of their conception, as well as healthrelated information about the gamete donors who enabled their conception.364 On the other hand, the United States’ tradition of secrecy
favors the rights of sperm donors to remain anonymous—also
known as the right to be forgotten—with respect to search results in
internet databases.365
363

See, e.g., Sabatello, supra note 348, at 31; Naomi Cahn, Do Tell! The
Rights of Donor-Conceived Offspring, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1077, 1079 (2014)
(“While the basic constitutional parameters support family privacy, respect for
familial autonomy does not pre-empt the possibilities for reforms affecting donorconceived people's interests.”); Pino D’Orazio, Half of the Family Tree: A Call
for Access to a Full Genetic History for Children Born by Artificial Insemination,
11 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 249, 276 (2006) (advocating that children conceived by AID should have the legal right to access non-identifying donor information pertaining to genetic and medical history); Michele Goodwin, A View from
the Cradle: Tort Law and the Private Regulation of Assisted Reproduction, 59
EMORY L.J. 1039, 1099 (2010); Guido Pennings, The Right to Privacy and Access
to Information About One's Genetic Origins, 20 MED. & L. 1, 13–14 (2001); Sara
Cotton et al., Model Assisted Reproductive Technology Act, 9 J. GENDER, RACE
& JUST. 55, 79–80 (2005) (proposing that “[p]arents of a child and the child born
as a result of assisted reproductive technology shall have unlimited access to nonidentifying information held by the registry about the gamete or embryo donor”).
364
See, e.g., Sabatello, supra note 348, at 31; see also Barbara Prainsack, DIY
Genetics: The Right to Know Your Own Genome, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND
THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW: GENETIC PRIVACY AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
281, at 100, 104–13 (considering the right to know one’s genomic information
balanced against the right not to know and the right to be forgotten); Samuel W.
Royston, The Right to Be Forgotten: Comparing U.S. and European Approaches,
48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 253, 254 (2016) (referring to the “‘right to be forgotten’ paradox”).
365
See Graeme Laurie, Privacy and the Right Not to Know: A Plea for Conceptual Clarity, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW: GENETIC
PRIVACY AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 281, at 38, 38–39 (discussing comparable rights under international law, for example, with respect to an individual’s
right not to know one’s genetic status); R. Andorno, The Right Not to Know: An
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The slow but steady trend in the United States appears to be following the lead of many other nations that have recognized the rights
of donor-conceived children to information about their genetic heritage, at least once they reach adulthood.366 For example, the 2017
Uniform Parentage Act requires clinics to record donor information
as well to give donors the option of remaining anonymous or allowing disclosure.367 Even if a donor elects anonymity, the clinic must
make a good faith attempt to provide the child with nonidentifying
information about the donor, and to notify the donor if the child requests information in order to allow the donor to reconsider the nondisclosure election.368
The latest iteration of the Uniform Parentage Act provision was
apparently modelled after a 2011 Washington state statute, the first
of its kind in the United States, that expressly permitted a child conceived by artificial insemination to access the donor’s medical information when the child reached age eighteen, even if the donor
had opted to remain anonymous.369 The Washington Legislature
Autonomy Based Approach, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 435, 435 (2004) (arguing that
“‘autonomy’, understood in a wide sense, provides a theoretical basis for a right
not to know one’s genetic status”); Gitter, supra note 330, at 368 (“In the field of
biomedical research, the principle of autonomy, or self-determination, suggests
that each individual has the right not to know selected information about herself.”); Bartha Maria Knoppers, Introduction: From the Right to Know to the
Right Not to Know, 42 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 6, 6 (2014) (“Respect for the autonomy of research participants recognizes that all individuals have the right to make
their own decisions.”).
The European Union Court of Justice introduced the “right to be forgotten” in
interpreting the since-superseded E.U. Data Protection Regulation. Royston, supra note 364, at 256. The right to be forgotten allows an E.U. citizen to petition
an internet search engine to remove links to personal information that would harm
one’s reputation. Id. In the European Union, “personal privacy trumps freedom of
information.” Leslie E. Minora, Comment, U.S. Courts Should Not Let Europe’s
“Right to Be Forgotten” Force the World to Forget, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 609, 609
(2017). But in the United States, freedom of expression and the free exchange of
information generally weigh more heavily in the balance than privacy interests.
Id. As has been observed, “[E.U.] law highlights the stark value clash between
freedom of expression in the United States and personal privacy in the EU.” Id.
366
See, e.g., Cahn, The New “ART”, supra note 359, at 1447–49 (highlighting
examples of state legislation regarding donor-identifying information).
367
Id. at 1448 (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 903).
368
Id. (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 903).
369
See id. at 1447–48 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.750(2)(b) (2017)).
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repealed the statute effective January 1, 2018, at the same time it
enacted the Uniform Parentage Act.370 California371 and Vermont372
also enacted the Uniform Parentage Act in 2018, and other states
have since introduced it in bill form.373
It remains to be seen whether state laws in the United States will
follow the lead of other nations by providing ART offspring the
right to obtain health-related information concerning gamete donors.
D.
California Consumer Privacy Protection Act
On January 1, 2020, a sweeping statute took effect in California
that addresses the right to informational privacy.374 Specifically, the
California Consumer Privacy Act375 creates new rights for consumers to control access to and dissemination of the personal information businesses collect and maintain about them.376 The Act,
which reportedly “gives nearly 40 million people in [California] the
strongest data privacy rights in the country,” was introduced on the
initiative of Alastair MacTaggart, Founder and Chair of Californians
for Consumer Privacy.377 MacTaggart did so after several internet

370

See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.903 (2018); see also Raegen Rasnic,
State’s Parentage Act Gets Major Makeover, KING COUNTY B. ASS’N (Feb. 1,
2019), https://www.kcba.org/For-Lawyers/Bar-Bulletin/PostId/690/states-parentage-act-gets-major-makeover.
371
Cal. A.B. § 2684, ch. 876 (2018).
372
Vt. H.B. § 562, Act 162 (2018).
373
2017 Parentage Act Enactment Map, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d204be0-8256-22dd73af068f (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
374
See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–199 (West, Westlaw current with urgency legislation through Ch. 3 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
375
Id.
376
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA): Background on the CCPA &
the Rulemaking Process, CAL. DEP’T JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa (last
visited Mar. 23, 2020) (soliciting public comments to rule modifications by March
27, 2020).
377
Letter from Alastair Mactaggart, Bd. Chair & Founder of Californians for
Consumer Privacy (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.caprivacy.org/post/a-letterfrom-alastair-mactaggart-board-chair-and-founder-of-californians-for-consumerprivacy (reporting that a new and stronger initiative was filed on November 19,
2019, that is slated to appear on the California general election ballot in November
2020). As Mactaggart explained,
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service providers had blocked proposed state legislation that would
have reigned in the commercial exploitation of users’ personal information.378

What this new law comes down to is giving consumers the right
to take back control over their information from thousands of
giant corporations. This is about power: the more a company
knows about you, the more power it has to shape your daily life.
That power is exercised on the spectrum ranging from the benign, such as showing you a shoe ad, to the consequential, like
selecting your job, your housing, or helping to shape what candidate you support in an election.
Id.; see Letter from Alastair Mactaggart, Bd. Chair & Founder of Californians for
Consumer Privacy, to Cal. Att’y Gen. Transmitting the Proposed Cal. Privacy
Rights Act of 2020 (Nov. 4, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/19-0021A1%20%28Consumer%20Privacy%20-%20Version%203%29_1.pdf.
378
The California Consumer Privacy Act defines “personal information”
broadly:
“Personal information” means information that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated
with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with
a particular consumer or household. Personal information includes, but is not limited to, the following if it identifies, relates
to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could be
reasonably linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household:
(A) Identifiers such as a real name, alias, postal address, unique
personal identifier, online identifier, Internet Protocol address,
email address, account name, social security number, driver's
license number, passport number, or other similar identifiers.
(B) Any categories of personal information described in subdivision (e) of Section 1798.80.
(C) Characteristics of protected classifications under California
or federal law.
(D) Commercial information, including records of personal
property, products or services purchased, obtained, or considered, or other purchasing or consuming histories or tendencies.
(E) Biometric information.
(F) Internet or other electronic network activity information, including, but not limited to, browsing history, search history, and
information regarding a consumer’s interaction with an internet
web site, application, or advertisement.
(G) Geolocation data.
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The Act authorizes the California Attorney General to adopt regulations after seeking public comment.379 As this Article went to
press, the proposed regulations have been published for notice and
comment.380 Among other things, the regulations would bar a business from using personal information for any purpose other than
those the business disclosed to the consumer at the time of collecting
the data.381 In addition, a consumer would have the right to “opt out”
from the sale of the consumer’s personal information,382 to know
what kind of personal information a business collects and maintains,383 and to request deletion of the consumer’s personal information.384
(H) Audio, electronic, visual, thermal, olfactory, or similar information.
(I) Professional or employment-related information.
(J) Education information, defined as information that is not
publicly available personally identifiable information as defined in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (20
U.S.C. Sec. 1232g; 34 C.F.R. Part 99).
(K) Inferences drawn from any of the information identified in
this subdivision to create a profile about a consumer reflecting
the consumer's preferences, characteristics, psychological
trends, predispositions, behavior, attitudes, intelligence, abilities, and aptitudes.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (emphasis added). Certainly, this definition appears to be sufficiently broad to encompass genetic information, at least to the
extent it implicates relational privacy interests of individuals who reside within
the same “household” as the individual whose “personal” information has been
collected and maintained by a business. See id.
379
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.185(a) (“On or before July 1, 2020, the Attorney
General shall solicit broad public participation and adopt regulations to further the
purposes of this title, including, but not limited to, the following areas . . . .”); see
also California Attorney General Publishes Privacy Regulations, Seeks Public
Comment, EPIC.ORG (Feb. 11, 2020), https://epic.org/2020/02/california-attorneygeneral-pu.html.
380
See California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA): Background on the CCPA
& the Rulemaking Process, supra note 376 (soliciting public comments to rule
modifications by Mar. 27, 2020).
381
Chapter 20. California Consumer Privacy Act Regulations: Text of Initial
Proposed Regulations, CAL. DEP’T JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/ccpa-proposed-regs.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (to be codified at CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.305(a)(3)).
382
Id. (to be codified at CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.306).
383
Id. (to be codified at CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.308(b)(1)).
384
Id. (to be codified at CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.308(b)(2)).
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It remains to be seen whether other states will follow California’s lead by enacting state statutes that regulate the collection,
maintenance, and retention of personal and relational information.
Even more speculative is how future courts may interpret and apply
state privacy statutes to address the increasingly complex relational
privacy issues generated by digitized “personal” information.
E.

European Union General Data Privacy Regulation
The General Data Privacy Regulation (“GDPR”),385 which
took effect on May 25, 2018,386 has global implications for informational privacy, even for businesses headquartered outside the European Union. It implements the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, which expressly provides that E.U. citizens have the
right to “the protection of personal data concerning him or her.”387
While the GDPR does not apply directly to U.S. citizens, its broad
privacy protections govern any internet service provider that reaches
E.U. citizens. Because so many technology-oriented businesses with
a global reach operate outside the European Union, the GDPR indirectly benefits citizens of the United States and other countries.388
385

GDPR, supra note 13.
See Gergana Sivrieva, The Equifax Breach Amid a Lawless Landscape:
Changes Are Afoot for Privacy & Data Security Due to the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 553, 562–63 (2018)
(summarizing the GDPR). “In every category, the GDPR exhibits provisions that
are substantially more favorable to EU consumers than the protections offered to
consumers by U.S. statutes.” Id.
387
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000,
2000 O.J. (C 364) 10.
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes
and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some
other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right
of access to data which has been collected concerning him or
her, and the right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an
independent authority.
Id. art. 8.
388
“The GDPR gives EU data subjects legal control and individual redress
rights related to access and use of their data anywhere in the world.” 3 ROBERT L.
HAIG, COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS § 27:37 (4th ed.
2019).
386
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But even the far-reaching GDPR raises serious issues about relational privacy interests because of its restrictive definition of “personal data.” That definition is couched in terms that relate to a “data
subject,” which is defined in turn to mean an “identifiable natural
person.”389
‘[P]ersonal data’ means any information relating to
an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or
to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person . . . .390
European scholars have already called for reform by redefining
the meaning of “data subject” to recognize the broad implications of
digital data-sharing—not only for individuals, but also for family
members, biological relatives, and even members of the same racial,
ethnic, or population group as the “data subject.”391
CONCLUSION
The “relational” right of privacy needs a much sounder footing
in U.S. constitutional, statutory, and common law. As articulated
and defined by U.S. scholars and jurists since the early twentieth
century, relational privacy interests have been unduly limited to a
shared desire to protect grieving family members from suffering further emotional distress as a result of disclosing information pertaining to the death of their loved ones.392
389
GDPR, supra note 13, art. 4(1) (defining “personal data”). See generally
P.T.J. Wolters, The Enforcement by the Data Subject Under the GDPR, 22 J.
INTERNET L. 21 (2019); P.T.J. Wolters, The Control by and Rights of the Data
Subject Under the GDPR, 22 J. INTERNET L. 6, 12–13 (2018).
390
GDPR, supra note 13, art. 4(1).
391
See generally, e.g., Ugo Pagallo, The Group, the Private, and the Individual: A New Level of Data Protection?, in GROUP PRIVACY: NEW CHALLENGES OF
DATA TECHNOLOGIES 159 (Linnet Taylor et al. eds., 2017).
392
See supra Part II.
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The American Law Institute will have the opportunity to clarify
these issues in developing the next installment of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts. But Congress and state legislatures will need to revisit the disclosure exemptions in FOIA and related state statutes
that allow agencies to withhold public records from disclosure to
protect “unwarranted invasions of personal privacy.”393 The traditional meaning of “personal privacy,” the term Congress employed
in FOIA exemptions to support a balancing test, relates to a right
that belongs to a living individual.394 Surviving family members
who desire protection from mental anguish as a result of disclosing
records pertaining to the death of their loved ones seek to prevent a
“relational wrong”395—but one that implicates interests in preventing infliction of emotional distress, not invasion of personal privacy.
The dramatic ongoing developments in mapping the human genome and collecting and disseminating genetic data demand that legal scholars and policymakers revisit relational privacy concepts
with respect to burgeoning DNA biobanks. The increasing accessibility of genetic data, unlike most medical and health care data,
raises complex privacy issues. Those issues not only require balancing the interests of the individual against the needs of the public, but
also the sometimes conflicting interests of other family members.396
To date, social values have generally favored the collection and dissemination of genetic data to enable medical research for the “public
good.” But little attention has focused on the serious risks to group
and family privacy of unregulated collection, use, and dissemination
of genomic data.397
393

See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
395
Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 423 S.W.3d 548, 549, 553
(Ark. 2012).
396
See, e.g., PATRICIA KUSZLER ET AL., GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 78–79 (2007). “[U]nlike much of a patient’s medical history, the implications of genetic information are simultaneously uniquely
personal and necessarily familial. This ‘dual ownership’ aspect of genetic information poses unique challenges for physicians as they attempt to reconcile competing duties to safeguard patient confidentiality and promote the welfare of others.” Id.
397
See, e.g., Clayton et al., supra note 220, at 5.
Each person’s genome, or full complement of DNA, is unique,
but the specific variants within an individual’s genome may be
394
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These complex legal and policy issues warrant further attention
as legislatures and other policymakers confront competing legal interests of those whose rights are implicated by the widespread collection and sharing of genetic information. This Article seeks to
open the long-overdue scholarly debate in the United States about
how best to resolve these challenging public policy issues and their
implications for family relationships. The genealogical genie has escaped from the bottle, and we have no time to waste.398
Finally, the United States can no longer avoid these far-reaching
global privacy issues, which are growing more complex by the minute with the rapid development of digitized information technology. The U.S. Supreme Court should expressly recognize a constitutionally-based right to relational information privacy—rather than
ducking the issue by attempting to ground those rights in circular
reasoning based on explicit privacy-based FOIA exemptions. And
legal scholars around the world, together with international human
rights tribunals, must work collaboratively on cross-border legislative solutions to what has become a global relational privacy challenge.

widely shared with biological relatives or even across the entire
human population. This mixed character of the genome—as a
uniquely individual assemblage of widely shared common elements—imbues it with a dual private and public significance
that confounds any discussion of policy addressing genetic privacy.
Id. at 2.
398
See Rothman, supra note 299 (“We’re up against a pretty big foe and time
is running out”) (quoting Cullen Hoback, director of the 2013 documentary film
Terms and Conditions May Apply).

